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ADDIE

C.

ROLNICK

Indigenous Subjects
A B S T RA C T. This Article tells the story of how race jurisprudence has become the most intractable threat to Indigenous rights -and to collective rights more broadly. It examines legal challenges to Indigenous self-determination and land rights in the U.S. territories. It is one of a handful of articles to address these cases and the only one to do so through the lenses of Indian law, the
law of the territories, international law, and race law. These recent challenges rest on the 2000 case
of Rice v. Cayetano, in which the Supreme Court struck down a Hawaii law that allowed only Indigenous Hawaiians, defined by reference to ancestry, to vote for trustees who controlled land and
assets held in trust for them. The Court's holding-that ancestry can be, and was in that specific
factual context, a proxy for race -rested on a thin conception of race as a static biological fact and
a narrow construction of indigeneity. In the hands of aggressive litigants, it has been transformed
into a shorthand rule that ancestry and race are equivalent; that ancestry-based classifications are
therefore illegal under the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments; and that legal protection for
Indigenous rights is limited to a narrow class of American Indian tribal citizens. This rule has
emerged as a significant threat to Indigenous rights and driven a deep wedge between the individual rights protected by the Reconstruction Amendments and the group-based harms they were
intended to remedy. It threatens to juridically erase Indigenous peoples in the territories by equating any recognition of their historical claims with an illegal racial classification. This Article unpacks the doctrinal evolution of the Rice rule, examines its theoretical and practical consequences,
and proposes a multitiered strategy to resist it.

A U T H O R. San Manuel Band of Mission Indians Professor of Law, UNLV Boyd School of Law.
I am grateful to Julian Aguon, who is navigating the doctrinal barriers set by these cases and working to mitigate their destructive impact every day. Thanks also to Gregory Ablavsky, Erwin
Chemerinsky, Frank Rudy Cooper, Seth Davis, Elizabeth L. MacDowell, K-Sue Park, Susan K.
Serrano, Kathryn M. Stanchi, David Tanenhaus, Mahina Tuteur, Leslie C. Griffin, Ian Bartrum,
Ruben J. Garcia, and the faculties at UC Irvine, UC Berkeley, the University of Washington, and
Drexel University for their comments and criticism; Devon W. Carbado, Sam Erman, Cheryl I.
Harris, Kim Hai Pearson, and Rose Cuison Villazor, whose ideas have helped me refine the arguments presented here; and Lena Rieke and Alexis R. Wendl for research assistance.
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INTRODUCTION

American law protects the rights of subordinated people through different
legal categories. Legislatures define the categories and courts shape them. But
the categories also operate outside of the courtroom to shape identities and structure political movements. This Article considers the evolution of five such categories: Indigenous, Indian, colonized peoples, race, and ancestry. "Indigenous"
and "Indian" are used interchangeably in popular discourse, but they are treated
very differently by courts. "Race" and "ancestry" are also used interchangeably,
a slippage that reflects popular confusion about the idea of race, a confusion
shaped by and reflected in law. Colonization (the process and the category of
colonized peoples) is rarely part of popular or legal discourse. In each instance,
the legal meaning of the category has become progressively detached from the
way it operates in people's lives. This has led to absurd results that can dramatically threaten the fates of people who exist between or across the categories. This
Article aims to bring clarity by tracing the historical and legal legacies of these
categories and exposing a campaign to use the categorical distinctions to further
subordinate the people affected by them.
This category confusion is especially dangerous for Indigenous peoples, as
evidenced by recent lawsuits that have used the Reconstruction Amendments
and civil-rights laws to attack Indigenous land, self-governance, and self-determination rights. These lawsuits argue that laws protecting such rights are actually illegal racial classifications. For example, in 2017, the U.S. Department of
Justice sued Guam, alleging that a longstanding lease program implemented to
protect the land rights of colonized Indigenous peoples violated federal civilrights laws.1 The same year, a Texas couple sued to invalidate the Indian Child
Welfare Act (ICWA), leading a federal district court to strike down the law as a
violation of the Equal Protection Clause in Brackeen v. Zinke. 2 These suits are the
most recent in a series of cases that "highlight[] a conflict between an individual's right to be free from race discrimination and the [I] ndigenous group's claim
for the protection of their lands and cultural rights."3 Both plaintiffs argued that

1.

Complaint at 2, United States v. Guam, No. 17-00113, 2018 WL 6729629 (D. Guam Dec. 21,
2018).

2.

338 F. Supp. 3d 514, 519, 536 (N.D. Tex. 2018), aff'd in part, rev'd in part sub nom. Brackeen v.
Bernhardt, 937 F.3 d 406 (5th Cir. 2019), aff'd in relevant part sub nom. en banc Brackeen v.
Haaland, 994 F. 3d 249 (5th Cir. 2021), cert. granted, 142 S. Ct. 1205 (2022)

3.

Rose Cuison Villazor, Problematizingthe Protection of Culture and the Insular Cases, 131 HARv.
L. REV. E 127, 128 (2018). Professor Villazor characterizes these cases as "cultural." See id. at
128-33. This understates the political nature of the claims of Indigenous and colonized peoples. But see infra notes 425 and 468 (discussing other work by Villazor in which she identifies
the political nature of indigenous rights).
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the laws in question were illegal because they singled out Indigenous people
based on race. The law challenged in Guam applies to "native Chamorros," defined as "those persons who became U.S. citizens by virtue of the authority and
enactment of the 195o Organic Act of Guam and descendants of those persons."4
In Brackeen, the plaintiffs challenged two classifications: "Indian famil[y]" and
"Indian child[ren]," the latter defined as unmarried people under eighteen who
are either "a member of an Indian tribe" or "eligible for membership in an Indian
tribe and .. . the biological child of a member of an Indian tribe. "5 The plaintiffs
in both cases characterized the laws as illegal racial classifications - illegal under
the Fair Housing Act in Guam' and illegal under the Fifth Amendment in Brackeen.7
The Guam suit ultimately settled,' and the Court of Appeals for the Fifth
Circuit reversed most of the district court's Brackeen decision in panel and en

4.

Complaint at 4, Guam, 2018 WL 6729629 (No. 17-00113) (citing Guam Pub. L. 15-118 (1980)).

s.

Complaint at 3, 8, Brackeen, 338 F. Supp. 3d 514 (No. 4:17-cv-oo868) (citing 25 U.S.C.
§§ 1915(a), 1903(4) (2018)). The plaintiffs also challenged § 1 9 1 5 (b), which refers to an "Indian foster home." Id. at 9. Neither "Indian family" nor "Indian foster home" is defined further
in the statute. However, "Indian" is defined as "any person who is a member of an Indian
tribe, or who is an Alaska Native and a member of a Regional Corporation as defined in [the
Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act]." 25 U.S.C. § 1903(3) (2018); see also 25 C.F.R. § 23.2
(2021). "Indian tribe" is defined as "any Indian tribe, band, nation, or other organized group
or community of Indians recognized as eligible for the services provided to Indians by the
Secretary because of their status as Indians, including any Alaska Native village as defined in
[the Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act]." 25 U.S.C. § 1903(8) (2018). The plaintiffs also
argued that the law and its implementing regulations violated the Commerce Clause, the
Spending Clause, the Tenth Amendment, the Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause, the
Administrative Procedure Act, and the Non-Delegation Doctrine. Complaint at 38-58, Brackeen, 338 F. Supp. 3 d 514 (No. 4:17-cv-oo868).

6.

Complaint at 1o-1, Guam, 2018 WL 6729629 (No. 17-00113).

7.

Complaint at 39, Brackeen, 338 F. Supp. 3d 51 4 (No. 4:17-cv-oo868) (alleging that DOI's Final
Rule implementing the statute violates the Administrative Procedure Act because its placement directives apply "to Indian children solely by dint of their or their parents' membership
in an Indian tribe - eligibility that often (as in this case) turns on blood quantum"); id. at 51
("ICWA's classification of Indians and non-Indians [in 25 U.S.C. §5 1915(b) and (c)], and its
discrimination against non-Indians, is based on race and ancestry and violates the constitutional guarantee of equal protection.").

8.

United States v. Guam, No. 17-00113, 2020 WL 4043750, at *1 (D. Guam July 17, 2020) ("On
June 5, 2020,... the parties settled this action."); Settlement Agreement, Guam, 2020 WL
4043750 (No. 17-00113). A federal district court earlier denied the United States's motion for
judgment on the pleadings, holding that it could not determine on the facts alleged whether
the Chamorro Land Trust Classification was political or racial and noting that the record
would have to be developed to resolve "the question of whether the Chamorro Land Trust
operates instead as a compensatory entity that seeks to implement the return to the people of
Guam of land that the United States took from them." Guam, 2018 WL 6729629, at 1 (No. 17-

2655

THE YALE LAW JOURNAL

131:2652

2022

banc decisions.' However, the legacy of these cases lives on. The Supreme Court
has agreed to review the decision in Brackeen,1o and the Guam government is
working to rewrite a law authorizing a self-determination plebiscite after another classification in that law was struck down on similar grounds." These lawsuits are just the most recent examples of race-based challenges to Indigenous
rights. In such cases, plaintiffs argue that laws that apply only to a subset of people identified as Indigenous (or Indian) are illegal because indigeneity (or Indianness) itself is a racial category or because the laws use descent or ancestry as a
criterion, and ancestry-based classifications are a stand-in for racial ones. Although the equal-protection guarantee in the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments

00113) (order denying the plaintiff's motion for partial judgment on the pleadings; order

granting in part and denying in part the defendant's motion for judgment on the pleadings
and joinder therein). In the interim, Guam lost another challenge to a similar classification,
which likely encouraged settlement in this case. See discussion infra Section II.C.
9.

Brackeen v. Bernhardt, 937 F. 3d 406 (5th Cir. 2019), aff'd in relevant part sub nom. en banc
Brackeen v. Haaland, 994 F.3 d 249 (5th Cir. 2021), cert. granted, 142 S. Ct. 1205 (2022). The en
banc decision was divided, and while it upheld most of the law, the court was equally divided
on whether key sections were illegal, including the preferences for Indian families in section
1915, so the en banc decision affirmed this portion of the district court's holding. See Brackeen,
994 F. 3d at 268-69. The challengers petitioned the U.S. Supreme Court for certiorari, asking
the Court to strike down the law. Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, Brackeen v. Haaland, No.
21-380 (U.S. Sept. 3, 2021), 2021 WL 4116992. The United States filed its own petition in
September 2021, asking the Court to uphold the law. Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, Haaland
v. Brackeen, No. 21-376 (U.S. Sept. 3, 2021), 2021 WL 4080795. Four tribal nations asked the
Court to uphold the law. Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, Cherokee Nation v. Brackeen, No.
21-377 (U.S. Sept. 3, 2021). Texas asked the Court to hold specifically that the "Indian child"
classification (upheld by the Fifth Circuit) violates the Fifth Amendment. Petition for a Writ
of Certiorari, Texas v. Haaland, No. 21-378 (U.S. Sept. 3, 2021), 2021 WL 4122397.

10. Brackeen v. Haaland, 142 S. Ct. 1205 (2022) (granting certiorari in Nos. 21-377, 21-378, 21-380).
11.

Joe Taitano II, Governor: Plebiscite Legislation in the Works,

PAC. DAILY NEWS (May 8, 2021),
https://www. guampdn.com/news/local/governor-plebiscite-legislation-in-the-works/article_9eoafd49-3823-5dde-b296-fb8da155f86c.html [https://perma.cc/Y23X-ZYPH] (quoting
the governor of Guam as recommending that the Legislature "amend the plebiscite statute,
and write it in such a way that would comply with whatever the issues and concerns were
from the court decision so that if we do it, there won't be ... legal protests or legal objections"
and describing one scholar's suggestion that the plebiscite be redesigned as a poll unassociated
with the Guam Election Commission).
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is the most common basis for such suits," some allege violations of the Fifteenth
Amendment13 or federal civil-rights laws.14
Recent claims cite the U.S. Supreme Court's 2000 opinion in Rice v. Cay-

etano15 to argue that that ancestry-based laws that project Indigenous rights are
illegal because they classify people on the basis of race. In Rice, the Court relied
on a thin conception of race as a static biological fact and a narrow construction
of indigeneity as dependent on Federal Indian tribal status. These definitions fail
to reflect the historical significance and material realities of race and indigeneity.
They are also generally out of sync with how these concepts are understood in
social and political movements.
The Court in Rice invalidated a voting rule that allowed only Indigenous
Hawaiians to vote for the trustees responsible for land and assets held by the
state in trust to benefit Indigenous Hawaiians. Rice rested on a shaky precedential foundation. The Court effectively invented a new rule about ancestry-based
classifications in voting.16 For Indigenous peoples, this rule now threatens to
limit all legal recognition of indigeneity to the framework of federal acknowledgement and tribal citizenship," leaving unrecognized tribes, Indigenous Hawaiians, Indigenous peoples in the U.S. territories, and anyone who is not a

See, e.g., United States v. Antelope, 430 U.S. 641, 644 (1977); Moe v. Confederated Salish
Tribes, 425 U.S. 463,479 (1976); Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 551 (1974); Means
v. Navajo Nation, 432 F. 3d 924, 932 ( 9 th Cir. 2005); Wabol v. Villacrusis, 958 F.2d 1450, 1451
(9th Cir. 1990).
&

12.

Kootenai

13.

See, e.g., Rice v. Cayetano, 528 U.S. 495, 498 (2000); Davis v. Guam, 932 F.3 d 822, 824 ( 9 th
Cir. 2019); Davis v. Commonwealth Election Comm'n, 844 F.3 d 1087, 1089 (9th Cir. 2016).

14.

See, e.g., Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 537 (1974); United States v. Guam, No. 17-00113,
2018 WL 6729629, at *1 (D. Guam Dec. 21, 2018).

15.

528 U.S. 495 (2000).

16.

More precisely, the Court held that classifications based on Indigenous ancestry "can be a
proxy for race" and were indeed such a proxy in the specific context of eligibility to vote in
elections for the state-run Office of Hawaiian Affairs. Rice, 528 U.S. at 514. This rule has been
reformulated by lower courts to suggest that any voting classification involving ancestry is
illegal if it "refer[s] to specific ethnic or [Indigenous] groups" or "reference [s] blood quantum
to determine descent." Commonwealth Election Comm'n, 8 44 F-3 d at 1093.

17.

Only certain Indigenous groups have a formally recognized relationship with the U.S. government, and only certain individuals are formally citizens of those governments. Many other
people may be considered Indigenous on the basis of noncitizenship affiliations, including
those who are affiliated with Indigenous groups that do not have the same formal presentday relationship with the U.S. or that lack formal citizenship rules. See, e.g., Addie C. Rolnick,
The Promise of Mancari: Indian PoliticalRights as Racial Remedy, 86 N.Y.U. L. REv. 958, 101525 [hereinafter Rolnick, The Promise ofMancari] (examining the Indian legal category); Addie

C. Rolnick, Tribal CriminalJurisdictionBeyond Citizenship and Blood, 39 AM. INDIAN L. REv.
337, 428-34 (2016) [hereinafter Rolnick, Tribal CriminalJurisdiction](critiquing over-reliance
on citizenship as the sole measure of tribal affiliation).
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tribal citizen unprotected. As evidenced by Brackeen, it also occasionally threatens long-established federal laws that apply to Indian tribes and their citizens.
These threats are not abstract: weakened legal protections for tribes and other
Indigenous peoples can mean a loss of land and housing, loss of children, weakened political and judicial institutions, poorer health, greater poverty, language
loss, and damage to cultural and religious practices.
The jurisprudential story of Rice exemplifies the legacy of historical blindness in the Court's interpretation of the Reconstruction Amendments. As such,
the case was an important step in a series of juridical moves to articulate a theory
of race as diametrically opposed to group political consciousness. It is one of
many cases remaking the Reconstruction Amendments, which addressed group
harms, into individual dignitary protections and then conscripting those protections in the service of White people as a weapon against non-White group identity. It was also an important milestone in the Court's effort to connect centuryold cases about anti-Black discrimination to modern attempts to amplify the political power of minority groups through voting, flattening any distinctions between the two by ignoring their historical context. This historical blindness is
part of what Ian F. Haney L6pez labels "reactionary colorblindness," and it is
exemplified in the Court's treatment of race-conscious remedies as morally and
legally equivalent to laws intended to subjugate racial minorities.1 Neil Gotanda
has similarly pointed to a sense of "unconnectedness" that distinguishes "formal
race" as used by the Court from "historical race."" Indeed, the foundation of the
Rice holding is almost entirely theoretical. The case reaches back more than a
century for its primary precedent, and it connects present to past with the thinnest of factual and doctrinal threads. It is, at bottom, a triumph of the Court's
insistence that race is reducible to biological labels and devoid of political content
or historical meaning.
It is striking that a case standing on such shaky doctrinal ground has not
been more effectively cabined, or even overturned. If it threatens the self-determination rights, political identity, and material conditions of so many people,

18. Ian F. Haney L6pez defines reactionary colorblindness as "an anticlassification understanding
of the Equal Protection Clause that accords race-conscious remedies and racial subjugation
the same level of constitutional hostility." Ian F. Haney L6pez, 'A Nation of Minorities":Race,
Ethnicity, and Reactionary Colorblindness,59 STAN. L. REV. 985, 988 (2007).
19.

As Neil Gotanda describes, the Court's colorblind, formal-race approach "assumes 'equal protection of the law' based on common 'citizenship,"' Neil Gotanda, A Critique of "OurConstitution Is Color-Blind," 44 STAN. L. REv. 1, 38 (1991), whereas in a historical race analysis "racial
categories describe relations of oppression and unequal power;" id. at 40. Tracing the lineage
of the formal-race approach back to the segregation era, Gotanda remarks that "[b] esides presuming that racial classifications are unconnected to social status or historical experience, the
Court's formal-race analysis fails to recognize ties between the classification scheme of one
statute and the treatment of race in other legislation." Id. at 38.
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why hasn't it been limited to its facts? 20 Instead, Rice has been honed into a doctrinal weapon in the cultural and geographic shadows of American law through
a series of Fifteenth Amendment challenges to Indigenous rights in the Pacific
territories. Because these cases involved Indigenous Pacific Islanders, who are
not recognized as Indians, they are not Federal Indian law cases. Because they
involved disputes over land rights and self-determination, they are also not typical civil-rights cases. Off the radar of Indigenous-rights2 1 and racial-justice lawyers, non-Native people and conservative voting-rights groups have successfully
used Rice to undermine the rights of Indigenous peoples in the U.S. territories.22
To fully comprehend the significance of these attacks on Indigenous rights
in the U.S. territories, this Article engages directly with three areas of law that
are not typically in conversation: Federal Indian law, constitutional race law, and
the law of the territories. It is the first article to consider all three areas together,
and one of only a few to consider any two of them together. The Article identifies
the doctrinal framework that has discouraged such conversations and traces its
effect on litigation and scholarship. In Indian law, this framework manifests in a
failure to identify commonalities between Indigenous rights on the mainland
and in the U.S. territories or between recognized and unrecognized tribal

20.

Indeed, some courts that have encountered questions about Kanaka Maoli rights and status
have limited or distinguished Rice. See, e.g., Doe v. Kamehameha Schs./Bernice Pauahi Bishop
Estate, 295 F. Supp. 2d 1141, 1164 (D. Haw. 2003) (declining to apply Rice or a Fourteenth
Amendment framework to a challenge to a private entity under 42 U.S.C. § 1981); Akina v.
Hawaii, 141 F.Supp.3d 11o6, 1125-1126 (D. Haw. 2015) (declining to apply Rice to invalidate an
election held by a nonprofit organization to elect delegates to a Kanaka Maoli constitutional
convention); Kahawaiolaa v. Norton, 386 F.3 d 1271, 1279 ( 9 th Cir. 2004) (holding that Rice
does not govern classifications that treat Indigenous Hawaiians as a political group, and applying rational basis review to the federal government's decision to exclude Kanaka Maoli from
regulations governing the acknowledgement of Indian tribes); see also Doe v. Kamehameha
Schs./Bernice Pauahi Bishop Estate, 470 F.3 d 827, 853 ( 9 th Cir. 2006) (Fletcher, J., concurring) ("Unlike Rice, the case before us does not involve preferential voting rights subject to
challenge under the Fifteenth Amendment. Rather, it involves the preferential provision of
educational benefits. To the extent that the federal Constitution is implicated at all, the relevant text is the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The Court in Rice
never questioned the validity of the special relationship doctrine under the Fourteenth
Amendment, and never even hinted that its Fifteenth Amendment analysis would apply to
the many benefit programs enacted by Congress for Native Hawaiians, Alaska Natives, and
American Indians.").

21.

More than 400 tribes, more than 2 dozen states, about 20 law professors, and several nonprofit
organizations filed briefs supporting the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA) in the Brackeen
case. None filed briefs in the Guam Fair Housing Act case or in the two cases described in
Section IIC. See text accompanying infra notes 394-395 (describing the Brackeen briefs).

22.

Davis v. Guam, 932 F.3 d 822, 824-25 ( 9 th Cir. 2019); Davis v. Commonwealth Election
Comm'n, 844 F.3 d 1087, 1091 ( 9 th Cir. 2016); see infra Section II.C (discussing the role of
conservative voting-rights groups in both Davis cases).
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groups. The marginalization experienced by territorial residents is thereby reproduced in the area of Indigenous rights. In race law, it appears as a reluctance
to fully understand and appreciate the racialized harms experienced by Indigenous peoples. In the law of the territories, it has resulted in a near-total failure
to grapple with the desires and contemporary struggles of Indigenous residents
as a distinct group. In each area, shortsighted acceptance of the doctrinal divisions between race and Indianness, between recognized and unrecognized Indigenous groups, and between citizens and subjects has also resulted in missed
opportunities to rethink important questions about racialized harm, history, and
inclusion. The Article argues that scholars and advocates should reject, not accept, these doctrinal divisions - and it proposes both short- and long-term options for doing so.
Beginning with its 1974 decision in Morton v. Mancari, the Supreme Court
has carved out a clear doctrinal distinction between indigeneity and race.23 The
law has long addressed the effects of colonization through a different structure
than it addressed the effects of Black slavery and subordination. Until Mancari,
however, it was possible to understand colonization as a racial harm, albeit a distinct one from enslavement.2 4 I have previously described how the Mancarihold-

ing, while legally correct, formally bifurcated Indianness from race and how later
applications of its rule compressed the legal meaning of both categories to make
them oppositional. 25 In that article, I described Rice as the case that "solidified
this oppositional framing" and argued that it was "a key step in the evolution of
the political classification doctrine because the majority decision crystallized the
dichotomy" first outlined in Mancari.2 6 The decision was "driven in part by a
concern that legal recognition of indigeneity, which implicates ancestry, would
be in conflict with Equal Protection jurisprudence that eschews any use of racial
classifications," and I predicted that it would therefore make "classifications that
rely on indigenous ancestry ... difficult for some courts to square with the
Court's colorblind race jurisprudence."2 The cases described in this Article show
that Rice has indeed been used to dismantle legal protections for indigeneity, first
for non-Indian Indigenous peoples and eventually for Indian tribes as well.

23.
24.

417 U.S. 535 (1974).
See Brief of MALDEF, Mancari, 417 U.S. 535 (No. 73-362) (treating the employment classification at issue in Mancarias a benign racial classification and arguing that such race-conscious
remedies should not be reviewed under strict scrutiny); Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke,
438 U.S. 265, 304 n.42 (1978) (opinion of Powell, J.) (discussing the petitioner's argument
that Mancari was an example of a court reviewing benign racial classifications under a lower
standard).

26.

Rolnick, The Promise of Mancari, supranote 17, at 963-65.
Id. at 996, looo.

27.

Id. at looo, 1016.

25.

26 60

INDIGENOUS SUBJECTS

Rice's ancestry-race equivalence is central to a colorblind, anticlassification
view of the Constitution. From the First Reconstruction through the Second Reconstruction, Black Americans were socially and legally classified according to
race and subordinated as a result of that classification. Courts did not have to
determine whether the central injury of racism occurred at classification or at
subordination because the two were undeniably linked in almost every case. 28
When asked to decide the constitutionality of race-conscious remedies, the
Court beginning in the 1970s embraced the anticlassification view, locating the
harm of racism at the moment of classification. 9 As envisioned by the Court, the
injury of classification is immediate and dignitary. That is, the harm is one to
personal dignity; occurs at the moment of classification; and is equally experienced by anyone so classified, White or non-White, regardless of the purpose or
material outcome of the classification. According to this view, classification alone
causes harm because race is insignificant and irrelevant, and it therefore harms a
person's dignity to be classified according to an insignificant trait. The anticlassification view is thus premised on an understanding of race as a static, biological
fact, unconnected to history, political power, or collective identity. From that definition flows descriptive and normative colorblindness - the belief that physical
or biological attributes are and should be unrelated to legal rights like voting and
citizenship. Accordingly, laws that make rights turn on racial classifications must
be carefully reviewed.30

28. The Amendments and major cases include language that appears to condemn both classification and subordination, though it is not clear that one would be condemned if not linked to
the other. See, e.g., Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 494-95 (1954) (holding the act of
separating by race unconstitutional regardless of equality of resources but reasoning primarily
that segregation "generates a feeling of inferiority [in Black students specifically] as to their
status in the community"); Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 552-64 (1896) (Harlan, J., dissenting) (using the language of colorblindness but recognizing a one-way stigma).
29.

See Jack M. Balkin & Reva B. Siegel, The American Civil Rights Tradition:Anticlassificationor
Antisubordination?, 58 UNIv. MiA. L. REV. 9, 10 (2003); Mario L. Barnes & Erwin Chemerinsky, The Once and Future Equal ProtectionDoctrine?, 43 CONN. L. REV. 1059, 1063-64 (2011);
J.M. Balkin, The Constitution of Status, 1o6 YALE L.J. 2313, 2318 (1997); Reva Siegel, Why Equal
ProtectionNo LongerProtects: The Evolving Forms of Status-Enforcing State Action, 49 STAN. L.
REV. 1111, 1142-43 (1997) ; Reva B. Siegel, Equality Talk: AntisubordinationandAnticlassification
Values in ConstitutionalStruggles over Brown, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1470, 1472-73 (2004) [hereinafter Siegel, Equality Talk]; Kimberl6 Williams Crenshaw, Race, Reform, and Retrenchment:
Transformation and Legitimation in Antidiscrimination Law, in CRITICAL RACE THEORY: THE
KEY WRITINGS THAT FORMED THE MOVEMENT 103, 105

(Kimberl6

Crenshaw, Neil Gotanda,

Gary Peller & Kendall Thomas eds., 1995).
30.

See Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630 (1993) (applying strict scrutiny to race-based redistricting);
Parents Involved in Cmty. Schs. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701 (2007) (also applying
a strict scrutiny framework to a school district's race-based admissions process).
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On the other hand, an antisubordination view focuses on whether state action harms a historically oppressed group or enforces existing hierarchies. 3 1 Racial classifications employed to dismantle hierarchies might thus be treated differently than racial classifications that reinforce them. This view understands
race as a dynamic sociohistorical process by which hierarchies have been produced, not as an abstract question of biology. It requires attention to historical
harm and relative political power.3 2 Although it may not be immediately apparent, the reflexive assumption that race is interchangeable with ancestry is thus
tied to an anticlassification, as opposed to antisubordination, view of the Constitution.

The Rice decision itself was limited in many respects. It involved a state asserting authority over matters generally reserved to the federal government. It
involved voting for officers of a state government. And it involved the unique
situation of an Indigenous group whom Congress had declined to recognize as
an Indian tribe. As precedent, however, the case has taken on a new life. Since it
was decided, advocates have cited Rice for a rule that clumsily equates race with
ancestry, categorically barring ancestry-based classifications under the Fifteenth
Amendment and requiring strict scrutiny under the Fifth and Fourteenth. 33 It is
cited in cases challenging the legality of "Indian" classifications generally,34 as
well as in cases challenging benign racial classifications in other contexts, such

31.

See Seigel, Equality Talk, supra note 29, at 1472-73; DERRICKA. BELL, AND WE ARE NOT SAVED:
THE ELUSIVE QUEST FOR RACIAL JUSTICE 162-77 (1987);

Owen

M.

Fiss, Groups and the Equal

ProtectionClause, 5 PHIL. & PUB. AFFS. 107, 108, 157 (1976).
32.

See Abigail Nurse, Anti-Subordination in the Equal ProtectionClause: A Case Study, 89 N.Y.U.

L. REV. 293, 300 (2014) (identifying group status, history of discrimination, and political
powerlessness as key themes in scholarly discussions of antisubordination).
33.

See Brief for Appellant at 35-37, Davis v. Guam, 932 E 3 d 822 ( 9 th Cit. 2013) (No. 13-15199);
Guam, 932 F. 3d at 834-35 ( 9 th Cit. 2019) (describing and rejecting Davis's argument that Rice
prohibits all ancestry-based classifications); Plaintiffs-Appellees' Answering Brief at 14, 22,
24-25, Arakaki v. Hawaii, 314 F.3 d 1091 ( 9 th Cit. 2002) (No. 00-17213); Brief of Amici Curiae
Goldwater Institute, Cato Institute, and Texas Public Policy Foundation in Support of Plaintiffs-Appellees on Rehearing En Banc at 4, Brackeen v. Haaland, 9 9 4 F 3 d 249 (5th Cir. 2021)
(No. 18-11479) (citing Rice for the proposition that an ancestry-based classification is unconstitutional even if it does not include all members of a racial group). See generally infra Part II
(explaining how the rule of Rice has matured as it has been used in litigation).

34.

See, e.g., Brackeen v. Bernhardt, 937 F. 3d 406, 429 (5th Cir. 2019) (distinguishing Rice from
the classifications used in the ICWA), aff'd in relevant part sub nom. en banc, Brackeen v. Haaland, 9 9 4 F.3 d 249 (5th Cit. 2021), cert. granted, 142 S. Ct. 1205 (2022); K.G. Urban Enterprises
L.L.C. v. Patrick, 693 F. 3d 1, 19 (1st Cit. 2012) (reasoning that "[t]he effect of Rice on a Fourteenth Amendment claim involving federally recognized tribes is unclear" in a challenge to a
Massachusetts law authorizing tribal-state gaming-compact negotiations).
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as majority-minority voting districts and affirmative action. 35 This Article traces
the precedential life of Rice to show how these three areas (Indigenous rights in
the territories, Indian law, and constitutional race law) are connected - and how
courts have employed specific intellectual moves to endanger all three.
The claim that ancestry is equivalent to race, if taken to its logical conclusion
in the hands of a colorblind, anticlassification Court, could juridically erase Indigenous peoples and fully sever the legal idea of race from its historical and
material context of group harm. This will be the eventual consequence of American law's refusal to link colonization and racial subordination.36 By centering
racialized Indigenous peoples in the territories and demonstrating how their
claims are illegible under Indian law, race law, and the law of the territories, this
Article highlights the limits of current legal doctrine.3 7 Together, the existing
cases cabin the recognition of historical harm and group rights to a small subset
of American people (subject to ultimate federal domination) and convert any
recognition of group harm into illegal race discrimination.
Because this Article is fundamentally about the law's unwillingness to capture the overlap, distinction, and nuance of political identity categories, I begin
in Part I by identifying several interrelated categories -Indigenous, Indian, colonized peoples, race, and ancestry- and describing the meaning, significance,
and boundaries of each one. Three of them (Indianness, colonization, and race)
are associated with distinct bodies of U.S. law (Federal Indian law, law of the
territories, and civil-rights law), 38 so that the axis of categorization determines

35.

See, e.g., Fisher v. Univ. of Tex., 136 S. Ct. 2198, 2221 (2016) (quoting Rice in a Fourteenth
Amendment challenge to a university's admissions policy); Prejean v. Foster, 227 F.3 d 504, 519
& n.25 (5th Cir. 2000) (quoting Rice in a Fifteenth Amendment challenge to the creation of a
majority-minority voting district); see also Shelby Cnty. v. Holder, 570 U.S. 529, 553 (2013)
(citing Rice for the proposition that the Fifteenth Amendment is focused on the present and
future, not the past).

36.

As scholars of territoriallaw have insisted, how American law treats the inhabitants of America's territories speaks volumes about American identity and the meaning of the Constitution
itself. See, e.g., SAM ERMAN, ALMOST CITIZENS: PUERTO RICO, THE U.S. CONSTITUTION, AND
EMPIRE (2018); AZIZ RANA, THE TWO FACES OF AMERICAN FREEDOM (2010);

Christina Duffy

Burnett [Ponsa-Kraus], "They Say IAm Not An American . . . ": The Noncitizen Nationaland
the Law of American Empire, 48 VA. J. INT'L LAw 659 (2008). But the territories rarely even
make it into in the law-school curriculum. Instead of leaving indigeneity as a footnote to the
status of territorial residents overall, this Article centers their legal situation and potential
claims and considers how they can be made legible under the Constitution.
37.

Cf Maggie Blackhawk, FederalIndian Law as ParadigmWithin PublicLaw, 132 HARv. L. REV.
1787 (2019) (rethinking public-law principles by centering Indian nations); Gregory Ablavsky, The Savage Constitution, 63 DUKE L.J. 999 (2014) (rethinking constitutional originalism
by centering Indian nations).

38.

Ancestry is closely associated with race but, as this Article explains, it is not always a matter
of civil-rights law. Indigeneity has meaning in international, but not domestic, law.
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the body of law that will apply to a case. In addition, when a classification is
challenged in court as a violation of equal protection, the test that courts apply
turns on the way the classification is characterized. Most obviously, if it is racial
or can be characterized as racial, a court will apply strict scrutiny. This analysis
presumes illegality unless stringent conditions are satisfied and a court's decision
to apply it often signals that it will strike down the law or policy." Opponents of
Indigenous rights can manipulate these categories to invoke the body of law
most likely to result in their desired outcome, as the litigants did in Rice. More
broadly, the tight association between category and body of law can mean that
the law is unresponsive to the situations of groups or people who fall into more
than one category.
In Part II, I trace Rice from its holding in 2000 to its use as precedent in later
cases. In that case, the State of Hawaii, seeking to invoke Federal Indian law,
argued that Indigenous Hawaiians were like Indians.40 Meanwhile, the challenger, seeking to invoke constitutional prohibitions on racial classifications, argued that the class was defined by ancestry and that ancestry should be treated
the same as race.41 When the Court held in favor of the challenger, it did so by
holding that the use of ancestry to identify Indigenous Hawaiians was a proxy
for race, and juxtaposing both concepts against political Indianness.4 2 The decision thus set Indigenous Hawaiians apart from Indian tribes as a matter of constitutional law and crystallized a political-versus-racial dichotomy. Part II examines how the Court used Fifteenth Amendment precedent to accomplish this

39. Constitutional-law scholars have questioned the conventional wisdom that strict scrutiny is
"strict in theory and fatal in fact," e.g., Adam Winkler, Fatal in Theory and Strict in Fact: An
EmpiricalAnalysis of Strict Scrutiny in the Federal Courts, 59 VAND. L. REV. 793, 794-796 (2006),
but it remains very difficult for race-conscious laws that benefit non-White people to survive
it, see David Schraub, Post-Racialismand the End of Strict Scrutiny, 92 IND. L.J. 599, 601-02
(2017) ; Ian . Haney-L6pez, "A Nation of Minorities": Race, Ethnicity, and Reactionary Colorblindness, 59 STAN. L. REv. 985, 988 n. 3 (2007); see also Winkler, supra, at 824-25, 839 (describing strict scrutiny as becoming more difficult to satisfy since 1990 and demonstrating
that certain types of race-conscious remedial laws fare worse under the standard). While strict
scrutiny arguably became less rigid and more contextual in the 2000s, see Eric K. Yamamoto,
Carly Minner & Karen Winter, Contextual Strict Scrutiny, 49 HOWARD L.J. 241, 245 (2006);
Angelo N. Ancheta, Contextual Strict Scrutiny and Race-ConsciousPolicy Making, 36 LoY. UNIV.
CHI. L.J. 21, 22-23 (2004), certain uses of race continue to fare better than others, see Ancheta,
supra, at 47-48 (describing the limited nature of deference to academic institutions in diversity-based affirmative action cases); Evan Gerstmann & Christopher Shortell, The Many Faces
of Strict Scrutiny: How the Supreme CourtChanges the Rules in Race Cases, 72 UNIV. PITT. L. REv.
1, 49 (2010) (describing courts' application of strict scrutiny to racial profiling by law enforcement as "stingy").
40.

See infra notes 187-188, 194-195 and accompanying text.

41.

See infra notes 188 and accompanying text.

42.

See Rice v. Cayetano, 528 U.S. 495, 514, 518-19 (2000).
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result more expediently. It then examines how the limited holding of Rice has
been expanded into a broad rule through circuit-court cases applying its Fifteenth Amendment analysis to the territories and later in lawsuits that move its
analysis beyond the context of voting. It concludes by examining the return of
Rice in lawsuits challenging the rights of Indian tribes. Part II thus provides a
detailed map of the doctrinal evolution of the Rice rule through individual cases.
Part III focuses on the implications of the broad rule that emerged from the
process described in Part II and its potential effects on Indigenous sovereignty
and self-determination. It also considers how the delineation between categories
of law has implications beyond Indigenous rights. It argues that the modern rule
of Rice employs constitutional race jurisprudence to perfect the colonization project. First, it argues that prohibiting any use of ancestry juridically erases Indigenous and colonized peoples as a separate class in the present day and paves the
way for members of colonizer nations to complete the project of colonization by
outnumbering and outvoting them. Second, it argues that the equivalence between ancestry and race is an important pillar of the Court's understanding of
race as a matter of individual, immutable, biological characteristics. This definition of race is what enables the Court to insist, as it did in Rice, that race is irrelevant to rights, identity, and peoplehood. Biologizing race further divorces it
from social, political, and historical reality, maling possible the Court's colorblind, anticlassification theory of race and turning the Reconstruction Amendments into a tool to dismantle collective racial identity and forbid structural remedies for racial subordination. That neither Indianness nor race are closely
associated with the U.S. territories supports a territorial jurisprudence that inadequately addresses the role of racialization and forced inclusion in U.S. colonization, while positioning full incorporation as the solution to colonial subordination.
Finally, Part IV returns to the question of how to protect Indigenous peoples
in the territories. It presents five strategies and analyzes their practical consequences and the theoretical challenges they could pose to the doctrinal puzzle
described in this Article. The purpose of Part IV is not to advocate for a particular
solution, but to illustrate that nearly all strategies benefit one group while harming another. I suggest that parties and amici advance the most practical and available defenses, while also challenging the larger doctrinal structure in which cases
arise.

I.

CLASSIFICATIONS IN U.S. AND INTERNATIONAL LAW

Indigenous peoples have rights under international law because they belong
to groups that occupied land within contemporary nations before other people
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arrived. 4 Although these rights may benefit individuals, they are collective
rights, and they accrue to individuals based on affiliation with a group.4 4 In U.S.
courts, Indigenous rights are recognized and protected through the "Indian
tribe" legal category.45 "Indian tribe" in this context usually refers to a group who
inhabited American states before they became American states and with whom
the United States continues to have a government-to-government relationship. 46 Individuals affiliated with Indian tribal governments have rights as "Indians" because of their affiliation.47 But as it is most commonly used in contemporary U.S. law, this category excludes many Indigenous peoples. 48 Most
notably, it excludes members of any Indigenous group not officially recognized
as an Indian tribe by the federal government. It therefore excludes the approximately 5oo,ooo Indigenous Hawaiians throughout the United States,49 the approximately 15o,ooo Indigenous Chamorros and Carolinians of Guam and the
Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands (CNMI), and the approximately 184,000 Indigenous Samoans.50

Colonized peoples, many of whom are Indigenous, also have rights under
international law based on their presence in, and national identity with, a nation

43.

See G.A. Res. 61/295 (Sept. 13, 2007) (establishing rights for Indigenous peoples under international law); S. James Anaya, Indigenous Peoples and InternationalLaw Issues, 92 AM. Soc.
INT'L L. PROc. 96, 96-97 (1998) (defining "Indigenous peoples" and summarizing the status
of their rights under international law).

44.

See Alexandra Xanthanki, Collective Rights: The Case of Indigenous Peoples, 25 AmICUS CURIAE
7, 7 (2000).

4s.

See Rolnick, The Promise ofMancari, supra note 17, at 959 n. 1714, 959 n.2, 963-64, 1000-01.

46.

See id. at 977-78; Rolnick, Tribal CriminalJurisdiction,supra note 17, at 374. Since the 1990s,
the Department of the Interior (DOI) has published an annual list of Indian tribes with which
the United States acknowledges a government-to-government relationship. See Indian Entities Recognized by and Eligible to Receive Services from the United States Bureau of Indian
Affairs, 86 Fed. Reg. 7,554 (Jan. 29, 2021).

47.

Rolnick, The Promise of Mancari, supra note 17, at 972-73.

48.

Historical uses of the term "Indian" were broader and could arguably support a decision by
Congress to embrace the Indigenous groups described here within the legal definition of Indian. I return to this point in Section IV.C. Generally, however, Congress and the courts have
declined to interpret the category broadly enough to encompass these groups.

49.

For more information about population estimates, which are usually based on self-identification, see Sara Kehaulani Goo, After 200 Years, Native HawaiiansMake a Comeback, PEW RSCH.
CTR. (Apr. 6, 2015), https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2o15/o4/o6/native-hawaiianpopulation [https://perma.cc/CGB4-B8UP].

so. Population estimates are based on census categories. See U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, THE NATIVE
HAWAIIAN AND OTHER PACIFIC ISLANDER POPULATION: 2010, at 14 (2012), https://www.census.gov/prod/cen2olo/briefs/c2o1obr-12.pdf [https://perma.cc/CAV2-82RA].
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before it was annexed or absorbed by another nation. 51 Colonized peoples in
U.S. territories that eventually became states are now U.S. citizens, legally indistinguishable today from other U.S. citizens, unless they are also Indians. Residents of nonstate territories are either citizens or nationals today, but their constitutional status is unique because they live in a territory.5 2 While the territorial
resident category lumps together Indigenous peoples, colonized peoples, and
new residents, local laws sometimes distinguish between territorial residents
based on indigeneity or colonized status. 53 However, as this Article will demonstrate, those classification systems are vulnerable because they do not match the
broader constitutional categories used in American law.
When policy makers attempt to enshrine protections for Indigenous peoples
who are not members of federally acknowledged tribes, or to distinguish between Indigenous and non-Indigenous (or colonized and settler) residents of
territories, they often define the protected category with reference to ancestry or
descent as a way to trace the connection between present-day people and historical groups that directly experienced colonization or settlement. The resulting
rules are confused with racial classifications, or labeled as ancestry-based classifications, which are then treated the same as racial classifications.54 For example,
the Bush Justice Department raised concerns about the constitutionality of a law
authorizing federal health services for Indian people because it covers "urban
Indians" -Native people living in cities,55 a category that includes people who

s5.

See infra notes 114-117 and accompanying text (describing the rights of colonized peoples under international law).

52.

See ERMAN, supra note 36, at 1 ("This book tells the story of 'almost citizens'-the people of
Puerto Rico who were deemed neither citizens nor aliens, and who lived in a land deemed
neither foreign nor domestic.") ; Valerie Vezina, Navigating Citizenship and NationalIdentity in
American Territories: Nationalism in American Samoa and Puerto Rico, 14 SHIm A 168, 172-75
(2020) (contrasting the status of citizen Puerto Ricans and national American Samoans).

s3.

See text accompanying infra notes 251, 253-257, 274-278, 272, 301, 307, 310-313, 401, and 432
(describing local laws in the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands (CNMI),
Guam, and American Samoa).

s4.

See infra Part II.

ss.

See UrbanIndianEligibility, INDIAN HEALTH SERV., https://www.ihs.gov/california/index.cfm
/health-programs/eligibility/urban-indian-eligibility [https://perma.cc/29Z7-BJSS]; see also
Urban Indian America, NAT'L URB. INDIAN FAM. COAL. 4-14, https://www.aecf.org/m/resourcedoc/AECF-UrbanlndianAmerica-20o8-Full.pdf [https://perma.cc/MF9C-E32S] (describing the urban Indian population). See generally DONALD LEE Fixico, TERMINATION & RELOCATION: FEDERAL INDIAN POLICY, 1945-1960

(1986)

(describing a federal policy of

relocating Indian people to cities and some reasons for severed or weakened ties between individuals and their tribes).
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are lineal descendants of tribes but are not tribal citizens.56 Similarly, the lack of
an Indigenous legal category in U.S. law, and the failure of Congress, the Executive branch, and the courts to extend the Indian category to encompass Indigenous Pacific Islanders, makes it increasingly difficult to legally distinguish between Indigenous and non-Indigenous residents of the U.S. territories.
While there is judicial and scholarly clarity on the idea that "Indian" classifications are not racial,57 courts often treat "race" and "ancestry" as interchangeable.58 Indeed, a commonly cited definition of race is an "identifiable class[] of
persons who are subjected to intentional discrimination solely because of their
ancestry or ethnic characteristics."59 This slippage, though, has undone the legal
rights of Indigenous peoples who exist outside the boundaries of federally
acknowledged Indian tribes and threatened the rights of all Indigenous peoples.

56. See DOJ Stumbles to Explain Indian Health "White Paper," INDIANZ (Mar. 14,

2007),

https://

www.indianz.com/News/2007/oo1843.asp [https://perma.cc/DV8M-8C7N] (describing a
controversy about the Department of Justice's 2007 white paper that "derailed" the Indian
Health Care Improvement Act) ; Bush Administration Takes Limited View of Indian Health, INDIANZ (Mar. 12, 2007), https://www.indianz.com/News/2007/001803.asp [https://perma.cc
/FKS6-GN78] ("As part of its long-standing objections to the Indian Health Care Improvement Act, the Department of Justice is questioning whether urban Indians, lineal descendants
and certain Alaska Natives can receive federal services at all."); Republican Off, Native HawaiianRecognition Bill Creates UnconstitutionalRace-Based Government, COMM. ON NAT. RES.
(Feb. 22, 2010), https://republicans-naturalresources.house.gov/newsroom/documentsingle
.aspx?DocumentID=171333 [https://perma.cc/HVV4-234W] (Republican statement opposing a Native Hawaiian recognition bill on the grounds that it creates a race-based government); see also Rolnick, The Promiseof Mancari,supra note 17, at 1016-17 (describing challenges
to health-care law and other "Indian" classifications that rely on descent).
57. Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 548 (1974) (finding "clear congressional sentiment that an
Indian preference in the narrow context of tribal or reservation-related employment did not
constitute racial discrimination of the type otherwise proscribed"); United States v. Antelope,
43o U.S. 641, 645 (1977) ("The decisions of this Court leave no doubt that federal legislation
with respect to Indian tribes, although relating to Indians as such, is not based upon impermissible racial classifications."); Moe v. Confederated Salish & Kootenai Tribes of Flathead
Rsrv., 425 U.S. 463, 479-80 (1976) (holding that tax immunity for reservation Indians is not
"invidious racial discrimination") ; Sarah Krakoff, Inextricably Political:Race, Membership and
Tribal Sovereignty, 87 WASH. L. REV. 1041, 1056-60 (2012); Bethany R. Berger, Reconciling
Equal Protection and Federal Indian Law, 98 CALIF. L. REv. 1165, 1179-87 (2010); Gregory
Ablavsky, "With the Indian Tribes": Race, Citizenship, and Original ConstitutionalMeanings, 70
STAN.

L. REV.

1025, 1028 (2018).

58.

Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81, 101 (1943); Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S.
214, 217 (1944). But see Davis v. Guam, 932 F. 3 d at 836 ("Just as race is a difficult concept to
define, so is ancestry's precise relationship to race. Ancestry identifies individuals by biological
descent. Racial categories often incorporate biological descent ... [b]ut ancestry and race are
not identical legal concepts.").

59.

Saint Francis Coll. v. Al-Khazraji, 481 U.S. 604, 613 (1987).
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Below, I explain five possible axes of classification -indigeneity, Indianness,
colonization, race, and ancestry-identifying their different purposes, their uses
and definitions, and areas of overlap between them. Some groups may be classified along multiple axes. For example, Chamorros in Guam and the Northern
Mariana Islands are Indigenous peoples who are also colonized peoples. 60
"Chamorro" has been listed as a racial category on the census.61 And some modern-day laws identify Chamorros with reference to ancestry. 62 However,

60.

See Keith L. Camacho, Filipinos, Pacifc Islanders, and the American Empire, in THE OXFORD
HANDBOOK OF ASIAN AMERICAN HISTORY 13 (David K. Yoo & Eiichiro Azuma eds., 2016); Mi-

chael P. Perez, Colonialism, Americanization, and Indigenous Identity: A Research Note on
ChamorroIdentity in Guam, 25 SOCIO. SPECTRUM 571 (2005); Michael P. Perez, Pacifc Identities
Beyond U.S. Racial Formations:The Case of ChamorroAmbivalence and Flux, 8 Soc. IDENTITIES
457 (2002).
61.

See Rachel Marks & Merarys Rios-Vargas, Improvements to the 2020 Census Race and Hispanic
OriginQuestion Designs, DataProcessing, and Coding Procedures,U.S. CENSUS BuREAu (Aug. 3,
2021),
https://www.census.gov/newsroom/blogs/random-samplings/2021/08/improvements-to-2020-census-race-hispanic-origin-question-designs.html
[https://perma.cc
/WG5K-2KQX] (discussing the 2020 census); Clare Kluskens, 1950 Census: Form P85, 1950
Census of Population- Guam, HIST. HUB (Nov. 3, 2021), https://historyhub.history.gov/community/genealogy/census-records/blog/2o21/11/03/195o-census-form-p85-195o-census-ofpopulation-guam [https://perma.cc/TU4K-KXWB] (describing use of Chamorro designation in 195o Guam census); see also C. Matthew Snipp, Racial Measurement in the American
Census: PastPracticesand Implicationsfor the Future, 29 ANN. REv. SoCio. 563, 577-578 (2003)
(discussing the complex relationship between shifting racial categories for Native Hawaiian
and Pacific Islander groups and legal claims to Indigenous rights). See generally MAILE ARVIN,
POSSESSING POLYNESIANS: THE SCIENCE OF SETTLER COLONIALISM WHITENESS IN HAWAI'IAND

OCEANIA

(2019) (describing how Indigenous Pacific Islanders have been racialized in opposition to White people).
62.

See, e.g., 5 GUAM CODE ANN. § 87105 (conditioning eligibility to serve on the board of trustees
of the Department of Chamorro Affairs on Chamorro ancestry); 21 GUAM CODE ANN. § 75102
(conditioning eligibility to serve on the Chamorro Land Trust Commission on Chamorro ancestry); see also infra notes 274-278279 and accompanying text (describing plebiscite law).
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Chamorros are not usually classified as Indians. On the other hand, Black people63 are generally described as a racial group, and may also be identified by reference to ancestry, but are neither Indigenous to the present-day United States
nor colonized peoples under international-law definitions.64
Under American law, how a group is classified according to these axes is important because the Constitution (and the civil-rights laws passed to carry out
its mandates) is interpreted differently depending on the type of classification.
That is, racial classifications are strictly scrutinized under the Fourteenth
Amendment65 and expressly forbidden under the Fifteenth Amendment 66 and
many statutes.6 7 "Indian" classifications are generally upheld under both the
Constitution and statutes so long as they are rationally related to federal power
over Indian affairs.68 Classifications based on indigeneity, colonization, and/or
ancestry thus survive and fall depending on whether they seem more racial or
more Indian.

63.

Even in the example, this categorical distinction obscures the experience of individuals who
are Black and Indigenous, and of freedmen -that is, Black people formerly enslaved by Indian
tribes who were later granted tribal citizenship in those nations. See generally KENDRA TAIRA
FIELD, GROWING UP WITH THE COUNTRY: FAMILY, RACE, AND NATION AFTER THE

CIVIL WAR

(2018) (providing a historiography and family history of people of African descent who migrated to Indian territory and made families with Creek and Seminole people); TIYA MILES,
THE TIES THAT BIND: THE STORY OF AN AFRO-CHEROKEE FAMILY IN SLAVERY AND FREEDOM

(2005) (providing a history of an Afro-Cherokee family); Kyle T. Mays, Blackness and Indigeneity, in FOUR HUNDRED SOULS: A COMMUNITY HISTORY OF AFRICAN AMERICA, 1619-2019, at
123-24 (Keisha N. Blain & Ibram X. Kendi, eds., 2021) (highlighting the history of Afro-Indigenous people -"those with a relationship not only to the mark of Blackness but also to
U.S. indigenous roots"); CIRCE STURM, BLOOD POLITICS: RACE, CULTURE, AND IDENTITY IN
THE CHEROKEE NATION OF OKLAHOMA (2002) (describing the history of Cherokee freedmen).

It also erases the pre-enslavement history of African-descended Americans. Kyle T. Mays, A
Provocation of the Modes of Black Indigeneity: Culture, Language and Possibilities, 44 ETHNIC
STUD. REV. 41, 43 (2021) (introducing the concept of Black Indigeneity and asking "what if
we take seriously that those Africans who were Indigenous peoples stolen from their own
places of home and forced to labor on dispossessed land, were actually Indigenous?").
64.

The fact that international-law definitions of colonized peoples do not usually encompass
peoples who were enslaved and displaced from the land to which they are Indigenous raises
difficult questions that are beyond the scope of this Article.

65.

See Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S.

66.

U.S. CONST. amend. XV.

67.

E.g., 42 U.S.C.

68.

See Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 551, 555 (1974); Rolnick, The Promise of Mancari, supra
note 17, at 995.
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Each of these classifications is also associated with a different legal framework. Laws that include racial classifications demand application of the Reconstruction Amendments and civil-rights laws. 69 Laws that address the rights of
Indians fit within the framework of Federal Indian law, generally separate from
race law. The rights of colonized peoples in the U.S. territories are governed by
territorial law, which is distinct from both race law and Indian law. Indigeneity
has meaning in international law, which is also a source of different rights and
protections for colonized peoples. Indigenous and colonized peoples under international law, and Indians under domestic law, have present-day group rights
connected to a recognition of past collective harms. Race law generally does not
include a similar recognition of group identity, historical harm, or collective
rights.
This Article contrasts the three domestic regimes implicated here -Federal
Indian law, race law, and law of the territories - by examining cases about Indigenous Pacific Islanders (a group that spans multiple categories). Each regime
incorporates certain assumptions, highlights certain themes, and elides certain
realities. For example, modern Federal Indian law cases include a robust engagement with history and sovereignty and an acknowledgement that forced assimilation has harmed Native people. 7 But they are premised on an assertion of expansive federal power" and they do not engage with the way racialization has
facilitated Native dispossession and subordination.72 Race law directly acknowledges the role of racism in subordination of various groups, but in its modern
form it employs an individualized analysis of discrimination and does a poor job
of acknowledging group identity and collective harm. Law of the territories comprehends the harm of colonization but obscures its unevenness by treating all
present-day residents the same and incorporating near-total federal power without a group remedy.
Highlighting a particular category thus means invoking a particular framework at the expense of other frameworks. This is illustrated by the cases discussed in Part II, which involved multiple axes of classification and therefore fell
between several possible legal frameworks. A court's decision about which
framework to apply is consequential because of what the different frameworks

69. Ancestry is not associated with any specific body of U.S. law, but it is most commonly treated
as race-adjacent and analyzed as a racial classification would be.
70.

See Rolnick, The Promise ofMancari, supranote 17, at 976, 991-92.

71.

See Michalyn Steele, Plenary Power, Political Questions, and Sovereignty in Indian Affairs, 63
UCLA L. REv. 666, 680-82 (2016); Natsui Taylor Saito, Assserting Plenary Power Over the
"Other": Indians, Immigrants, Colonial Subjects, and Why U.S. JurisprudenceNeeds to Incorporate
InternationalLaw, 20 YALE L. & PoL'Y REv. 427,430 (2002); Nell Jessup Newton, FederalPower
Over Indians:Its Sources, Scope, andLimitations, 132 U. PA. L. REv. 195, 233-34 (1984).
See Rolnick, The Promise of Mancari, supra note 17, at 987-88.

72.
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highlight and obscure. Most importantly for Indigenous peoples, among domestic regimes, only Indian law acknowledges historical harms and present-day
group political identity. For non-Indigenous peoples, claims to group political
rights and remedies for collective harms are nearly always out of reach because
of the individual, anticlassification bent of modern race law. This Article describes how Indigenous peoples could similarly be denied group rights and identity, leaving them vulnerable to loss of territory and blocked pathways to selfgovernance and collective liberation. As those cases demonstrate, all frameworks
have their shortcomings, but the inability of courts to employ more than one at
a time has caused the greatest damage.
A.

Indigeneity

Indigeneity does not have independent legal significance in U.S. law-that
is, Indigenous status alone does not trigger any specific set of doctrinal protections. Indigeneity is a political status and a racialized category,73 but it is more
than what is encompassed by either racial Indianness or political recognition as
an Indian under U.S. law. Those two categories overlap but are not identical.
The "American Indian/Alaska Native" racial category (for example, on the census) includes people who are not legally considered Indians.74 The "Indian" legal
category includes many people of mixed racial backgrounds. Neither the "Indian" racial category nor the "Indian" legal category is coextensive with the "Indigenous" category, which may encompass anyone descended from peoples colonized by the United States.
"Indigeneity" is an important category in international law. The United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples does not include a precise
definition of "indigeneity," but its drafters identified several factors that define
Indigenous populations: descent, land occupation, cultural distinctiveness, and
nondominant status. 75 As S. James Anaya explains,

73.

74.

See generally id. at 967 (examining the relationship between the Indian legal and racial categories).
See Malia Villegas, Amber Ebarb, Sarah Pytalski & Yvette Roubideaux, DisaggregatingAmeri-

can Indian andAlaska Native Data: A Review ofLiterature, NAT'L CONG. OF AM.

INDIANS, PoL'Y

RSCH. CTR. 14-15 (2016), https://www.policylink.org/sites/default/files/AIAN-report.pdf
[https://perma.cc/834Y-TQHU] (discussing the difference between tribal affiliation and racial self-identification in census data). For example, a person may identify as American Indian
based on family history or genetic evidence of connection to an American Indian community,
but if that person is not recognized as a citizen or affiliate by the contemporary tribal government, they would not qualify as Indian for legal purposes.
75. Erica-Irene A. Daes, An Overview of the History of IndigenousPeoples: Self-Determination and the
United Nations, 21 CAMBRIDGE REV. INT'L AFFS. 7, 9-10 (2008); U.N. DEP'T OF ECoN. & Soc.
AFFAIRS, THE CONCEPT OF INDIGENOUS PEOPLE, at 2-3, U.N. Doc. PFII/2004/WS.1/3 (2004).
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[Indigenous peoples are] the culturally distinctive and more or less cohesive groups whose ancestors were the original inhabitants of lands now
dominated by others. These include Indian tribes or communities of the
American continents and aboriginal peoples in Australia and New Zealand, as well as other insular groups whose origins predate the settler
societies that have developed around them. 76
In the context of the United States, a group should be considered Indigenous
if all or part of its ancestral territory is within the present-day boundaries of the
United States, without regard to present-day national" or state78 borders or relocation to other territory within the United States.79
Although connection to occupied land is only one part of the definition
above, it is the factor that most distinguishes "indigeneity" from related categories. As Taiaiake Alfred and Jeff Corntassel explain:
The communities, clans, nations and tribes we call Indigenous peoples
are just that: Indigenous to the lands they inhabit, in contrast to and in
contention with the colonial societies and states that have spread out
from Europe and other centres of empire. It is this oppositional, placebased existence, along with the consciousness of being in struggle

76.

Anaya, supra note 43, at 96.

77.

The Jay Treaty recognizes the right of Canada-U.S. border tribes to free passage across the
Canada-U.S. border. Treaty of Amity Commerce and Navigation, between His Britannick
Majesty; and The United States of America, by Their President, with the advice and consent
of Their Senate, Art. III, 8 Stat. 1i6 (1794); Act of Apr. 2, ch. 308, 45 Stat. 401 (1928); Caitlin
C.M. Smith, The Jay Treaty FreePassageRight in Theory andPractice, 1 AM. INDIAN L.J. 161, 162
(2012). Similarly, the Tohono O'odham Nation has resisted federal efforts to build a border
wall through its territory. Resolution o17, INTER TRIBAL ASS'N OF ARIZ. (Feb. 10, 2017), http:
//www.tonation-nsn.gov/wp-content/uploads/217/2/ITAA-Resolution- 0117-Opposition
-to-Border-Wall.pdf [https://perma.cc/6J6V-DD9B].

78.

For example, the Shoshone-Paiute Tribes of the Duck Valley Reservation occupy a territory
that straddles the Idaho-Nevada border and the tribes' ancestral territory includes present day
Idaho, Nevada, and Oregon. See Duck Valley Indian Reservation, NEV. STATE HIST. PRESERVATION OFF., https://shpo.nv.gov/nevadas-historical-markers/historical-markers/duck-valleyindian-reservation [https://perma.cc/68FS-YNRS]. The Standing Rock Reservation is situated in North and South Dakota. About, STANDING ROCK Sioux TRIBE, https://www.standingrock.org/about [https://perma.cc/48WW-BMT7].

79.

For example, the Cherokee Nation is in Oklahoma, even though the aboriginal homeland of
the Cherokee people was in present-day Georgia and North Carolina, because the U.S. government relocated tribes from the East Coast under duress. See generally CLAUDIO SAUNT, UNWORTHY REPUBLIC: THE DISPOSSESSION OF NATIVE AMERICANS AND THE ROAD TO INDIAN TER-

RITORY (2020) (historicizing the forced migration of Indigenous people across the Mississippi
River in the 183os and state-sponsored theft of their land, now known as "Indian Removal");
WILuIAM L. ANDERSON, CHEROKEE REMOVAL: BEFORE AND AFTER (1991) (Surveying Cherokee
removal).
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against the dispossessing and demeaning fact of colonization by foreign
peoples, that fundamentally distinguishes Indigenous peoples from
other peoples of the world. 80
"[H]istorical continuity with pre-invasion and pre-colonial societies"81 is thus
arguably the defining feature of indigeneity as compared to "minority" status.8 2
Importantly, descent and land occupation are linked.
[Indigenous peoples are] descendants of the peoples who inhabited the
present territory of a country, wholly or partially, at the time when persons of different culture or ethnic origin arrived there from other parts of
the world, overcame them and, by conquest, settlement or other means,
reduced them to a non-dominant or colonized status. 83
Indigeneity is thus a group status, and the status of an individual as Indigenous
depends on both self-identification and group acceptance.84 Accordingly, ancestry is used to trace the link back through time between a living person and the
group who inhabited the territory precolonization.
As groups, Indigenous peoples have a right to self-determination,85 but that
right has been interpreted in light of nations' right to territorial integrity.86 For
Indigenous peoples located "within" settler states, this has meant that self-determination is not always understood to include the right to complete political
independence because some argue that could amount to secession.8 7

so.

Taiaiake Alfred & Jeff Corntassel, Being Indigenous: Resurgences Against Contemporary Colonialism, 4O Gov'T & OPPOSITION 597, 597 (2005) (emphasis omitted).

81. Julian Aguon, On Loving the Maps our Hands CannotHold: Self-Determinationof Colonized and
IndigenousPeoples in InternationalLaw, 16 UCLA AsIAN PAC. AM. L.J. 47, 56 (2011).
82. Will

Kymlicka, Beyond the Indigenous/MinorityDichotomy?, in REFLECTIONS

ON THE UN DEC-

LARATION ON THE RIGHTS OF INDIGENOUS PEOPLES 184 (Stephen Allen & Alexandra

Xanthaki

eds., 2011) (acknowledging that despite other similarities, other minority groups do not share
"the same territorial claims").
83. Daes, supra note 75, at 9.
84. Addie C. Rolnick, Indigenous Children, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF CHILDREN'S RIGHTS
LAw 571, 572 (Jonathan Todres & Shani M. King eds., 2020).
85.
86.

See G.A. Res. 61/295, at 3-4 (Sept. 13, 2007).

See Samuel I.N. Blay, TerritorialIntegrity and PoliticalIndependence, in MAX PLANCKENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL

87.

LAw

9-11 (2010).

See MAIVAN CLECH LAM, AT THE EDGE OF THE STATE: INDIGENOUS PEOPLES AND SELF-DETERMINATION, at xii-xxvi (Richard Falk ed., 2000); Maivan Clech Lim, Remembering the Country
of Their Birth: IndigenousPeoples and Territoriality,57 J. INT'L AFFS. 141-42 (2004) [hereinafter
Lam, Remembering] (describing the tension between territorial integrity and self-determination, explaining why political-independence claims by nonconsenting indigenous peoples are
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B. Indianness
American law recognizes Indigenous rights through the categories of "tribe"
and "Indian."" These categories are associated with Federal Indian law, the body
of law that deals specifically with the unique relationship between the federal
government and the Indian tribes.
Indian "tribes" have "an unquestionable, and, heretofore, unquestioned right
to the lands they occupy, until that right shall be extinguished by a voluntary
cession to our government." 89 In the Constitution, they are "contradistinguished
by a name appropriate to themselves, from foreign nations, as from the several
states composing the union."9 0 Indian tribes are acknowledged in federal law as
separate sovereigns with whom the United States signed treaties.9 1
Based in part on these provisions,92 Congress claims plenary power to recognize and "terminate" its government-to-government relationship with tribes,
and federal courts have agreed that Congress has the power to say which groups
will be recognized as tribes.9 3 Today, that power has been delegated to the Department of the Interior's Office of Federal Acknowledgement, but the decision
to acknowledge or stop acknowledging an Indigenous nation as an Indian tribe
has been exercised by all three branches of government.9 4 Not all Indigenous
groups are recognized as tribes, 95 and the current system allows few opportunities to challenge a decision not to acknowledge. 96
Indians are those people who are properly the subjects of federal law relating
to Indian tribes because of their relationship to a group that is or was acknowledged as a tribe. The definition of "Indian" varies across different laws, but it
always includes some political component. That is, a person does not qualify as

not secession, and noting that "virtually all indigenous peoples seek a freely negotiated partnership with states rather than independence").
88. Ablavsky, supranote 57, at 1032-33.
89. Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1, 17 (1831).
90.

Id. at 18; see U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 3.

91.

See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3; U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.

92. Gregory Ablavsky, Beyond the Indian Commerce Clause, 124 YALE L.J. 1012, 1014 (2015).
93.
94.

See Newton, supra note 71, at 233-34, 249.

See Kirsten Matoy Carlson, Congress, Tribal Recognition, and Legislative-AdministrativeMultiplicity, 91 IND. L.J. 955, 957 (2016) (finding that Congress acknowledged more tribes than the
Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA) did during the period studied); William W. Quinn, Jr., Federal
Acknowledgement ofAmerican Indians Tribes:Authority, JudicialInterposition, and25 C.ER. 5 83,
17 AM. INDIAN L. REv. 37, 41 (1992) (describing acknowledgement via the judicial branch).

95.

Lorinda Riley, When a Tribal Entity Becomes a Nation: The Role of Politicsin the Shiing Federal
RecognitionRegulations, 39 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 451, 452 (2016).

96.

See id. at 474.
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an Indian just because they describe themselves that way. In most cases, they
must demonstrate a connection to a specific Indian tribal government and, importantly, the Indian tribal government must recognize them as members.9 7 The
easiest and most common form of this relationship is formal citizenship in a
tribe. 98 However, federal" (and tribal 0 0 ) definitions of "Indian" often sweep
more broadly than tribal citizenship. This makes sense considering the many
federal policies that intentionally severed the formal relationship between individuals and their nations, and made citizenship a site of financial and political
contestation. Many of the definitions of "Indian" incorporate some reference to
ancestry. 11 Even so, they are treated as nonracial classifications for the purposes
of equal-protection analysis. This means that they are exempted from the strict
scrutiny that applies to racial classifications and are constitutional as long as they
are "tied rationally to the fulfillment of Congress' unique obligation toward the
Indians."1 0 2
While "Indian" is a racial category, and the federal legal "Indian" category is
shaped by the historical racial duality of Indian versus White, 0 3 there are several
reasons to treat "Indian" classifications differently from other racial classifications. For instance, the category itself denotes a political relationship between
individual and nation, and between an Indian nation and the U.S. nation. Indian
tribes are described separately in the Constitution, 4 and instead of undoing

97.

See Ablavsky, supra note 57, at 1o56 (describing historical and constitutional usage of "Indian"
as based on "belonging to a Native polity"); Rolnick, Tribal CriminalJurisdiction,supra note
17, at 468 (describing how Indian legal classifications emphasize tribal affiliation). But see
Rolnick, Tribal CriminalJurisdiction,supra note 17, at 381-83 (noting that federal-government
recognition of a person as Indian can suffice for some purposes in the absence of tribal-government recognition of that person).

98.

See Matthew L.M. Fletcher, Race and American Indian Tribal Nationhood, 11 Wyo. L. REV. 295,
324 (2011).

99.

See Rolnick, The Promise of Mancari, supra note 17, at 974.

100. See Rolnick,

Tribal CriminalJurisdiction,supra note 17, at 376-77.

101. Even definitions that turn on citizenship may incorporate descent if the tribe's citizenship laws

require documentation of ancestry. See, e.g., Indian Self-Determination and Education Assistance Act, 25 U.S.C. § 53o4(d) (2018) (defining "Indian" as a member of a federally acknowl-

Govtribal-citizenship laws and identifying descent

edged tribe); see KIRSTY GOVER, TRIBAL CONSTITUTIONALISM: STATES, TRIBES, AND THE
ERNANCE OF MEMBERSHIP 10 (2010) (collecting

and/or percentage of ancestry as common criteria).
102. Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 555 (1974)
103. See Ablavsky, supranote 57, at 1050-54; United States v. Sandoval, 167 U.S. 278 (1897); United
States v. Rogers, 45 U.S. 567, 573 (1846); Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191,
210-11 (1978).

104. See U.S. CONST.
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that distinction, 105 the Fourteenth Amendment reinforced it.106 In the case setting forth the rule of rational basis scrutiny, however, the Court simply described
legal "Indian" classifications as "political rather than racial in nature." 107 Although the statutory classification at issue in that case did in fact reference ancestry and included people who were not tribal citizens, 108 the Court described it as
a classification based only on citizenship in a recognized tribal government.0 9
Beyond protection from strict scrutiny, the framework of Federal Indian law
has at least two other significant themes. First, it includes an awareness that U.S.
citizenship was imposed on Indian people without their consent and as a tool of
colonization via forced assimilation. 1 0 Second, it explicitly protects group rights
and preserves the connection between individual and group.1 1 These themes are
important because American law otherwise centers on individual rights and
views group power as hostile to individualism. It also elevates U.S. citizenship

1os. Compare Dred Scott v. Sanford, 6o U.S. (19 How.) 393, 393 (1857) (enslaved party), superseded
by constitutionalamendment, U.S. CONST. amend. XIV (holding that free individuals of African
descent were not citizens), with U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (granting citizenship to all persons born in the United States, including individuals of African descent).
106.

Compare U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 3 (excluding "Indians not taxed" when determining apportionment of Congressional representatives for each state), with id. amend. XIV, 2 (retaining the "Indians not taxed" exclusion).

107. Mancari, 417 U.S. at 553 n.24.

1ob. See Carole Goldberg, American Indians and "Preferential"Treatment, 49 UCLA L. REv. 943,
949-50 (2002).
109. Mancari,417 U.S. at 553-54; Goldberg, supra note 1o8 (explaining that the statute required one

quarter Indian blood, but not tribal citizenship, and the Court relied on a subsequent BIA rule
adding the citizenship requirement); Carole Goldberg, What's Race Got to Do With It?: The
Story of Morton v. Mancari, in RACE LAw STORIES 237, 237-38 (Rachel F. Moran & Devon
Wayne Carbado eds., 2008) (further analyzing differences in coverage between the statute
and the rule).
110. See Bethany R. Berger, BirthrightCitizenshipon Trial: Elkv. Wilkins andUnited States v. Wong

Kim Ark, 37 CARDozo L. REv. 1185, 1241-42 (2016).
11. Mississippi Band of Choctaw Indians v. Holyfield, 490 U.S. 30, 49 (1989) (describing the
ICWA protecting "not only the interests of individual Indian children and families, but also
of the tribes themselves"); Addie Rolnick & Kim Pearson, RacialAnxieties in Adoption: Reflections on Adoptive Couple, White Parenthood, and Constitutional Challenges to the ICWA, 2017
MICH. ST. L. REV. 727, 744 n. 65 (2017) (describing the Holyfield Court's identification of the
link between group rights and children's best interests).
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as the carrier of many individual rights and therefore as a highly sought after
(and sometimes jealously guarded11 3) status.

12

C. Colonized
Colonized status is an aspect of the definition of "indigeneity," but it has independent meaning under international law. Colonized peoples are inhabitants
of "territories whose peoples have not yet attained a full measure of self-government."11 4 The United Nations maintains a list of non-self-governing territories." 5 Inclusion on the list operates as a prima facie case that the peoples in
question have an inchoate right to political self-determination, which may be
exercised via independence, free association, or statehood. However, peoples excluded from that list may also have self-determination rights under international
law principles. Some colonized peoples are not included on the list of non-selfgoverning territories on the theory (sometimes contested) that they have already
exercised their rights to political self-determination through free association
(e.g., the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands), independence
(e.g., Philippines), or statehood (e.g., Hawaii). Of the U.S. territories, only
Guam, American Samoa, and the U.S. Virgin Islands remain on the list.
As recognized by the U.N. General Assembly's Declaration on the Granting
of Independence to Colonial Peoples and Countries, "all peoples have the right
to self-determination," which includes the right to freely determine their political
status.1 16 Colonized peoples are thus entitled to the remedy of decolonization." 7
If colonized peoples are citizens of the colonizing nation, such citizenship may
be a double-edged sword, signifying domination while containing rights.

112. But see Devon W. Carbado, Racial Naturalization,57 AM. Q. 633, 639, 644 (2005) (offering an
interpretation of Black American inclusion as violence, noting that "slavery both denaturalized
Blacks from Africa and Americanized them" and observing that formal citizenship for Blacks
has entailed "inclusive exclusion").
113. See Eric Cohen & Melissa Rodgers, Trump's Wealth Testfor Citizenship Targets People of Color,
HILL (Aug. 4, 2020, 7:00 PM EDT), https://thehill.com/opinion/inmmigration/51o481trumps-wealth-test-for-citizenship-targets-people-of-color [https://perma.cc/KP2Z-NFSF]
(describing recent proposals to restrict naturalization).
114. U.N. Charter art. 73.
11s. Non-Self-Governing Territories, UNITED NATIONS (Aug. 17, 2021), https://www.un.org/dppa

/decolonization/en/nsgt [https://perma.cc/8URJ-QC7R].
116. G.A. Res. 1514 (XV), Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and
Peoples, ¶ 2 (Dec. 14, 196o) [hereinafter Declaration on the Granting of Independence].
117.

See Aguon, supra note 81, at 52.
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While colonized peoples may also be Indigenous,118 the categories are not
coextensive. For example, all the people living in Guam when it was annexed to
the United States were colonized under the international-law definition. But not
all were Indigenous." 9 It is therefore possible to be colonized, but not Indigenous. 20 On the other hand, Indigenous peoples living within the boundaries of
settler-colonial nations are not considered to be non-self-governing territories
under international law." While those peoples also experienced colonization,
international law recognizes only their right to limited self-determination, which
does not include political independence.12
It is important to note that both "indigeneity" and "colonized" status are formal legal categories under international law. They are also group-based statuses,
not individual labels. A group is Indigenous, or a group is colonized. An individual is a colonized person or an Indigenous person only vis-a-vis their connection
to the group.

118. Indeed, the application of international law to colonized peoples has sometimes involved
drawing a distinction between Indigenous and non-Indigenous colonized people, and further
between "savage" and "civilized" Indigenous peoples. See, e.g., Burnett [Ponsa-Kraus], supra
note 36, at 668 (describing how the Treaty of Paris allowed Spanish inhabitants of new U.S.
territories to elect between Spanish and U.S. citizenship but denied "native inhabitants" the
right to determine their own status); id. at 699-700 (discussing Federico Degetau's amicus
brief in Gonzalez . United States, which argued that "native inhabitants" referred only to "uncivilized native tribes," which in his view existed in the Philippines but not in Puerto Rico).
119. Most, however, were. See Davis v. Guam, No. 11-00035, 2017 WL 930825, at *6 (D. Guam
Mar. 8, 2017) (using data from the 195o federal census of Guam to explain that most of Guam's
inhabitants were Chamorro, but some were not).
120. See Aguon, supra note 81, at 57 n. 62 (differentiating between the meaning of self-determination for colonized and indigenous peoples); see also ANTONIO CASSESE, SELF-DETERMINATION
OF PEOPLES: ALEGAL REAPPRAISAL 87 (1995) (explaining outlier colonies like Gibraltar and the
Falklands/Malvinas, where the colonial inhabitants are essentially of colonial (i.e. British)
stock).
121. Aguon, supra note 81, at 52; accord Principles Which Should Guide Members in Determining
Whether or not an Obligation Exists to Transmit the Information Called for Under Article 73e
of the Charter, G.A. Res. 1541 (XV), U.N. Doc. A/4684 (Dec. 15, 1960); Declaration on the
Granting of Independence, supra note 116; U.N. Doc. A/4684 (Dec. 14, 1960); see also Julian
Aguon, Native Hawaiiansand InternationalLaw, in NATIVE HAWAIIAN LAw: A TREATISE 353424 (Melody Kapilialoha MacKenzie, Susan K. Serrano & D. Kapua'ala Sproat eds., 2015) (explaining and critiquing the United Nations' removal of Hawaii from its list of non-self-governing territories based on U.S. arguments that Hawaiians had exercised their rights to selfdetermination by voting for statehood and the U.S. had consequently fulfilled its international
obligations).
122. Daes, supra note 75, at 11-12.
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American law's treatment of colonized peoples is roughly bifurcated between
states and unincorporated territories.123 Inside states,1 2 4 consistent with the international principle of territorial integrity, a history of colonization does not
necessarily give rise to present-day rights of independence or decolonization. 12 1
To the extent that colonization is recognized or addressed in fully incorporated
areas, it is done via the domestic doctrine of Federal Indian law. 126 Outside the
states, the status of colonized peoples is governed by the extraterritoriality doctrine set forth in the InsularCases.1 2 ' This approach has been criticized for creating a second-class form of Americanness, where residents of the territories are
subjected to U.S. rule but do not enjoy full citizenship or constitutional rights,
existing instead in a not-quite-in, not-quite-out relationship to the United
States. For some, this looks like formal citizenship without full constitutional or
voting rights. For others, it looks like the status of "non-citizen national." 12 In
other words, colonized peoples are subjects of the United States, but not fully a
part of its political community.129
Most scholars object to this subject status, and indeed many have persuasively argued for full citizenship and full constitutional protections to be applied

123. See Christina Duffy Burnett [Ponsa-Kraus] , A Convenient Constitution?ExtraterritorialityAfter
Boumediene, 109 COLUM. L. REV. 973, 982-83 (2009).
124. In earlier periods, U.S. territories that would eventually become states were treated as sometimes outside the reach of some constitutional rules, a contest that greatly affected the lives of
colonized peoples in Alaska and the American Southwest. See infra notes 470-475.
125. See LAM, AT THE EDGE OF THE STATE, supra note

87, at

136-38 (describing state-centric

re-

sistance to Indigenous claims to external self-determination rights); Lam, Remembering the
Country of Their Birth, supra note 87, at 140-43; Aguon, supra note 81, at 5o-51 (describing the
tension between external self-determination and territorial integrity in debates about the definition of "peoples" and noting that the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples recognizes a right of self-determination); MAURO BARELu, SEEKING JUSTICE IN
INTERNATIONAL

LAW: THE

SIGNIFICANCE AND IMPLICATIONS OF THE UN DECLARATION ON THE

(analyzing the final version of the Declaration and
noting that, by "invoking an unqualified principle of territorial integrity, Article 46(1) requires
that indigenous peoples exercise their right to self-determination within the framework of
existing States").
RIGHTS OF INDIGENOUS PEOPLES 25 (2016)

126. See Johnson v. M'Intosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543, 589-90 (1823); Cherokee Nation v. Georgia,
30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1, 23-24 (1831).
127.

E.g., Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244, 250 (1901); Gonzalez v. Williams, 192 U.S. 1,10 (1904);
Balzac v. Porto Rico, 258 U.S. 298,304-05 (1922); see also Harris v. Rosario, 446 U.S. 651, 65152 (1980) (applying the Insular Cases's extraterritoriality doctrine to an equal-protection claim
arising in Puerto Rico).

128. Tuaua v. United States, 788 F. 3d 300, 304 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (holding that American Samoans
are not entitled to birthright citizenship), cert. denied, 579 U.S. 902. (2016). But see Fitisemanu
v. United States, 426 F. Supp. 3d 1155, 1196 (D. Utah 2019) (holding that American Samoans
are U.S. citizens, a holding that was reversed on appeal), rev'd, 1 F.4 th 862 (loth Cir. 2021).
129. See ER MAN, supra note 36.
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in the territories. 3 0 For Indigenous peoples, however, citizenship and full constitutional protections have been a decidedly mixed bag. It is arguably their subject status that has enabled Indigenous Pacific Islanders to maintain land and
self-governance rights"" against the backdrop of an American legal system that
generally refuses to recognize group identity and is veined with the belief that
"[t]he soil and the people within these limits are under the political control of
the Government of the United States, or of the States of the Union.""

Accordingly, although legal scholars aligned in support of the argument that
American Samoans were entitled to birthright citizenship when federal courts
considered the issue,13 3 some Samoans expressed concern that citizenship would
mean the loss of land rights protected in part by federal courts' limited application of Fourteenth Amendment jurisprudence to the territories." 4
D. Race

Race is a legally and socially constructed category that was, at one time, formally defined in law.135 While not scientifically real and rarely legally defined
130. See, e.g., Neil Weare, Why the Insular Cases Must Become the Next Plessy, HARV. L. REv. BLOG
(Mar. 23, 2018), https://blog.harvardlawreview.org/why-the-insular-cases-must-becomethe-next-plessy [https://perma.cc/PL6N-ZPAA]; Villazor, supra note 3; Rose Cuison Villazor, American Nationalsand InterstitialCitizenship, 85 FORDHAM L. REv. 1673 (2017).
131. See Susan K. Serrano, Elevating the Perspectivesof U.S. TerritorialPeoples: Why the Insular Cases
Should be Taught in Law School, 21 J. GENDER, RACE & JUST. 395, 445-48 (2018); LINE-NOUE
MEMEA KRUSE, THE PACIFIC INSULAR CASE OF AMERICAN SAMOA: LAND RIGHTS AND LAw IN
UNINCORPORATED US TERRITORIES 76-89 (2018); Developments in the Law-The U.S. Territo-

ries, 130 HAJv. L. REv. 1616, 1680-1703 (2017); Rose Cuison Villazor, Blood Quantum Land

Laws and the Race Versus PoliticalIdentity Dilemma, 96 CALIF. L. REv. 801, 809 (2008).
132. United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375, 379 (1886).
133. See Brief for Scholars of Constitutional Law & Legal History as Amid Curiae Supporting Appellees with Respect to the Insular Cases, Fitisemanu v. United States, 1 F.4th 862 (loth Cir.
2021) (Nos. 20-4017, 20-4019); Brief of Citizenship Scholars as Amici Curiae in Supporting
Plaintiffs-Appellees and Affirmance, Fitisemanu, 1 F.4 th 862 (Nos. 20-4017, 20-4019); Brief of
Amid Curiae Scholars of Constitutional Law & Legal History in Support of Neither Party,
Tuaua v. United States, 788 F 3 d 300 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (No. 13-5272); Corrected Brief of Citizenship Scholars as Amici Curiae Supporting Appellants and Urging Reversal, Tuaua, 788
F. 3d 300 (No. 13-5272).
134. Michelle Broder Van Dyke, Why Some American Samoans Don't Want U.S. Citizenship, NBC
NEWS (Dec. 17, 2019, 1:04 PM EST), https://www.nbcnews.com/news/asian-america/whysome-american-samoans-don-t-want-u-s-citizenship-n103256
[https://perma.cc/AQ6HJHWK]; see also MEMEA KRUSE, supra note 131, at 79-84 (explaining how American Samoa's
unincorporated status shields customary practices regarding nobility and land alienation).
135. While race is often discussed as a social construction, it was also a legal construction in the
sense that the racial categories we know today were shaped by legal rules. See K-Sue Park, The
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today, race is "a real and central social vessel of group affiliation and life in the
modern world."136 Because it has no natural meaning, race is best described as a
category that results from the process of racialization. This is a "discursive process by which particular groups have been classified as non-White; specific
meanings have been attached to those groups; and those meanings have been
used to support the hierarchical distribution of power, land, and resources.""'
Racial categories have often worked by attaching legal or social significance to
otherwise insignificant characteristics. 138 A variety of factors have been used to
define groups as non-White and to map people into those groups.139 Distinctions of phenotype and ancestry are probably the most common factors, but religion, culture, and even nonmutable or performative characteristics have mattered too. 10
For much of American history, race was also a formal legal category." The
definitions and boundaries of racial categories shifted across time, place, and
History Wars and Property Law: Conquestand Slavery as Foundationalto the Field, 131 YALE L.J.
1062, 1111-12 (2021) (describing how colonial property laws created and defined racial catego-

A. LEON HIGGINBOTHAM, JR., IN THE MATTER OF COLOR: RACE AND THE AMERICAN LEGAL PROCESS 36-47 (cataloguing laws that solidified the category of Blackness in relation to
property rights).
ries);

136. Eduardo Bonilla-Silva, The Essential Social Fact of Race, 64 AMER. SOCIO. REV. 899, 899
(1999).
137. Rolnick, The Promise of Mancari, supra note 17, at 965 n.31 (citing MICHAEL OMI & HOWARD

(2d ed.
1994)).
138. Id. at 1001; Ian F. Haney L6pez, The Social ConstructionofRace: Some Observationson Illusion,
Fabrication,and Choice, 29 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 1, 3-5 (1994); MICHAEL OMI & HOWARD
WINANT, RACIAL FORMATION IN THE UNITED STATES: FROM THE 1960S TO THE 1990S

WINANT, RACIAL FORMATION IN THE UNITED STATES

3,

13

( 3 d ed.

2015).

139. Rolnick, The PromiseofMancari, supra note 17, at 962-63 n.23 (citing Jerry Kang, Trojan Horses
of Race, 118 HARV. L. REV. 1489, 1499 (2005)).
140. Devon W Carbado & Mitu Gulati, The

Fih Black Woman, 11 J. Contemp. Legal Issues 701,
722-25 (2001) (discussing the theory of "identity performance" which recognizes that racial
discrimination is based not just on phenotypic characteristics but on how one presents difference, such as hairstyle or dress). See Khaled Beydoun, Between Muslim and White: The Legal
ConstructionofArab American Identity, 69 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 29, 50-58 (2013) (arguing
that religion demarcated the boundary between White and non-White in Arab naturalization
cases); Ariela Schachter, Rene D. Flores & Neda Maghbouleh, Ancestry, Color, or Culture?How
Whites Racially Classify Others in the U.S., 126 AM. J. SoCio. 1220, 1241 (2021) (" [The] unexpected absence of the strictest versions of ancestry-based logics, combined with a heavy reliance on skin color for some categories but not others, as well as the importance of less formalized [cultural] cues [especially for non-Black people of color], reveal the growing complexity
of the U.S. racial system and the inadequacy of referring to it as solely based on institutionalized ancestry logics.").

141. Laura G6mez, UnderstandingLaw and Race as Mutually Constitutive, 8 J. SCHOLARLY PERSPS.
47,53-57 (2012) (collecting examples of laws that defined the menu of and boundaries between
racial categories).
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purpose.142 Whatever the definition, though, race as a legal category secured or
removed specific rights and freedoms." The key similarity between different
legal definitions of race was the lack of relationship between the factors used to
classify racial groups and the rights and freedoms affected. Hair texture has
nothing to do with enslavement."4 Sedentary farming culture (as opposed to
nomadic hunting and gathering culture) has nothing to do with whether a person is legally competent to manage his or her own property rights.145 Rather,
racial categories were created along whatever lines were convenient as a filter
through which to sort power and ownership rights over land, production, and
national identity.
By creating these categories and tying rights to them, early American settlers
could more efficiently exercise control over non-White peoples.146 Recognizing
this history, modern courts strictly scrutinize any use of racial categories. 147
While the Supreme Court has acknowledged that recognition of, and classification by, race might be required to undo racial harms, 148 it has moved steadily
toward a rejection of all uses of race." The justification for heightened scrutiny
has also evolved from a concern about historical subordination based on race to
a belief that race, as an invented category, has no logical connection to rights like

142. See Kevin Noble Maillard, The PocahontasException: The Exemption ofAmerican IndianAncestry
from Racial Purity Law, 12 MICH. J. RACE & L. 351, 370-74 (2007); Gotanda, supra note 19, at
6, 23-36 (1991); Hudgins v. Wright, a Va. (1 Hen. &M.) 134,135 (1806).
143.

See, e.g., IAN HANEY LOPEZ, WHITE BYLAW: THE LEGAL CONSTRUCTION OF RACE (2006) (explaining how naturalization rights were restricted to White people and naturalization case law
in turn helped construct the legal category of Whiteness); Bethany Berger, Red: Racism and
the American Indian, 56 UCLA L. REV. 591, 615 (2009) (describing laws that prohibited Indians from testifying, holding office, and voting); Ariela Gross &Alejandro de la Fuente, Slaves,
FreeBlacks, and Race in the Legal Regimes of Cuba, Louisiana, and Virginia: A Comparison, 91
N.C. L. REv. 1699, 1723-24 (2012-2013) (describing Louisiana's Code Noir, which prohibited
free Black people from, among other activities, gathering in public and appearing on the
streets without a pass); id. at 1730-31 (describing laws that restricted free Blacks' right to give
testimony and vote).

144. See Hudgins, 1 Va. (1 Hen. & M.) at 139-40.
145.

See KATHERINE ELLINGHAUS, BLOOD WILL TELL: NATIVE AMERICANS AND ASSIMILATION POLICY 49 (2017) (" [C] ompetent Native American people were often imagined by the U.S. government as self-sufficient farmers.").

146. See G6mez, supra note 141.
147. See, e.g., Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 224 (1995); Grutter v. Bollinger,
539 U.S. 306, 326 (2003). The Court first set forth this rule of constitutional strict scrutiny in
Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944).
148. E.g., Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 28 (1971); Wygant v. Jackson
Bd. of Ed., 467 U.S. 267, 280 (1986).
149.

E.g., Parents Involved in Cmty. Schs. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 733 (2007) ; Shaw
v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 654-55 (1993).
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citizenship, voting, property, or autonomy. 150 More recently, some decisions
have suggested that even "racial attentiveness," or race-conscious action, will be
scrutinized. 151
The law no longer functions as the final arbiter of racial categories, but racial
categories are still important to law. Most obviously, antidiscrimination law requires that courts pay attention to racial categories in order to determine whether
old legal hierarchies persist and where remedies are required.15 2 In both law and
public conversation, however, an effort has emerged to separate race as a social
idea (one that might be important to organizing and identity, but which is otherwise not real) from race as a scientific idea (one that is biologically real, but is
not related to identity or rights).153 Old scientific theories of race (such as eugenics) have been discredited, but the widespread belief in race as a biological
fact persists. Some modern science continues to advance the idea that there are
important genetic and physical differences among human populations that correspond with geographic ancestry.15 4 Popular discourse often embraces these biological divisions as facts, but legal scrutiny is triggered when these assumed
biological facts are linked to the social idea of race. Thus, although the general
public might understand socially constructed race to be important to identity,
social organization, and political rights, the law rejects the possibility that race,
biologically defined, could be relevant to any of these concepts.
Unlike indigeneity, Indianness, or colonization, which all speak to group status, this modern understanding of race renders it a matter of individual identity.
This conception is reflected in the legal protections associated with race. Though
the Reconstruction Amendments originally attempted to remedy group-based

iso.

See, e.g., Shaw, 509 U.S. at 657; Rice v. Cayetano, 528 U.S. 495, 514 (2000).

151. See Cheryl L Harris & Kimberly West-Faulcon, Reading Ricci: Whitening Discrimination,Rac-

ing Test Fairness, 58 UCLA L. REV. 73, 103 (2010) (coining the term "racial attentiveness" and
describing Ricci v. DeStefano, 557 U.S. 557 (2009)).
152. E.g., Saint Francis Coll. v. Al-Khazraji, 481 U.S. 604, 613 (1987); Abdullahi v. Prada USA

Corp., 52o F.3 d 710, 712 (7th Cir. 2008).
153. The equation of ancestry and race speaks to the common desire to disavow race as an invented

category while clinging to the idea that there is some biological truth to racial categories, a
move accomplished by accepting that race is real on a scientific level while asserting that it has
no significance outside of scientific and medical data.
154. DOROTHY E. ROBERTS, FATAL INVENTION: How SCIENCE, POLITICS, AND BIG BUSINESS RE-

CREATE RACE IN THE 21ST CENTURY 57-68 (2011);

Camille

Gear Rich, Elective Race: Recognizing

Race Discriminationin the Era of Racial Self-Identfication, 102 GEO. L.J. 1501,

1503-07

(2014);

Kimberly TallBear, DNA, Blood, and Racializingthe Tribe, 18 WCAzO SA REv. 81, 81-82 (2003).
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harms with collective remedies, 55 they are understood today as extending only
individual protection, regardless of group affiliation.156
E. Ancestry

Ancestry refers to the genetic or historical connection between a living person and those progenitors who preceded the person, sometimes through generations. It connects a living person to their parents, grandparents, or other relatives who came before. It is most often used as a proxy for some other kind of
connection between a living person, a relative, or a group with rights, property,
or specific historical status. Ancestry is not coextensive with race, though there
is significant overlap.157
Ancestry has been used to sort people into racial categories, which were in
turn the basis for the denial of important rights.158 Japanese Americans subject
to curfew, relocation, and imprisonment during World War II were denied freedom based on an invocation of their ancestry, which served as a way to connect

ss. See Fiss, supra note 31, at 123-27.

Barnes & Chemerinsky, supra note 29, at 1076-80, 1084-85 (tracing the Court's interpretation of the Reconstruction Amendments); see generally ERIC FONER, THE SECOND FOUNDING: HOW THE CIVIL WAR AND RECONSTRUCTION REMADE THE CONSTITUTION (2019) (describing how the purposes of the Reconstruction Amendments were defeated by narrow
judicial construction and congressional inaction).

156. See

157. The Rice v. Cayetano opinion itself acknowledges this, holding that "[a]ncestry can be a proxy

for race." 528 U.S. 495, 496 (2000) (emphasis added). Circuit courts have continued to recognize the distinction. See, e.g., Davis v. Guam, 932 F. 3d 822, 834 ( 9 th Cir. 2019) ("Our first
inquiry is whether ... Rice held all classifications based on ancestry to be impermissible proxies for race. It did not."). However, litigants and courts inaccurately cite Rice for the proposition that ancestry is always equivalent to race. See, e.g., Brackeen v. Zinke, 338 F. Supp. 3 d 514,
533-34 (N.D. Tex. 2018) ("characterizing Rice as a case concerned with ancestry-based classifications generally and holding that [b]y deferring to tribal membership eligibility standards
based on ancestry, rather than actual tribal affiliation, the ICWAs jurisdictional definition of
'Indian children' uses ancestry as a proxy for race").

1s8.

Maillard, supra note 142, at 354-55 (describing the treatment of Native American ancestry in
antimiscegenation statutes and linking it to legal erasure); Gotanda, supra note 19, at 6, 2426 (describing the "one drop of blood" racial classification system for Black people and linking
it to slavery); Tanya Kateri Hernndez, "Multiracial"Discourse:Racial Classificationsin an Era
of Color-BlindJurisprudence,57 MD. L. REv. 97, 115-17 (1998) (describing a variety of ways in
which Whiteness is valued as a property right in a hierarchical society because it is a prerequisite for legal and social benefits, from cemetery admission to citizenship).
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them to Japan and the stereotypes of disloyalty associated with Japanese people. 159 Although ancestry was not the only factor important to Japanese racialization,16 0 it provided an easy way to connect individuals to a racial group. Similarly, grandfather clauses used by Southern states in the wake of Reconstruction
provided an easy way to link present-day voters to past groups (White and
Black) in order to continue the work of denying rights to free Blacks.161 When
ancestry functions as a stand-in for race, it is treated by courts as a racial category
and analyzed under the same constitutional framework as a racial category
would be.
However, ancestry has other meanings.1 6 2 For example, some colleges rely
on "legacy" status in admissions and financial aid decisions. 163 "Legacies" are
people whose parents, grandparents, or other relatives attended the same college. 164 And probate and inheritance rules classify people by ancestry in order to
determine how property should be distributed upon a person's death. 165 Although these uses of ancestry undoubtedly facilitate the transfer of property and

159. See Jerry Kang, Denying Prejudice:Internment, Redress, and Denial, 51 UCLA L. REv. 933, 95354 (2004).
160. Devon W. Carbado, Yellow by Law: The Story ofOzawa v. United States, in RACE
175, 208-14, 235 (Rachel F. Moran & Devon Wayne Carbado eds., 2008).
161.

See MICHAEL J. KLARMAN,

FROM JIM CROW TO

CIVIL RIGHTS:

IAW STORIES

THE SUPREME COURT AND THE

STRUGGLE FOR RACIAL EQUALITY 34 (2006).

162. Ancestry is used in law for nonracial purposes, but most of those laws operate in contexts
where no one would think to link them to race discrimination. For example, most people
would not think twice about considering ancestry in probate decisions about how to allocate
a deceased person's estate. Few would think to call that a racial classification in disguise; it
also is not singled out as an ancestry-based classification. It is just one of many areas of law
where ancestry is used to mark something else of legal significance: family relationships.
163. See Rosenstock v. Bd. of Governors of the Univ. of N.C., 423 F. Supp. 1321, 1327 (M.D.N.C.
1976) (college's interest in alumni monetary support provides a sufficiently "reasonable basis"
to justify admissions preference for descendants of out-of-state alumni because "no suspect
criteria or fundamental interests are involved"); see also Richard D. Kahlenberg, Introduction,

in

AFFIRMATIVE ACTION FOR THE RICH: LEGACY PREFERENCES IN COLLEGE ADMISSIONS

1

(Richard D. Kahlenberg ed., 2010) (raising concerns about legacy preferences but describing
them as "widespread").
164. Jasmine Harris, A New Bill in Congress Would End "Legacy" College Preferences. Here'sWhy that
Matters, WASH. POST (Feb. 15, 2022), https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2o22/o2/15
/legacy-colleges-universities-black-brown [https://perma.cc/H2A8-DGD9].
165.

See, e.g., ALA. CODE §

43-8-42 (2021);

§

STAT. ANN.

732.103 (2021);

KIAN.

§

ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN § 14-2103 (2021); FLA. STAT.
59-506 (2021); WIS. STAT. § 852.01 (2021). Other laws

also consider ancestry. Children born outside the United States have special rights to acquire
United States citizenship if they can demonstrate that their parents are United States citizens.
See 8 U.S.C. §5 1431, 1433 (2018). In Georgia, out-of-state residents can only apply for lifetime
hunting licenses in Georgia if they can demonstrate they are descended from a lifetime license
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wealth from White people to their descendants, they are not racialized and therefore do not trigger the constitutional framework of strict scrutiny.
Because the "ancestry" category has been used to facilitate racial subordination, it is understandable why some seek to proceed as if "ancestry" should always be treated as a code word for "race." Indeed, even critical race scholars
sometimes assume the two are the same - or that ancestry is at least subsumed
within race.166 Unpacking the relationship between ancestry and indigeneity
thus provides a rare opportunity to critique the judicial and popular understandings of race as ancestry- that is, race as a legally insignificant biological truth.
This inquiry is urgent for Indigenous peoples, but it is important for other
groups as well. For example, disentangling ancestry from race might help illuminate the conversation about reparations for enslavement, a point I return to
in Section IV.D.

For Indigenous peoples, ancestry traces the connection between a historical
group and those alive today who remain connected to that group. Present-day
inhabitants who have a sufficient connection to pre-settlement inhabitants can
thus use ancestry to demonstrate that they should be part of a group that exercises the political rights of former inhabitants. Ancestry is an imperfect proxy to
determine membership in a present-day Indigenous group, or even to identify
those with a sufficient connection to a pre-settlement group to count as Indigenous. Nonetheless, asking who one is descended from is an obvious way to assess
this temporal and historical connection, and sometimes it is the best available
method. After all, group rights may not die when individual people do, but if
there is no way to connect present-day peoples to past peoples, settlement would
achieve erasure within a generation.
One might expect classifications that use ancestry to identify Indigenous
peoples to be analyzed under Federal Indian law. But within the U.S. law framework that applies to Indigenous peoples, as explained further in the next Part,
courts have generally associated ancestry with race even when it is being used to
demarcate indigeneity.

holder. GA. CODE ANN. § 27-2-3.1(c)(1)(3) (2021) ("An applicant for a lifetime sportsman's
license who is a nonresident shall not be eligible for issuance of such license unless: (A) He or
she is from two through 15 years of age and is the grandchild of a resident who holds a valid
paid lifetime sportsman's license .... ").
166. In distinguishing between color discrimination and race discrimination, Vinay Harpalani suggests that the Reconstruction framers' understanding of race was more about ancestry than
skin color, arguing that they used skin color "as a proxy for race when evidence of ancestry
was not available." Vinay Harpalani, Civil Rights Law in Living Color, 79 MD. L. REv. 881, 907
(2020); see also Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81, 100 (1943) (describing group-based
subordination of Japanese Americans as ancestry-based and condemning laws that classify on
the basis of ancestry).
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The five categories described in this Part may overlap, but they have different
legal meanings, serve different purposes, and are associated with different doctrinal frameworks and treated differently under the Constitution. Only race is
strictly scrutinized. Some uses of ancestry escape scrutiny entirely, while others
are reflexively equated with race. Indigeneity, colonized status, and Indianness
evoke entirely different inquiries, but only Indianness is a significant source of
protection in U.S. law. Part II describes how litigants have used these different
doctrinal strands against each other to restrict the protections offered by each
one, with Indigenous Pacific Islanders as the first casualty, and outlines the key
juridical moves that made this possible. Part III investigates the social and political consequences of this confusion, which include legal erasure of non-Indian
Indigenous peoples and a narrow understanding of race as unrelated to historical
subordination or political power. In the case of both Indigenous and non-Indigenous people, this translates into a denial of collective rights.
The categories also have different popular meanings, which structure social
movements and shape public responses to legal controversies. While some may
view the categories as common sense or natural concepts, each has been shaped
by history and law. The doctrinal evolution described in Part II has thus contributed to popular confusion about whether ancestry equals race, whether attention
to race is always dangerous, and whether recognizing indigeneity and the harm
of colonization threatens a national commitment to colorblindness. This confusion is not abstract or accidental; it reinforces the denial of rights described in
Part III.

II. BLURRED CATEGORIES

Doctrinally, these five categories (indigeneity, Indianness, colonized status,
race, and ancestry) have become increasingly difficult to disentangle. While the
discussion above sets forth the different purposes, uses, and boundaries of each
one in law, courts sometimes have difficulty recognizing their differences. While
some of the confusion seems genuine, it is also the consequence of deliberate
legal strategies to redefine or constrain the categories, or to erase a particular
category by subsuming it within another. Moreover, because the categories have
popular usages that both reflect and diverge from the legal definitions, juridical
blurring creates confusion in popular understandings, which in turn reinforces
restrictive legal definitions.
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The stakes of this entanglement are high when the constitutionality of recognition and remedies is at issue, as they were in the Supreme Court's 200o decision in Rice v. Cayetano.167 Rice was a constitutional challenge to a Hawaii law
that limited the right to vote in certain elections to Indigenous Hawaiians and
defined that category with reference to ancestry. The case was a rare moment of
collision between all five categories: Indigenous Hawaiians, or Kanaka Maoli,
are Indigenous peoples who were colonized by the United States, but they are
not always included in the "Indian" legal category and their status under international law has been a matter of debate; they have been racialized; and the class
was defined by ancestry, which for some on the Court recalled the use of ancestry
in some nineteenth-century anti-Black voting laws. Instead of taking the opportunity to carefully interrogate the overlap and distinctions between the various
demarcations of identity at play in Rice, the Court collapsed race into ancestry
and indigeneity into Indianness.16 Rice itself was a limited decision, and it
might have had limited impact.169 But, in the decades since, it has become the
centerpiece of a campaign to dismantle Indigenous rights,170 beginning in Hawaii and the Pacific Islands, and bleeding back into laws affecting tribes in the
continental United States. Litigants have taken its holding that ancestry can be
a proxy for race and used it to argue that ancestry is equivalent to race, so any
classification that uses ancestry to identify a group is illegal. This strategy eliminates indigeneity and colonized status as categories of legal analysis and redefines ancestry and race in a way that chokes off any legal acknowledgement of
collective harm or identity.
This process unfolded in five stages. First, the Court in Rice collapsed ancestry into race, walling the two off from Indianness and eliminating indigeneity
and colonized status as separate frames of legal inquiry. By collapsing these categories, the Court was able to skip the intent inquiry that is normally required
in situations where a statute does not employ a facial racial classification. Second,

167. 528 U.S. 495,495-96 (2000).
168. Rolnick, The Promise of Mancari, supra note 17, at 996-1000.

Supp. 2d 4 , 19 (D.D.C.
2002) (distinguishing Rice in an equal-protection challenge to an "Indian" classification in
federal contracting because "Rice only dealt with the right to vote, which is a fundamental
right evoking strict scrutiny"); Goldberg, supra note 1o8, at 951-52 (noting that the Court in
Rice emphasized the particular facts of the case and the state voting context rather than delving
into broader questions about Native Hawaiian legal status); see also Berger, supra note 57, at
1193 (noting that, while some feared the Court might use Rice to limit Mancari, the Court
relied instead on the Fifteenth Amendment and the context of state voting laws, limiting its

169. See, e.g., Am. Fed'n of Gov't Emps. (AFL-CIO) v. United States, 195 F.

170.

applicability to Indian rights).
Susan K. Serrano, A ReparativeJustice Approach to Assessing Ancestral ClassificationsAimed at
Colonization'sHarms, 27 WM. & MARY
at, 447-48.

BiL RTS. J.

501, 513-14 (2018); Serrano, supra note 131,
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the Rice Court borrowed rules developed in the context of the Fourteenth
Amendment and applied them through the Fifteenth, with the Fifteenth Amendment's blunt prohibition on race-based voting classifications allowing the Court
to avoid the careful weighing of potential government interests required by a full
equal-protection analysis."' Third, lower courts expanded the reach of the Rice
rule beyond state elections and Kanaka Maoli affairs to bar ancestry-based voting
classifications in federal territories. Although the context differed from Hawaii
in important ways, these cases still involved Fifteenth Amendment challenges.
They were therefore governed by Rice and by the Court's longstanding approach
of carefully scrutinizing every burden on voting and treating race-based voter
qualifications as categorically unconstitutional.
Fourth, armed with several cases holding that that ancestry-based voting
classifications were illegal in the territories, the U.S. Department of Justice imported those holdings into the context of property rights and statutory law. It
did so by invoking the Fair Housing Act to challenge a lease program intended
to prevent Indigenous land loss. Fifth, the Rice rule came full circle when a federal district court relied on Rice to strike down the ICWA.172 The law applies to
children who are citizens of (or eligible for citizenship in) the federally aclMowledged Indian tribes that the Court in Rice first used as a foil to explain why
Kanaka Maoli, as an unrecognized group whose members were not identifiable
by citizenship rules, would not be protected by Mancari. While the Fifth Circuit
Court of Appeals reversed the most far-reaching of the district court's equal-protection holdings, the Supreme Court granted certiorari and will consider the
Act's constitutionality." In the Sections below, I outline all five stages in greater
detail.

171. See Jones v. Florida, 975 F. 3d 1016, 1043 (1ith Cir. 2020) (citing Rice for the rule that the Fif-

teenth Amendment "does not subject race-based voter qualifications to strict scrutiny-they
are per se unconstitutional").
172. See cases cited supra note 2.
173. Brackeen v. Haaland, No. 21-380, 2022 WL 585885 (2022); Cherokee Nation v. Brackeen, No.

21-377, 2022 WL 585883 (2022); Haaland v. Brackeen, No. 21-376. 2022 WL 585881; Texas v.
Haaland, No. 21-378, 2022 WL 585884. The Court seems mostly likely to focus on anticommandeering arguments, standing, and equal-protection arguments about the Act's placement
preferences, but at least one petitioner has asked the Court to consider the constitutionality
of the "Indian child" classification. See cases cited supra notes 9-10.
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A.

Collapse: Rice v. Cayetano

Harold Rice was born and raised in Hawaii.174 Rice was a White man, a
rancher, and a descendant of missionaries and ranchers who migrated to the Hawaiian Islands in the 1800 s. 175 This was the period when American settlement
in Hawaii began in earnest and when the plantations and agricultural businesses
that later dominated the islands first took hold. 176 In the mid-18oos, settlers
were still a numerical minority and were generally not Hawaiian citizens, but
their influence over the Hawaiian Kingdom's governance and land policies grew.
By 1890, fewer than 5,ooo out of a population of 9o,ooo people owned land.1 7 7
Three out of four parcels of private land were owned by European and American
settlers, who collectively owned over a million acres. 178 The major exception to
this trend toward settler land ownership was the Bernice Pauahi Bishop Estate,
a trust established in 1884 to benefit the Kamehameha Schools for Indigenous
Hawaiian children.1 7 9

174. Rice v. Cayetano, 528 U.S. 495, 510 (2000).
175. Id. at 5o1. See also Mililani B. Trask, Rice v. Cayetano: Reaffirming the Racism of Hawaii'sColonial Past, 3 ASIAN-PAc. L. & PoL'Y J. 352, 352 (2002) (describing Rice as a "white man [who]
was not allowed to vote in the OHA election" and who "was a descendant of the missionaries
who had conspired with the United States to overthrow the Hawaiian Kingdom in 1898.").
According to Rice, his great-great-grandfather helped write the Bayonet constitution, the document which would eventually lead to Hawaii's annexation. Judy Rohrer, "Got Race?" The
Productionof Haole and the Distortion of Indigeneity in the Rice Decision, 18 CONTEMP. PAC. 1, 6
(2006) (citing an interview with Harold Rice).
176. See Neil M. Levy, Native HawaiianLand Rights, 63 CALIF. L. REv. 848, 85o (1975).
&

177. LAWRENCE H. FUCHS, HAWAII PONO: A SocIAL HISTORY 251 (1961); ROBERT H. HOROWITZ
JUDITH

B. FINN,

LEGIS. REFERENCE

(1967);

BUREAU,

REP.

No. 3,

PUBLIC LAND POLICY IN HAWAII: MA-

MACKENZIE, NATIVE HAWAIIAN LAW: A
TREATISE 18 (Melody Kapilialoha MacKenzie, Susan Serrano & D. Kapua'ala Sprout eds.,
2015). The seeds of this transition of property ownership began years earlier. Stuart Banner
has described how Kamehameha III sought to make royal lands resemble private lands as a
buffer against colonization, but-due in part to court interpretations -by annexation these
lands were treated as public lands and thus became U.S. federal lands. Stuart Banner, Preparing to Be Colonized: Land Tenure andLegal Strategy in Nineteenth-CenturyHawaii, 39 L. & Soc'Y
REv. 273, 305-07 (2005).
JOR LANDOWNERS 3-4

MELODY KAPILIALOHA

178. HOROWITZ & FINN, supra note 177, at 4; MACKENZIE, supra note 177, at 18; see also H.R. REP.

No. 66-839, at 6 (1920) (finding that in 1919, only 6.23 percent of property in the Hawaiian
Islands was owned by Kanaka Maoli).
179. In 1955, the Bishop Estate held nearly 16% of all privately held land in the territory. Clinton
T. Tanimura and Robert M. Kamins, A Study of Large Landowners in Hawaii, LEGISL. REF.
BUREAU 17 (1957), https://lrb.hawaii.gov/wp-content/uploads/1957_AStudyOfLargeLandOwnersInHawaii.pdf [https://perma.cc/LXY8-DSG2]. With the Land Reform Act of 1967,
HAw. REv. STAT. §§ 516 et seq. (1967), Hawaii used its eminent domain power to break up
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Political pressure from new residents led to the "Bayonet constitution,"
which extended voting rights to settler men (even if they were citizens of other
countries) and set a property ownership qualification that disenfranchised many
Indigenous Hawaiians.180 Queen Lili'okulani proposed limiting voting rights to
Hawaiian citizens, but her government was illegally overthrown by settlers collaborating with the U.S. military and replaced by an interim government that
"consented" to being annexed to the United States. 8 1 Hawaiians have long contended that the overthrow violated international law,18 2 and in 1993 Congress
formally acknowledged its illegality and apologized for the "deprivation of the
rights of Native Hawaiians to self-determination."' Notably, Congress directed
the apology at Native Hawaiians, defined as "any individual who is a descendent
of the aboriginal people who, prior to 1778, occupied and exercised sovereignty
in . . . Hawaii."184
In 2000, Hawaii was a U.S. state and Harold Rice wanted to vote in the election for trustees to the state Office of Hawaiian Affairs (OHA). OHA is an agency
created to manage land and money reserved to Indigenous Hawaiians.185 Under
state law, only "Native Hawaiians" could be trustees ("any descendant not less
than one half part of the races inhabiting Hawaii in 1778") and only "Hawaiians"
could vote for trustees ("any descendant of the aboriginal peoples inhabiting the
Hawaiian islands" who exercised sovereignty in 1778 and have continued to live

tracts held by the Bishop Estate and other large private landowners and redistribute land title
to lessee homeowners. See Haw. Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229, 231-32 (1984) (upholding the Act and citing the Legislature's findings that by the mid-196os, 49% of land in Hawaii
was owned by the state or federal government and 47% was owned by only 72 private landowners) ; Stacy Leeds, By Eminent Domain or Some Other Name: A Tribal Perspective on Taking
Land, 41 TULSA L. REV. 51, 56 (2005) (describing the Midkiffdecision). Although styled as a
benefit for the residential lessees, Gideon Kanner has pointed out that the Bishop Estate leased
at below-market rents and criticized the legislation as "a political gesture" that failed to create
new housing or stabilize rents and led to many residents selling their homes to investors.
Gideon Kanner, Kelo v. New London: Bad Law, Bad Policy, and BadJudgment, 38 URB. LAw.
201, 212-14 (2006).

180. RALPH

S. KUYKENDALL,

1874-1893: The KalakauaDynasty,

in THE HAWAIIAN KINGDOM

368-72

(1967).
181. Id. at 344-72; see also Joint Resolution of July 7, 1898, 30 Stat. 750 (authorizing the annexation
of Hawaii).
182. See Julian Aguon, The Commerce of Recognition (Buy One Ethos, Get One Free): Towards Curing
the Harm of the United States' InternationalWrongful Acts in the HawaiianIslands, 'OH1A 5-10
(2012), https://www.law.hawaii.edu/sites/www.law.hawaii.edu/files/content/Programs%2
CClinics%2CInstitutes/1o8622%2oL1%2oAguon%2or5.pdf [https://perma.cc/BA77-3ZKT].
183.

Joint Resolution of Nov. 23,
§ 2, 107 Stat. at 1513.

184. Id. at

185. HAw. CONST.
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1993, Pub. L. No. 103-150,

§ 1(3),

107 Stat. 151o, 1513.
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there).186 Rice was neither. He challenged the law, specifically the "Hawaiian"
classification, under the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments.
The Hawaii law used ancestry to designate a class of people who are Indigenous to the Hawaiian Islands, and by virtue of this status have certain rights to
land and benefits that other citizens of Hawaii do not have. The classification
furthered Hawaii's professed and demonstrated intent to provide a modicum of
self-determination and control over land and other resources to Indigenous peoples in keeping with domestic and international legal regimes that recognize
those rights. 187 In other words, ancestry was a proxy for indigeneity in a context
where the state must define the boundaries of the Indigenous group for the purposes of allowing the group to assert rights they inherently possess under international and domestic law.188
Unlike Indian tribes in the continental United States, most of which have
written citizenship rules and have organized into governments recognized by the
United States as competent to promulgate these citizenship rules, 189 Hawaiians
were not officially recognized as a single government at the time the law was
passed190 and did not have a unified, written membership rule. In the absence of
such a rule, ancestry provided a relatively clean and easy-to-document proxy.""

a trustee for OHA); HAw. REV. STAT.
(defining the terms "Native Hawaiian" and "Hawaiian").

186. Id. (determining who can vote and serve as

§

10-2

(2021)

187. The self-determination framing was controversial among Kanaka Maoli. OHAs structure and
voting restrictions did give Indigenous Hawaiians a greater voice in the administration of their
own trust assets, but OHA was still a state agency, not an Indigenous government. This is
similar to the way Mancari permitted greater Indian control over BIA, but did not solve the
problem of a federal agency running Indian affairs. See Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 55255(1974).
188. Rice argued that the 1778 date has "has no special relevance to" Hawaiian sovereignty because
it was well before the island was unified under a monarchy, a style of government that was
familiar to American and European powers and therefore easy to recognize as sovereign. Brief
for Petitioner at 24, Rice v. Cayetano, 528 U.S. 495 (2000) (No. 98-818). Because no monarchy
existed in 1778, he argued, "the only possible relevance of 1778 is that it marks the last days of
what might be characterized as the era of relative 'racial purity' in the Hawaiian Islands." Id.
at 25. But sovereignty does not turn on whether a people exercise a European-style form of
government, and although it may have changed form, Hawaiian sovereignty did not begin
with Kamehameha I. Rice's argument boils down to the claim that, if a people did not use a
style of self-government familiar to European powers, they are no more than a loose affiliation
of racially and culturally similar people whose political and land rights need not be respected.
189. See generally GOVER, supra note

lot

(collecting

and analyzing tribal citizenship laws).

190. Of course, the Hawaiian Kingdom was recognized as a sovereign government under international law prior to U.S. annexation, a fact that is important to deoccupation arguments under
international law. See Aguon, supra note 121, at 356, 369.
191. Many American Indian tribal citizenship rules also refer to ancestry as a central criterion for
citizenship. Ancestry there serves as a proxy for kinship ties and historical connection. Carole
Goldberg, Descent into Race, 49 UCLA L. REv. 1373, 1390 (2002).
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It is also consistent with Indigenous Hawaiian understandings of relatedness
and belonging. Kanaka Maoli understand themselves to be the "descendants of
Papa, the earth mother, and Wakea, the sky father," whose relationship with the
islands has, since time immemorial, been familial, ancestral, and sacred. 192 "Like
many other native people, [Kanaka Maoli] believed that the cosmos was a unity
of familial relations. [Their] culture depended on a careful relationship with the
land, [their] ancestor, who nurtured [them] in body and spirit.""
The parties advanced two different frameworks for analyzing the legality of
the "Hawaiian" classification. The first framework, adopted by the dissent, was
that of Federal Indian law. The state argued that it was trying to identify Hawaiians as an Indigenous group, for purposes of self-determination." By likening
Kanaka Maoli to American Indian tribes, the dissent could easily hold that the
classification was political, avoiding entirely the trap of constitutional race law
which at this point was solidly governed by a colorblind, anticlassification approach.1 95
Rejecting the first framework, the majority opinion emphasized two separate
issues. First, while the Court conceded that in some contexts Kanaka Maoli classifications might be political classifications, it took the view that the prerequisite
step would be for Congress to recognize Kanaka Maoli as an Indian tribe.196
Then, they would come within the legal box of "Indian." Under the Court's 1974
decision in Morton v. Mancari, when Indians are singled out, even relying in part
on their ancestry, it is for a political, not a racial purpose, so it is not illegal.197
Second, the state, rather than the federal government, made the voting rule.
Even if Kanaka Maoli were considered to be akin to an Indian tribe, it would
typically be the federal government, not the state, that would pass rules singling
them out.198
The second framework, which the majority adopted, was that of race law,
governed by the Reconstruction Amendments. By likening Harold Rice to free
Black people denied voting rights, 9 9 the majority cast a cloud of suspicion over

192. MARY KAWENA PUKUI, 'OLELO NO'EAU: HAwAIIAN PROVERBS & POETICAL SAYINGS 56

(1983).

193. HAUNANI-KAY TRASK, LIGHT IN THE CREVICE NEVER SEEN, at xv (1994).

194. Rice v. Cayetano, 528 U.S. 495, 520 (2000).
195. Id. at 529-538 (Stevens,
1003-04.

J., dissenting);

see Rolnick, The Promise of Mancari, supra note 17, at

196. Rice, 528 U.S. at 518. However, the majority also raised questions it declined to address about
Congress' power to do this. See Rolnick, The Promise ofMancari, supranote 17, at 997.
197.

417 U.S. 535 (1974). See Rolnick, The Promiseof Mancari, supra note 17, at 993-96 (explaining
how this rule was solidified in cases that followed Mancaribut preceded Rice).

198. Rice, 528 U.S. at 537 (Stevens,
199.

Id. at 512-14,
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the statute's use of ancestry and foreclosed any consideration of its purpose or
context. The Rice Court did not hold that ancestry is equivalent to race, and it
certainly did not address such an equivalency argument in the Fourteenth
Amendment context. However, it ultimately concluded that ancestry was operating as "a proxy for race" in the Hawaiian context and that the classification was
therefore barred by the Fifteenth Amendment's rule that voting cannot be denied
or abridged based on race.2 00 In so doing, the Court collapsed ancestry into race
and chose to associate ancestry with the framework of race law. This move has
made it difficult to defend any use of ancestry for the purpose of identifying Indigenous people.2 01
By tightening the link between ancestry and race, the majority created a new
test that made it easier to prove racist intent in laws intended to promote selfdetermination: find a reference to ancestry and reason that ancestry is being used
as a "proxy" for race. Accordingly, the Rice majority stated that it "demeans the
dignity and worth of a person to be judged by ancestry instead of by his or her
own merit and essential qualities" and that an "inquiry into ancestral lines is not
consistent with respect based on the unique personality each of us possesses."20 2
Certainly, ancestry-based categories have in many cases been demeaning and
disrespectful because they were imposed in a context where ancestry had no significance except as a way to oppress2 or as a crude stereotype.204 In contrast, in
Rice, ancestry did have independent significance, and its use in voting was linked
to its use in defining the beneficiary class affected by the positions being voted
upon. The Court's approach ignored that significance.
One architect of the Court's holding was now-Justice Kavanaugh, whose
amicus brief provided the groundwork for the majority's reasoning by treating

200. Id. at 514, 517
201. See Rolnick, The Promise of Mancari, supra note 17, at 1016-1019.

202. Rice, 528 U.S. at 517.
203. Guinn, 238 U.S. at 365.
204. See, e.g., Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81, 91, 96-101 (1943) (upholding wartime

curfew directed at people of Japanese ancestry after deferring to the government's rationale
that people of Japanese ancestry were more likely to be disloyal); Korematsu v. United States,
323 U.S. 214, 218-19 (1945) (relying on Hirabayashi to uphold exclusion order directed at people of Japanese ancestry), abrogated by Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392, 2423 (2018); Hirabayashi v. U.S., 627 F. Supp. 1445, 1456 (WD. Wash. 1986) (granting Hirabayashi's petition
for writ of error coram nobis after finding that the government concealed the real reason for
the curfew: a military commander's belief that it was impossible to separate disloyal people of
Japanese ancestry from those who were loyal); Karen Korematsu, Carrying on Korematsu:
Reflections on My Father'sLegacy, in WOMEN &L. 95, 101 (2020) ("The real reason for the government's deplorable treatment of Japanese Americans wasn't acts of espionage. Rather, the
government acted on a baseless perception of disloyalty grounded in racial stereotypes.").
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the terms "ancestry" and "race" as interchangeable. 20 Kavanaugh filed the brief
on behalf of an organization called Center for Equal Opportunity, 2 06 which bills
itself as "the nation's only conservative think tank devoted to issues of race and
ethnicity." 207 Its work focuses mainly on opposing racial classifications and remedial legislation in areas where the focus on race is used to benefit minorities,
such as affirmative action and voting rights. 208 Indeed, the brief advanced Justice
Scalia's stringent articulation of colorblindness from Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co.
that "only a social emergency rising to the level of imminent danger to life and
limb ... can justify an exception to the principle embedded in the Fourteenth
Amendment that our Constitution is color-blind, and neither knows nor tolerates classes among citizens." 2 09
B.

Borrow: Equal Protection, Race, Voting, and Intent

The Court's choice to focus on the Fifteenth Amendment was important. The
Fifteenth and Fourteenth Amendments cover similar ground and belong to the
same general legal framework, but their prohibitions, and the way courts have
interpreted them, are different. By analyzing the case under the Fifteenth

205.

Brief for Center for Equal Opportunity, New York Civil Rights Coalition, Carl Cohen & Abigail Thernstrom as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioner at *4 n.2, Rice, 528 U.S. 495 (No. 98818), 1999 WL 345639 ("We will use the terms 'race' and 'racial' throughout this brief to encompass the overlapping concepts of race, ethnicity, ancestry, and national origin, as government distinctions based on such characteristics are subject to the same stringent constitutional
scrutiny.").

206. Id. Kavanaugh coauthored the brief with Roger Clegg, Robert Bork, and Theodore Ullyot.

Rice was represented by Ted Olson. Rice, 528 U.S. 495. Justice Kavanaugh, of course, formerly
clerked for Justice Kennedy, who authored the majority opinion, and he would go on to replace Kennedy on the bench. Justice Roberts, the current Chief Justice, argued the case for
Hawaii. Id.
207. CEO Staff Mission

Statement,

CTR. FOR EQUAL OPPORTUNITY (Dec. 22, 2011), https://www

.ceousa.org/2011/12/22/mission-statement [https://perma.cc/Y5CL-3GK4].
208. After Rice, the Center for Equal Opportunity remained involved in subsequent challenges to
Kanaka Maoli rights. See Trisha Kehaulani Watson, Civil Rights and Wrongs: Understanding
Doe v. Kamehameha Schs., 3 HuLILI 69, 8o-81, 89 (2006) (describing the Center's role in litigation challenging Kamehameha Schools' admissions policy, which grants preference to Indigenous Hawaiian applicants, and stating that "the Center for Equal Opportunity's work in
the Doe case is actually part of a larger campaign that systematically attacks programs throughout the United States that work to remedy hundreds of years of education discrimination").
209. Brief for Center for Equal Opportunity, New York Civil Rights Coalition, Carl Cohen & Abigail Thernstrom as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioner, supra note 205, at *11-12 (quoting
City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 521 (1989) (Scalia, J., concurring)) (omission in original). The brief acknowledges that the Court had not adopted such an extreme
rule but suggested that it should.
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Amendment, the Court could borrow its Fourteenth Amendment case law without having to seriously engage with the compelling interests that might have
saved the classification in a Fourteenth Amendment analysis.
Fifteenth Amendment case law borrows heavily from the Fourteenth
Amendment, incorporating a similar theory of colorblindness and an understanding of racism as intentional action.21 0 The text, however, suggests a more
absolute rule: it seems to forbid any race-based denial of voting rights, with no
room for balancing of interests. By employing a Fifteenth Amendment analysis,
but borrowing the colorblindness approach from the Fourteenth Amendment,
the Court could simply point to an invocation of race and the law would fall,
sidestepping any need for inquiry into the purpose, effect, or importance of the
law.211

The majority opinion also circumvented a discussion of legislative purpose
by treating the case as a facial racial classification, thus obviating the need to
inquire about intent. By the end of the twentieth century, the Court had solidified two doctrinal approaches in its equal-protection cases.2 1 2 If a law includes a
facial (that is, express) racial classification, the Court will apply strict scrutiny

210. See, e.g., Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 240 (1976) (holding that a law violates the Fourteenth Amendment only if it can be "traced to a racially discriminatory purpose"); Wright v.
Rockefeller, 376 U.S. 52, 56 (1964) (affirming the dismissal of a voting-rights case because
"appellants failed to prove that the New York Legislature was either motivated by racial consideration or in fact drew the districts on racial lines); see also City of Mobile, Alabama v.
Bolden, 446 U.S. 55, 66-67 (1980) (Stewart, J., plurality) (" [O]nly if there is purposeful discrimination can there be a violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.... [T] his principle applies to claims of racial discrimination affecting voting just as it
does to other claims of racial discrimination."); Rogers v. Lodge, 458 U.S. 613, 617-19 (1982)
(reviewing the intent requirement applied in voting cases). Congress amended Section 2 of
the VRA shortly after Bolden was decided, Pub. L. No. 97-205, § 3, 96 Stat. 134 (1982) (codified as amended at 53 U.S.C. § 10301), so Bolden no longer controls disparate impact analysis
under the statute, but it still controls analysis under the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments. See Reno v. Bossier Parish Sch. Bd., 520 U.S. 471, 482 (1997) ("Because now the Constitution requires a showing of intent that § 2 does not, a violation of § 2 is no longer afortiori
a violation of the Constitution."); accordLodge, 458 U.S. at 617-19 (upholding requirement of
proof of discriminatory intent in cases concerning voting despite Congress's amendment, just
days earlier, of the Voting Rights Act).
211. See Travis Crum, The Superfluous FieenthAmendment?, 114 Nw. UNIv. L. REV. 1549, 1623
(2020) (criticizing the Court's importation of Fourteenth Amendment colorblindness jurisprudence into voting cases and proposing that "instead of a well-worn argument over whether
equality is best achieved through race-neutral or race-conscious means, the Fifteenth Amendment may embody a distinctively different framework, such as the empowerment of racial
minorities through the ballot and their fair representation at various levels of government").
212. Ian Haney L6pez, IntentionalBlindness, 87 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1779, 1782-84 (2012).
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based onAdarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena.2 13 If it does not, the Court must conduct a careful inquiry into its intent. In situations where race is not expressly
mentioned, the Court has made it clear that it will not lightly imply a racially
discriminatory intent, regardless of its impact or historical context. 21 4 Because
the definition of "Hawaiian" referred only to ancestry, it should have been treated
as an intent case, requiring an inquiry into the law's purpose and, importantly,
whether it was intended to deny the vote to White people on account of race.
Instead, the Court treated it as a colorblindness case by seizing on the use of
ancestry and sewing it directly to race.
In this sense, Rice belongs in a special category of cases that are neither facial
racial classifications nor intent cases. In these cases, the Court has identified statutory text that it associates with race and then determined that the purpose of
the statute can be explained in no way other than a desire to account for race. 215
For example, in Guinn v. United States, the Court noted the use of a grandfather
clause referring to 1866 and understandably asked why the Oldahoma legislature
would condition voting rights on the status of one's ancestor in 1866 unless it
was for the purpose of excluding Black voters. 216 In Gomillion v. Lightfoot, the
Court asked why the Alabama legislature would draw a "strangely irregular
twenty-eight-sided" district around previously-square Tuskegee unless it meant
to exclude all Black voters.217 In Shaw v. Reno, the Court asked a similar question
triggered by the odd shape of the district. 218 And, in Rice, the Court asked why
Hawaii would make voting turn on the status of one's ancestor in 1778.
In a typical intent analysis, this is the point at which the Court would consider the legislature's motives to determine whether there existed any legitimate
explanation for the classification, or whether it was instead motivated by a desire
to exclude or harm a particular racial group. Thus, in Guinn and Gomillion, it

213. 515 U.S. 200, 227 (1995);

id. at 239

(Scalia,

J., concurring).

214. See Vill. of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 270-71 (1977) (reversing a holding for respondents despite evidence of a disproportionate burden on racial minorities because there was no evidence of discriminatory purpose); Washington v. Davis, 426
U.S. 229, 240-41 (1976). The Court held that this same intent rule applied to Fifteenth
Amendment cases in City of Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55, 74 (198o).
215. See N. Jay Shepherd, "Abridge" Too Far: Racial Gerrymandering, the FieenthAmendment, and
Shaw v. Reno, 14 B.C. THIRD WORLD L. J. 337, 365-66 (1994) (asserting that a plaintiff could
meet its burden of proof in a Fifteenth Amendment challenge by showing that a law "could
not be explained on grounds other than race").
216. 238 U.S. 347, 364-65 (1915).
217. 364 U.S. 339, 341, 347-48 (196o).
218. 509 U.S. 630, 633-34 (1993); see also Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. goo, 91o-11 (1995) (finding
that the irregular shape of a voting district may constitute evidence of racial gerrymandering).
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was critical that the Oldahoma and Alabama legislatures could not offer any explanation for their actions or any factor that connected the excluded voters, leaving the Court to conclude that those rules stemmed from a desire to exclude
Black voters on account of race.2 19
In Shaw and Rice, on the other hand, the legislatures did offer an explanation.
The North Carolina law was a response to a preclearance denial, in which the
U.S. Attorney General indicated a need for a second majority-Black district. The
new district was drawn in an attempt to condense the political power of Black
voters, increase Black voting power, and comply with the Voting Rights Act
(VRA) .2o And in Rice, the 1778 date and the use of ancestry as a tracing device
was an attempt to designate the present-day members of a class of people who
were Indigenous to the Hawaiian Islands - as evidenced by their presence before
the arrival of European explorers who would eventually colonize the islands."'
Although other groups certainly have a rich history in the Hawaiian Islands, no
other group was Indigenous to that land.
In neither case did the Court grapple with intent, however. The Court in
Shaw recounted historical uses of racial gerrymandering to disenfranchise Black
voters, including Gomillion.222 But instead of characterizing Gomillion as an intent case, which it arguably was, it transformed that case into evidence that the
Constitution prohibited segregating voters by race, regardless of purpose. 2
Even though race was not expressly used, the Shaw Court described the new
district as "so extremely irregular on its face that it rationally can be viewed only
as an effort to segregate the races for purposes of voting, without regard for traditional districting principles. . ."z The Court divided the race precedents into
three groups: (1) cases about laws that "contain[] explicit racial distinctions"" 5

219. Guinn, 238 U.S. at 365 ("[W]e are unable to discover how, unless the prohibitions of the 151h
Amendment were considered, the slightest reason was afforded for basing the classification
upon a period of time prior to the 15 1h Amendment."); Gomillion, 364 U.S. at 346-48 ("While
in form this is merely an act redefining metes and bounds, if the allegations are established,
the inescapable human effect of this essay in geometry and geography is to despoil colored
citizens, and only colored citizens, of their theretofore enjoyed voting rights."). See Shepherd,
supra note 215, at 350 (describing the Guinn Court's concern with the purpose of the law).
220. Shaw, 509 U.S. at 638-39; see A. Leon Higginbotham, Jr., Gregory A. Clarick & Marcella David, Shaw v. Reno: A Mirage of Good Intentions with DevastatingRacial Consquences, 62 FoRDHAM L. REV. 1593, 1618-20 (1994).
221. Rice v. Cayetano, 528 U.S. 495, 500-01, 510-11 (2000).
222. Shaw, 509 U.S. at 640-41.
223. Id. at 644-45. But see Aziz Z. Huq, What Is DiscriminatoryIntent?, 103 CORNELL L. REV. 1211,
1240, 1251-57 (2018) (providing a taxonomy of definitions of discriminatory intent, including
one in which classification equals intent).
224. Shaw, 509 U.S. at 642.
225. Id. at 643.
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(racial classification cases), (2) cases where the classification in question "is ostensibly neutral but is an obvious pretext for racial discrimination" 2 2 (neutral
classification/intent cases), and (3) "those 'rare' statutes that, although race neutral, are, on their face, 'unexplainable on grounds other than race."'2 2 7 The dis-

trict in question was an example of the third category, the Court held, so it "demands the same close scrutiny that we give other state laws that classify citizens
by race." 228

To the Court, the Rice classification was another example of this third category. Although the statute did not purport to make a racial classification, it did
mention ancestry, and the Court concluded that ancestry was a proxy for race. 22 9
Unlike Shaw, in which the plaintiffs' Fourteenth Amendment claim would presumably have been weighed against any compelling state interests, the Rice
Court declared the law illegal without any discussion of its purpose, because the
Fifteenth Amendment does not require a balancing test.23 0 Because it was applying the Fifteenth Amendment's categorical prohibition, the Court could avoid
any examination of what ancestry actually meant or what the purpose of the classification at issue was. As precedent, Rice thus adds an important analytical dimension to Guinn, which involved an ancestry-based classification but where the
Court engaged in minimal discussion about the relationship between ancestry

226.

Id. at 644 (citing Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 18 U.S. 356 (1886)).

227. Id. at 643 (quoting Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S.

252,

266 (1977)).

228.

Id. at 644.

229.

Rice v. Cayetano, 528 U.S. 495, 513-16 (2000). The statute used and defined the terms Hawaiian and Native Hawaiian, HAw. REV. STAT. § 10-2 (2021), which the state did not view as
racial terms or racial classes. Brief for Respondent, Rice v. Cayetano, No. 98-818, 1999 WL
557073, at *1, *39.The definition of Hawaiian referred to Indigenous Hawaiians as "peoples,"
a term signaling political identity. The definition of Native Hawaiian set a blood quantum
floor and referred to "the races inhabiting the Hawaiian Islands previous to 1778" but also
refers to "such aboriginal peoples which exercised sovereignty." Rice, 528 U.S. at 509 -10 (citing
HAw. REV. STAT. § 10-2 (2021)). The definition of Native Hawaiian was not at issue in the
case. Id. at 521 (" [T]he validity of the voting restriction is the only issue before us."). To support its holding that ancestry was being used as a proxy for race, the Court pointed to the
legislative history of the Hawaiian statute at issue, where the term "peoples" was used interchangeably with the term "races." To the Court, the legislature's invocation of peoplehood was
also itself a code for race. Id. at 516; see Rolnick, The Promiseof Mancari, supranote 17, at loo5

n.

201.

230. Case law interpreting the Fifteenth Amendment is sparse, see Crum, supra note 211, at 1554-55,
so I do not wish to suggest here that courts have carefully examined whether the Amendment
might be understood to incorporate exceptions or require interest balancing. However, courts
have interpreted categorical language in other amendments to require interest balancing. See
Joseph Blocher, CategoricalismandBalancingin Firstand SecondAmendment Analysis, 84 N.Y.U.
L. REV. 375, 381-413 (2009) (describing judicial interest-balancing approaches, and contrasting them with categorical or absolutist approaches, in cases interpreting the First and
Second Amendments).
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and race and instead inquired about the purpose of the classification. With ancestry and race linked as they were in Rice, future courts can simply engage in a
word hunt to find a term like "descent" or "ancestor" in a statute or its legislative
history.
Intent doctrine has been widely criticized for the way it prevents an inquiry
into outcomes and makes it impossible to recognize systemic discrimination as a
legal problem. 231 As commentators have noted, the Supreme Court's intent inquiry sets a high bar, requiring clear evidence of discriminatory intent before it
will invalidate a facially neutral statute.23 2 Thus, the Court has upheld zoning
rules intended to keep poor people out of wealthy suburban neighborhoods despite evidence that residents and decisionmakers were also trying to keep out
Black people, 233 a decision to seek the death penalty in the face of clear evidence
that it was used almost entirely to vindicate White death at the hands of Black
killers,2 4 and federal prosecution of Black defendants for crack cocaine offenses
in the face of evidence that Black people were much more likely to be prosecuted
and receive longer sentences.235 In all these cases, the Court refused to strike
down laws that clearly harm non-White people without ironclad evidence of intent to harm. In contrast, the Rice Court struck down a law benefitting a group
of primarily non-White people without requiring any evidence of intent to harm

231. See, e.g., Haney L6pez, supra note 212, at 1783 (describing modern intent cases as requiring a
state of mind "akin to malice" and noting in 2012 that the standard had never been satisfied);
Barnes & Chemerinsky, supra note 29, at 1082.
232. Pers. Adm'r of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 258 (1979) ("'[D]iscriminatory purpose' implies
more than intent as volition or intent as awareness of consequences; it implies that the decision maker selected or reaffirmed a particular course of action at least in part 'because of; not
merely 'in spite of,' its adverse effects upon an identifiable group."); see Huq, supra note 223,
at 1231 n.86 (describing Feeney as "excluding cases in which racial effects were anticipated but
not intended"). Compare N.C. State Conf. of the NAACP v. McCrory, 831 F. 3d 204, 233 ( 4 th
Cir. 2016) (applying Arlington Heights to hold that North Carolina voting restrictions were
motivated by discriminatory intent), and Christopher Ingraham, The 'Smoking Gun' Proving
North CarolinaRepublicans Tried to DisenfranchiseBlack Voters, WASH. POST (July 29, 2016),
https ://www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonk/wp/2o16/o7/29/the-smoking-gun-proving

-north-carolina-republicans-tried-to-disenfranchise-black-voters

[https://perma.cc/Q72J-

TWKW] (discussing evidence of intent in the case), with McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279,
298-99 (1987) (upholding death sentence against an equal-protection challenge based on evidence that Black defendants who killed White victims were much more likely to receive the
death penalty than White defendants who killed Black victims because "[f] or this claim to
prevail, McCleskey would have to prove that the Georgia Legislature enacted or maintained
the death penalty statute because of an anticipated racially discriminatory effect").
233.

Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 271 (1977); Cuyahoga Falls v.
Buckeye Cmty. Hope Found., 538 U.S. 188, 199-200 (2003).

234. McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 319 (1987).
23s. United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456, 469-70 (1996).
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White or other non-Indigenous people (and despite evidence of non-racist intent).

Another characteristic of intent doctrine, which arises from its interrelationship with colorblindness, 23 6 is that intent has come to mean intent to recognize
race rather than intent to harm on the basis of race.237 Shaw and Rice facilitated
this transition by turning what would otherwise be intent cases into racial classification cases, employing the equivalency rule of the racial classification cases
to strike down the laws without any discussion of whether they actually intended
to discriminate on the basis of race. They led to a new rule that the Constitution
prohibits the intent to segregate or classify, and that much less is required to
show intent to classify than would be required to show intent to discriminate in
a non-classification case. While Shaw employed this rule in the Fourteenth
Amendment context, where the Court's balancing test could potentially permit
some uses of race, Rice imported it to the Fifteenth Amendment context, enabling the Court to impose an absolute bar.
C. Expand: The PacificIsland Cases
The specific circumstances that gave rise to the Rice decision-the right to
vote for officers of a state agency on a matter concerning the rights of nonfederally recognized Indigenous peoples - are unlikely to recur. These twin circumstances - a group that is not federally acknowledged as an Indian tribe and a state
government action- obscured the eventual threat that Rice would pose to the
rights of Indigenous and colonized peoples. Moreover, the Court decided the
case on Fifteenth Amendment grounds and declined to address Harold Rice's
Fourteenth Amendment challenge. As a result, it only directly impacted voting
cases, softening its potential effect on land rights, self-government rights, or
self-determination more generally.
However, as an advocacy tool, the case has transformed into a shorthand rule
that ancestry-based classifications are illegal in general. While Federal Indian law
doctrine protects most ancestry-based classifications that are also based on tribal
citizenship, the Rice rule has been used to chip away at the rights of Indigenous
peoples in two main categories of cases.
In the first category, litigants have invoked Rice in several cases with the goal
of declaring a variety of programs benefitting Kanaka Maoli unconstitutional.23 s

236.

See Haney L6pez, supra note 212, at 1779.

237.

See Harris & West-Faulcon, supra note 151, at

1no-11.

238. See Arakaki v. Lingle, 477 F.3 d 1048 ( 9 th Cir. 2007); Doe v. Kamehameha Schs./Bernice
Pauahi Bishop Estate, 470 F.3 d 827 ( 9 th Cir. 2006); Doe v. Kamehameha Schs./Bernice
Pauahi Bishop Estate, 596 F.3 d 1036 ( 9 th Cir. 2010).
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These cases attempt to expand the holding prohibiting ancestry-based Hawaiian
classifications beyond the context of voting rules to bar any state law classifying
Hawaiians or Native Hawaiians. Federal courts have largely declined to strike
down programs benefitting Kanaka Maoli, making this attempted expansion of
Rice largely unsuccessful. 239
Partly as a response to these continuing challenges, the federal government
issued new regulations in 2016 that would allow Kanaka Maoli to petition for
recognition as an Indian tribe.24o Yet Rice still haunts the process. A recognized
government will require elections for leaders, and the state cannot hold those
elections after Rice. A non-profit, Na'i Aupuni, was created for the purpose of
managing the election process. 241 Non-Indigenous residents of Hawaii sued, citing Rice, but a federal district court rejected the challenge in the initial stages,
holding that the election was not a state function.242 The challengers petitioned
Justice Kennedy for an emergency stay, which was granted.24 3 Na'i Aupuni
stopped its voting process, but it continued to oversee self-governance activities,
including a constitutional convention. 244
The second set of cases are lawsuits challenging Indigenous rights in the Pacific territories - one lawsuit in the CNMI and one in Guam. 24 Because these
suits challenged voting-related classifications, plaintiffs succeeded by invoking
Rice's Fifteenth Amendment analysis.

239. See Carroll v. Nakatani, 342 F.3 d 934, 943, 948 (9 th Cir. 2003) (dismissing challenges to the
Hawaiian Homes Commission Act for lack of standing); Corboy v. Louie, 283 P-3 d 695, 697
(Haw. 2011) (same); see also cases cited supra note 20; Doe, 47o E 3 d at 830 (upholding Native
Hawaiian-only admission policy at private school).
240.

Procedures for Reestablishing a Formal Government-to-Government Relationship with the
Native Hawaiian Community, 43 C.ER. S 50 (2022). Although federal acknowledgement
would result in stronger protections for Kanaka Maoli rights and self-governance in some
contexts, it is a highly contested strategy. See Rolnick, The Promise of Mancari, supra note 17,
at 997 n.178 (summarizing criticisms of the federal acknowledgement strategy); see also J. Kehaulani Kauanui, The Politics of Blood and Sovereignty in Rice v. Cayetano, 25 POL. & LEGAL
ANTHROPOLOGY REv. 110, 121 (2002) [hereinafter Kauanui, The Politics ofBlood] ; J. Kehaulani
Kauanui, Precarious Positions: Native Hawaiians and U.S. Federal Recognition, 17 CONTEMP. PAC.
1, 15 (2005) [hereinafter Kauanui, Precarious Positions].

241. Akina v. Hawaii, 141 F Supp. 3d

iio6, 1117-18 (D. Haw. 2015).

242. Id. at 1136.
243. Akina v. Hawaii, 577 U.S. 1024 (2015) (mem.).
244. Makekau v. Hawaii, 943 R 3 d 1200, 1202-03 ( 9 th Cir. 2019).
245. Davis v. Commonwealth Election Comm'n, 2014 WL 2111065 (D.N.M.I. 2014), aff'd, 8 4 4 R 3 d
1087 ( 9 th Cir. 2016), cert. denied, 138 S. Ct. 127; Davis v. Guam, 2017 WL 930825 (D. Guam
2017), aff'd, 932 F.3 d 822 ( 9 th Cir. 2019), cert. denied, 140 S. Ct. 2739 (2020).
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In 2016, a Ninth Circuit panel struck down a law in the CNMI that limited
the right to vote on a constitutional amendment affecting the land rights of Indigenous peoples to eligible voters "who are also persons of Northern Marianas
descent as described in Article XII, Section 4" of the NMI Constitution. 24 6 In
2019, another Ninth Circuit panel struck down a law limiting the right to vote
to "native Inhabitants of Guam," a category defined in part by ancestry. 247 The
lawsuits were part of a concerted, well-funded conservative campaign to enforce
"civil liberties" and dismantle important protections for minority rights in voting, education, and government contracting. 248 Unlike the post-Rice Hawaii
challenges, these were voting lawsuits governed by the Fifteenth Amendment.
Lower courts viewed them as close enough to Rice that they were bound to strike
down the rules, but each also contained an incremental expansion of the Rice
rule. 249 By applying Rice, the Court expanded its application of race jurisprudence beyond state-law classification of Hawaiians to include laws singling out
Indigenous peoples in the territories. In so doing, the Court made it more difficult for those peoples to advance claims under a Federal Indian law framework
or even under a territorial or international framework.
In the CNMI case, non-Indigenous residents filed a lawsuit seeking the right
to vote on a proposed amendment to the CNMI Constitution. 25 0 The provision
in question, Article XII, restricts "the acquisition of permanent and long-term
interests in real property within the Commonwealth" to "persons of Northern
Marianas descent." 21 "Permanent"is defined to include leases longer than fiftyfive years. 2 2 "A person of Northern Marianas descent" is defined as a person
who is a U.S. citizen and "at least some degree of Northern Marianas Chamorro
or Northern Marianas Carolinian blood or a combination thereof," while a "full
blooded" person is defined as any person who "was born or domiciled in the
Northern Mariana Islands by 1950 and was a citizen of the Trust Territory of the

246.

Davis v. Commonwealth Election Comm'n, 2014 WL 2111o65 (D.N.M.I. 2014), aff'd, 844 F.3 d
1087 ( 9 th Cir. 2016), cert. denied, 138 S. Ct. 127 (quoting CNMI CONST. art. XVIII, § 5(c)).
The panel was composed of Chief Judge Thomas, Judge Callahan, and Judge Murguia.

247.

Davis v. Guam, 932 F.3 d 822, 843 ( 9 th Cir. 2019), cert. denied, 140 S. Ct. 2739 (2020). The
panel was composed of Judge Berzon, Judge Wardlaw, and Judge Rawlinson.

248. See Serrano, supra note 170, at 5o1, 502 n.4 (describing the role of conservative think tanks and
legal organizations in the Guam case).
249. See infra notes 257-259 (CNMI holding and expansions), 281-284 (Guam holding and expansions), 3oo and accompanying text (further explaining the doctrinal expansions).
250. Davis v. Commonwealth Election Comm'n, 2014 WL 2111065, at *1 (D.N.M.I. 2014).
251. N. MAR. I. CONST.
252. Id. art. XII,
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Pacific Islands before the termination of the Trusteeship."25 3 Article XII implements a provision in the Covenant between the United States and the Commonwealth that limits land ownership to Indigenous peoples.25 4 The Covenant's land
ownership restriction was aimed at protecting the cultural significance of land
and the economic self-sufficiency of the people.25 5 The restriction expired in 2011
(twenty-five years after the termination of the trusteeship agreement) and the
NMI legislature provided that Indigenous Northern Marianas residents would
vote on whether to retain it. 256 The court ultimately used Rice to find that
CNMI's Indigenous-only voting rule violated the Fifteenth Amendment.21

7

By applying Rice to bar a voting rule in the territories, the CNMI case eroded
two of the main perceived limitations on Rice's impact. First, it applied Rice beyond the limited context of state elections. This expansion was not obvious: the
federal government has a much more direct role in territorialgovernance than in
state governance, and the Court in the Insular Cases held that the Constitution
must therefore apply differently in that context. 258 Second, the Court's rejection
of the Indigenous-rights framework in Rice hinged partly on the fact that Congress claims plenary power over the acknowledgement of Indian tribes and had
not clearly indicated an intent to bring Kanaka Maoli within the scope of those

253.
254.

Id. art. XII, § 4.
Id. (permitting the government of the Northern Mariana Islands to "regulate the alienation
of permanent and long-term interests in real property so as to restrict the acquisition of such
interests to persons of Northern Mariana Islands descent"). See Nicole Manglona Torres, SelfDetermination Challenges to Voter Classifications in the Marianas After Rice v. Cayetano: A Call
fora Congressional Declaration of Territorial Principles, 14 ASIAN-PAc. L. & PoL'Y J. 152,154 (2012)
(discussing the relationship between section 8o5 of The Covenant to Establish a Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands in Political Union with the United States of America
and the Northern Mariana Islands Constitution).

255.

See Wabol v. Villacrusis, 958 F.2d 145o, 1452 ( 9 th Cit. 1990).

256.

2011 N. Mar. L Pub. L. 17-40, S 1; Torres, supra note 254, at 157. The twenty-five-year restriction is reminiscent of the twenty-five-year trust that prevented individual Indians from
selling land they received during Allotment. Judith Royster, The Legacy ofAllotment, 27 A1uz.
ST. L. J. 1, 10 (1995) (discussing the 25-year trustperiod and opposition to "continued federal
guardianship" that led Congress to authorize early issuance of patents to Indians who were
determined to be competent to manage their own property). Once the trust period expired,
the individual would receive a fee patent and the land could be sold to settlers. Much of it was,
until the federal government realized the mistake of allotment policy and reimposed the trust
restrictions. Royster, supra, at 10-12, 16-17. Here, the ability of Indigenous CNMI residents to
decide whether to extend the restriction puts power in Indigenous hands. By striking down
the voting restriction, the Court placed the decision about whether to open lands for settlement in the hands of the non-Indigenous majority.

257. Davis v. Commonwealth Election Comm'n, 2014 WL 2111065, at *14, (D.N.M.I. 2014),

aff'd,

844 F. 3 d 1087, 1091-93 ( 9 th Cit. 2016).
258. The claim to plenary power over the territories then provided an additional basis for distin-

guishing the CNMI case from Rice. I discuss this idea further in Section W.B.

2705

THE YALE LAW JOURNAL

131:2652

2022

protections. Article XII implements the provision of a covenant between Congress and the CNMI. Arguably, the covenant indicates that Congress intended
to treat Chamorros and Carolinians in a manner analogous to Indian tribes, although within a completely different political structure. 259 Yet, the Ninth Circuit
accorded no significance to this expression of congressional purpose.
Moreover, the CNMI land laws had already been upheld against a challenge
that they classified on the basis of race. 2 0 A decade earlier, the Ninth Circuit in
Wabol v. Villacrusis had considered an equal-protection challenge to Article
XII. 261 The constitutional provision survived, with the court holding that Indigenous property protections were "not subject to equal protection attack" even if
they required classifying on the basis of ancestry.26 2 In so holding, the court relied on the Insular Cases to hold that Congress could selectively incorporate constitutional guarantees to the territories, and that it had done so with the Fourteenth Amendment's equal-protection guarantee. 263 Because this new lawsuit
was about voting rights, however, it was challenged under the Fifteenth Amendment, and the court applied Rice to strike down the classification. 264 The Fifteenth Amendment framing obscured the way the case was situated in a
longstanding contestation between settlers and Indigenous peoples over land. It
also helped the Court of Appeals avoid the question raised by Wabol about the
application of constitutional provisions in the territories because, unlike the

259. Every time Congress employs a different framework for its relationships with Indigenous
peoples, which it has sometimes done in recognition of the shortcomings of Federal Indian
law, the difference in status has raised questions about whether Indigenous people count as
Indians and whether they are entitled to the same protections. See infra notes 470-475.
260. See Wabol v. Villacrusis, 958 F.2d 1450, 1451 ( 9 th Cir. 1990). In that case, the Ninth Circuit

upheld the land ownership restriction against an equal-protection challenge, relying on the
Insular Cases to hold that applying the constitutional guarantee of equal protection in access
to long term property interests would be impractical and anomalous in the CNMI because
"[a]bsent the alienation restriction, political union would not be possible." Id. at 1460-62.
261.

Id. at 1451-52. The plaintiff in that case sought to void a lease by arguing that it violated Article
XII, and the defendant argued that Article XII violated the Equal Protection Clause. Id. at 1451.

262. Id. at 1462; see Davis v. Commonwealth Election Comm'n, 2014 WL 2111065, at *12 (noting

that the Wabol court assumed without analysis that the restriction was race-based).
263.

Id. at 1451 ("This case requires us to determine whether the constitutional guarantee of equal
protection of the laws limits the ability of the United States and the Commonwealth to impose
race-based restrictions on the acquisition of permanent and long-term interests in Commonwealth land.").

264. Davis v. Commonwealth Election Comm'n, 2014 WL 2111065, at *12 - *14 (D.N.M.I. 2014).

The district court also held that it violated the Fourteenth Amendment as a voting restriction,
id. at *18, but the Ninth Circuit addressed only the Fifteenth Amendment challenge, Davis v.
Commonwealth Election Comm'n, 844 F. 3d at 109.
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Fourteenth Amendment, the Fifteenth Amendment is made fully applicable to
CNMI through the Covenant. 265

The CNMI litigation was largely local. The Northern Marianas Descent Corporation, a group formed in 2013 to advocate for the land rights of people of
Northern Marianas descent, filed the only amicus brief.266 Academic interest in
the decision was limited to scholars who study the territories. 26 7 As the case

wound through the courts, however, it attracted the attention of leading conservative figures and organizations working against minority voting rights.
Hans A. von Spakovsky highlighted the CNMI case in the NationalReview, criticizing the Obama Justice Department for having "no interest in filing a lawsuit
under the Voting Rights Act against a blatantly discriminatory and repugnant
law that prevented John Davis from voting because he doesn't have the right
'blood' quantum."268 J. Christian Adams of the Election Law Center described
the decision as "a huge victory for the right to vote."2 69 Adams and von Spakovsky were later primary architects of the fabricated voter-fraud claims used by the
265. Davis v. Commonwealth Election Comm'n, 844 F.3 d at 1095.
266. See Brief Amicus Curiae of Northern Marianas Descent Corporation in Support of Defendants-Appellants and Reversal, Davis v. Commonwealth Election Comm'n, No. 14-16090, 2014
WL 5510536, at *1; Marc Venus, NMD Group Forms Nine Committees, SAIPAN TRIB. (July 25,
2019), https://www.saipantribune.com/index.php/nmdgroupformsninecommittees [https:
//perma.cc/B3PF-7P75] (describing the formation and goal of the corporation).
267. Eleven law-review publications reference the case. Five specifically address Indigenous rights

in the territories, most written by scholars with personal ties to the territories. See Ian Falefuafua Tapu, Who Is Really a Noble?: The Constitutionalityof American Samoa's Matai System, 24
ASIAN PAc. AM. L.J. 61 (2020); Villazor, supra note 3; Serrano, supra note 131, at 395; Serrano,
supra note 170, at 5o1. Gregory Ablasky was the only scholar to explicitly examine the case in
relation to Federal Indian law. See Gregory Ablavsky, Sovereign Metaphors in Indian Law, 8o
MONT. L. REV. 11, 36-39 (2019). Three publications consider Kanaka Maoli rights post-Rice.
See Melody Kapilialoha MacKenzie & D. Kapua'ala Sproat, A Collective Memory of Injustice:
Reclaiming Hawai' i's Crown Lands Trust in Response to JudgeJames S. Burns, 39 U. HAW. L. REv.
481 (2017); Troy J.H. Andrade, (Re)Righting History: Deconstructingthe Court's Narrative of
Hawai'i'sPast, 39 U. HAw. L. REv. 631 (2017); Lisset M. Pino, Comment, Colonizing History:
Rice v. Cayetano and the Fight for Native Hawaiian Self-Determination, 129 YALE L.J. 2574
(2020). One considers territorial law more broadly. See Adriel L Cepeda Derieux & Neil C.
Weare, After Aurelius: What Futurefor the Insular Cases?, 130 YALE L.J. F. 284 (2020). The
remainder are law updates. ConstitutionalLaw-Territories-NinthCircuit Holds that Guam's
PlebisciteLaw Violates FieenthAmendment, 133 HARv. L. REv. 683, 686 n. 44 (2019) ; Developments in the Law: Introduction, 130 HARv. L. REv. 1617, 1626 (2017).
268. Hans A. von Spakovsky, Voting DiscriminationStruck Down in Northern MarianaIslands-DOJ
Nowhere to Be Seen, NAT'L REv. (May 23, 2014, 7:22 PM), https://www.nationalreview.com
/corner/voting-discrimination-struck-down-northern-mariana-islands-doj-nowhere-beseen-hans [https://perma.cc/27DD-RB4F].
269. Mindy Aguon, 9' Circuit Upholds Voting Rights in CNMI, GUAM DAILY POST (Dec. 31, 2016),

https ://www.postguam.com/news/local/th-circuit-upholds-voting-rights-in-cnmi/article
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Trump Administration to legitimate restrictive election laws.27 0 Adams's Public
Interest Legal Foundation was even sued for defamation because its report suggested that nonfelon citizens were noncitizen felons committing voter fraud.271
Meanwhile, in Guam, a non-Indigenous resident challenged a law limiting
the right to vote on self-determination to "native inhabitants of Guam." 2 2 Unlike the CNMI, which negotiated a Commonwealth relationship with the United
States that the people of the CNMI believed would confer greater autonomy than
a purely territorial one, Guam has not yet negotiated its political status.27 3 As a
non-self-governing territory under U.S. rule, it retains the right to political selfdetermination, which could take many forms, including independence (similar
to the Philippines), free association (similar to the COFA nations of Palau, the
Marshall Islands, and the Federated States of Micronesia), or statehood (similar
to Hawaii). The election at issue was a nonbinding plebiscite intended to document the views of the colonized residents of Guam and transmit them to the
United States as a starting point for negotiations.
The "native inhabitants" category includes "those persons who became U.S.
citizens by virtue of the authority and enactment of the 195o Organic Act of

_4666aa68-ce7f-11e6-8732-8bbec2efaec6.html [https://perma.cc/PX76-IERD]; see Steve
Limtiaco, No "Native Inhabitant"Vote After U.S. Supreme Court Denies Guam's PlebisciteAppeal,
PAc. DAILY NEWS (May 5, 2020), https://www.guampdn.com/news/local/no-native-inhabitant-vote-after-u-s-supreme-court-denies- guams-plebiscite-appeal/article_a2c5157o-27o75 9 9 5 -b16 9 -fc18 7 f5 5f2 5b.html [https://perma.cc/8AKR-7JQT].
270.

See Simon Lewis & Joseph Tanfani, Special Report: How a Small Group of U.S. Lawyers Pushed
VoterFraudFearsinto the Mainstream, REUTERS (Sept. 9, 2020, 3:43 AM), https://www.reuters
.com/article/us-usa-election-voter-fraud-special-repo/special-report-how-a-small-group-of
-u-s-lawyers-pushed-voter-fraud-fears-into-the-mainstream-idUSKBN26o1GZ
[https://
perma.cc/HA2M-X7KU] (naming Adams and von Spakovsky as part of "a small network of
lawyers who have promoted [voter-fraud claims] for two decades, funded by right-wing
foundations" and listing the Public Interest Legal Foundation, the Heritage Foundation, the
American Constitutional Rights Union, Judicial Watch and True the Vote); Jim Rutenberg,
The Attack
on
Voting,
N.Y.
TIMES
(Sep.
30,
2020),
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/09/3o/magazine/trump-voter-fraud.html [https://perma.cc/856V-2DNG]
(naming Adams and von Spakovsky as "the two leading proponents of the voter fraud narrative").

Kasprak, How to "Weaponize" MisleadingNarrativesAbout Voting: Lessonsfrom TrumpLinked PILF Playbook, SNOPES (Oct. 15, 2020), https://www.snopes.com/news/2o2o/10/15
/the-fog-of-war/ [https://perma.cc/K5HM-VC7N].

271. See Alex

272. 3 GUAM CODE ANN.

§

21000 (2021). Eligible voters include "[e]very person who is a Native

Inhabitant of Guam ...

[as defined in the statute] or who is descended from a Native Inhab§ 21003 (2021). This is redundant, as anyone who is
descended from a "Native Inhabitant" would themselves be included in the definition of "Naitant of Guam .... " 3 GUAm CODE ANN.
tive Inhabitant." See 3 GUAm CODE ANN.
273.

§ 21001

(2021).

Aguon, supranote 81, at 52-53; Non-Self-Governing Territories,supra note 115.
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Guam and descendants of those persons."2 74 The Guam Organic Act, which
changed Guam's political relationship with the United States from an unorganized to an organized unincorporated territory,2 7 extended U.S. citizenship to

the following categories of people "and their children born after April 11,
1899"276: (1) all inhabitants of Guam on April 11, 1899 who were Spanish sub-

jects; and (2) all persons born on Guam and inhabiting the island on April 11,

§ 21001(e) (2021).
81-630, § 3, 64 Stat. 384,

274. 3 GUAM CODE ANN.

275. Pub. L. No.
384 (1950) (codified at 48 U.S.C. § 1421a (2018)); see
also Gumataotao v. Dir. of Dep't of Revenue & Tax'n, 236 F.3 d 1077, 1079 ( 9 th Cit. 2001)
("Congress organized Guam as an unincorporated possession of the United States through
the 195o Organic Act of Guam .... "); Anthony Ciolli, The Power of United States Territories to
Tax Interstate andForeign Commerce: Why the Commerce andImport-Export Clauses Do Not Apply, 63 TAx LAw.1223, 1226 (2010) ("In addition to being deemed incorporated or unincorporated, United States territorial possessions may also be classified as organized or unorganized.
'An "organized" territory is one that has established a civil government under an organic act
passed by Congress: An 'organic act' is defined as '[t]he body of laws that the United [States]
Congress has enacted for the government of a United States insular area .. .' A territory's
organic act will 'usually include [] a bill of rights and the establishment and conditions of the
insular area's tripartite government: Although 'some organized insular areas now have constitutions of their own, the organic act was meant to substitute for such a document while
retaining ultimate authority over the insular area:" (quoting Off Insular Affs., Definitions of
InsularAreaPoliticalOrganizations, DEP'T INTERIOR, https://www.doi.gov/oia/islands/politicatypes#: ~:text=A%20jurisdiction%20that%2Ois%2oneither,Territory%2oOf%2Othe%2OPacific%2olslands [https://perma.cc/GM3E-Z63Q])).
276. Pub. L. No. 81-630, § 4(a), 64 Stat. 384, 384 (1950) (current version at 8 U.S.C. § 1407
(2018)). April 11, 1899 is the effective date of the Treaty of Peace Between the United States
and Spain, pursuant to which Spain ceded its political authority over Guam to the United
States. Treaty of Peace Between the United States of America and the Kingdom of Spain,
Spain-U.S., Dec. 10, 1898, 30 Stat. 1754 [hereinafter Treaty of Paris]. Guam had previously
been under Spanish control for three centuries, and it was subsequently a possession of the
United States for approximately half a century (except for a brief period of Japanese occupation during the Second World War), before its inhabitants were granted U.S. citizenship.
Francis X. Hezel & Marjorie C. Driver, From Conquest to Colonization: Spain in the MarianIslands, 23:2

J.

PAC. HIST. 137 (1988); ANNE PEREZ HATTORI, COLONIAL DIS-EASE: US NAVY

HEALTH POLICIES AND THE CHAMORROS OF GUAM, 1898-1941, at 14 (2004);

Anthony

(T.J.) F.

Quan, "Respeta I Taotao Tano": The Recognition and Establishmentof the Self-Determination and
SovereignRights of the Indigenous Chamorrosof Guam underInternational,Federal,and Local Law,
3 ASIAN-PAc. L. &POL'Y J. 56, 63 (2002); see Guam v. Guerrero, 290 F. 3 d 1210, 121 4 (9 th Cit.
2002); see also Gov't of Guam ex rel. Guam Econ. Dev. Auth. v. United States, 179 F 3 d 630,
6 3 2( 9 th Cir. 1999). Of course, this chronology obscures the reality that people lived on Guam
long before it became the object of European colonization. See ROBERT F. ROGERS, DESTINY'S

LANDFALL: AHISTORY OF GUAM 6-7, 22 (1995). While their citizenship status has varied under
each foreign occupation, the inhabitants of Guam have continued to live on the island and
exercise varying degrees of limited self-government.
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1899.277 The Act also extended citizenship to "[a]ll persons born on the island
of Guam on or after April 11, 1899 ... ."278 Most of the people encompassed by
this definition were Chamorros, but any non-Chamorros who were born on
Guam and lived there in 1899 (and did not elect to take Spanish or U.S. citizenship) would also be included.
While all people living on Guam certainly have a stake in its future status,
they are not all similarly situated with regard to international rights. The remedy
of decolonization arises from the injury of colonization, and only those groups
who were colonized suffered that injury. Under the Treaty of Paris, non-Native
inhabitants were permitted to choose their citizenship status; only Native inhabitants were left in colonial limbo. 279 Certainly, those people who moved to Guam
once it was under U.S. control are better understood as members of the colonizing nation (or even another nation), and not as colonized peoples. The "native inhabitants" category traces its origins to federal laws and reflects the U.S.
position that Guam's colonized population continues to have a group political
identity. That group political identity is significant, at least, for purposes of international law on decolonization. If the settler population could outvote the colonized population on the question of whether and how to decolonize, the remedy would be meaningless.2 so
A federal district court struck down the plebiscite law; 2 1 the Ninth Circuit,
citing Rice, agreed, although it recognized the importance of self-determination
and rejected the argument advanced by the plaintiff that ancestry always equals
race. 282 Both courts glossed over potentially important distinctions between

277.

Pub. L. No. 81-630, § 4(a), 64 Stat. 384, 384 (current version at 8 U.S.C. § 1407 (2018)). The
Act excluded from the first two categories anyone who took certain steps to retain citizenship
or nationality from another country, and it included anyone who otherwise fit the statutory
definitions but was temporarily absent from Guam when the law was enacted, as well as anyone who otherwise fit the statutory definition and continued living in a U.S. territory, even
if that territory was not Guam. Id.

278.

Id.

279.

Treaty of Paris, supra note 276.

280.

See Gillot et al. v. France, U.N. Human Rights Comm'n, Commc'n No. 932/2000, U.N. Doc.
CCPR/C/75/D932/2000, at p. 14.3 (July 26, 2002) (noting that a state may restrict voting in
a self-determination referendum to ensure that "results cannot be undermined by a massive
vote by people who have recently arrived in the territory and have no proven, strong ties to
it"); Aguon, supranote 121, at 388 (arguing that "to have allowed the American settler population in Hawai'i to vote alongside the colonized population diluted ad absurdum the latter's
right to a decolonization remedy guaranteed by international law"); Kauanui, The Politicsof
Blood, supra note 240, at 112 (noting that, in the election that resulted in Hawaii statehood,
"Hawaiians were outnumbered by settlers as well as military personnel").

281. Davis v. Guam, No. 11-00035, 2017 WL 930825, at *1 (D. Guam Mar. 8, 2017).
282. Davis v. Guam, 932 F 3 d 822, 837, 839, 843 ( 9 th Cir. 2019). Guam sought review by the

preme Court, which denied the petition in 2020. See Limtiaco, supra note 269.
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Guam and Hawaii (and even CNMI). First, Native inhabitants of Guam, as residents of a non-self-governing territory, have clear rights to self-determination
and access to the remedy of decolonization. While most of the colonized population is Indigenous, these rights stem from international law on colonized peoples, not Indigenous peoples. Accordingly, the right of the Native inhabitants of
Guam to self-determination clearly encompasses independence, should that be
the will of the Native inhabitants of Guam. 28 3 Second, because Guam is a nonself-governing territory, it is more directly controlled by the federal government
than is either Hawaii or CNMI. The legislature responsible for the challenged
law is more an arm of Congress than either the CNMI or Hawaii in the sense
that its relationship to the United States is not mediated through a covenant or
state constitution. Moreover, the Guam legislature was simply employing a classification clearly understood by Congress 28 4 to designate Native inhabitants as a
separate class.
The conservative figures and organizations that expressed interest in the
CNMI case were more directly involved in the Guam case. J. Christian Adams of
the Election Law Center represented the plaintiff in the Guam challenge. 285 He
was assisted by lawyers from the Center for Individual Rights, 286 a conservative
nonprofit that represented the plaintiffs in Reno v. Bossier Parish School District,
which made it easier for covered jurisdictions to obtain preclearance under Section 5 of the VRA despite evidence of discriminatory purpose. 28 7 The Pacific Legal Foundation, one of dozens of "so-called 'public interest' litigation boutiques"
funded by "dark money" that "scour the country for sympathetic and willing
'plaintiffs of convenience' to bring litigation that advances their constitutional
theories and ideological and political goals, even in the absence of a genuine 'case

283. Hawaiians argue that they are entitled to the same remedies, but the law is less clear and the

U.S. position is different. Aguon, supra note
284. See

121,

at 385-91.

S. REP. No. 81-2109 (1950), reprintedin 1950 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2840, 2841 (acknowledging

Congress's responsibility under the Treaty of Paris to provide for "[t]he civil rights and political status of the native inhabitants").
285. See Application for Pro Hac Vice Admission-J. Christian Adams, Davis. v. Guam, No. 11-00035
(D. Guam Nov. 22, 2011).
286. See Application for Pro Hac Vice Admission-Michael E. Rosman, Davis v. Guam, No. 11-00035
(D. Guam Nov. 22, 2011).
287. See Peyton McCrary, Christopher Seaman & Richard Vallely, The End of Preclearanceas We

5 of the Voting RightsAct, 11 MIcH. J. RACE
& L. 275 (2006). Part of the Center for Individual Rights' mission is "to get the government
out of the business of granting preferential treatment to individuals based on their race." Issue
Areas: Civil Rights, CTR. FOR INDIVIDUAL Rts., https://www.cir-usa.org/category/civil-rights
[https://perma.cc/JFP7-3TEQ].
Knew It: How the Supreme Court Transformed Section
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or controversy,"' 288 filed an amicus brief. 28 1 Whereas von Spakovsky complained
about the Obama Justice Department's lack of interest in the CNMI case, these
organizations were able to secure an amicus brief from the Trump Justice Department in support of their position in the Guam case. 2 90
Both the CNMI and Guam cases involved an attempt to expand the holding
of Rice beyond its facts and transform it into a rule that all ancestry-based classification are racial ones - a rule that, if accepted, could be used to undermine all
Indigenous classifications, including Indian laws. Although the Court in Rice
only held that ancestry could be a proxy for race, litigants in the lower courts
advocated for the view set forth in the CEO amicus brief that ancestry always
equals race.291 This was the core argument used in both the CNMI and Guam
challenges: if a law identifies a group by reference to ancestry or descent, it is
unconstitutional because ancestry equals race and racial classifications are generally unconstitutional. Because of the two cases' factual similarity to Rice (all
three involved ancestry-based classifications in voting and non-Indian Indigenous peoples), the lower courts hearing these cases employed Rice's Fifteenth
Amendment analysis and therefore did not consider as consequential the reasons
ancestry was being used: in CNMI to identify people who were Indigenous and
thus had claims to land that predated settlement by others, and in Guam to identify people affected by colonization on a specific date in order to operationalize
international rights to self-determination for colonized peoples.
Litigants in the Guam case doubled down on this argument, urging the court
to hold that all ancestry-based classifications are racial classifications.2 92 The
court of appeals addressed this argument at length in an important passage of its

288. Sheldon Whitehouse, A Flood ofJudicialLobbying: Amicus Influence and FundingTransparency,
131 YALE

L.J.F.

141,155 (2021).

289. Brief Amicus Curiae of Pacific Legal Foundation in Support of Appellant and Reversal, Davis
v. Guam, 932 F. 3 d 8- ( 9 th Cir. 2019) (No. 17-15719), 2013 WL 3171316.
290. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Plaintiff-Appellee and Urging Affirmance, Davis v. Guam, 932 F.3 d 822 ( 9 th Cir. 2019) (No. 17-15719), 2017 WL 5957470
291. Brief of Amici Curiae Center for Equal Opportunity et al. Supporting Petitioner, supra note
205, at *2-4.

292. See Davis v. Guam, 932 F.3 d 822, 834 ( 9 th Cir. 2019) ("Our first inquiry is whether, as Davis
maintains, Rice held all classifications based on ancestry to be impermissible proxies for race.")
The district court in Davis v. Guam rejected the argument that ancestry and race are always
equivalent. 2017 WL 930825, at *4 (stating that the Rice Court found that "ancestry can be a
proxy for race," implying that it is not always a proxy for race). Yet, it determined that in the
context of Guam's election, in which the government used ancestry to identify voters, ancestry
was operating as a racial proxy. Id. at *8. The court of appeals agreed. Davis v. Guam, 932 F.3 d
at 839.
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opinion that rejected such a broad reading of Rice.293 Turning to the substance
of the argument, the court acknowledged that "[j] ust as race is a difficult concept
to define, so is ancestry's precise relationship to race."2" Although racial classifications often incorporate ancestry, the court reasoned that "ancestry and race are
not identical legal concepts" and that "[s]tate and federal laws are replete with
provisions that target individuals based on biological descent without reflecting
racial classifications."2 9 Further undermining the expansive characterization of
the Rice rule, the court also noted that the Supreme Court has "rejected any categorical equivalence between ancestry and racial categorization."2 96 Here, the
court specifically cited the Supreme Court's approval of American Indian classifications that rely in whole or in part on ancestry.2 ' Ultimately, the court held
that "biological descent or ancestry is often a feature of a race classification, but
an ancestral classification is not always a racial one."2 9
It is important that this conceptual expansion of Rice failed to gain traction
in the courts.2 " However, the Pacific Island cases still represent doctrinal expansions of the Rice rule and their holdings diminished the legal protections available to Indigenous Pacific Islanders. The challengers succeeded in expanding Rice
by using it to challenge classifications made by the U.S. government (in CNMI)
or directly traceable to U.S. law (in Guam), as opposed to state voting rules, and
rules that apply in territories outside the states. Because both cases involved voting, the courts treated Rice's Fifteenth Amendment analysis as controlling. But
the broader context of the cases implicates underlying issues beyond voting.
While Rice was arguably related to Kanaka Maoli self-governance, it involved an

293. Davis, 932 F.3 d at 834-35 (rejecting Davis's argument that Rice stands for the rule that all ancestry-based classifications are racial and noting that "[n]owhere did the Court suggest that
classification by ancestry alone was sufficient to render the challenged classification a racial
one").
294.

Id. at 836.

295.

Id.
Id. at 837.

296.
297.

Id. As Sarah Krakoff has explained, the "Indian" classification "assumes ancestral ties to peoples who preceded European (and then American) arrival." Sarah Krakoff, They Were Here
First:American Indian Tribes, Race, and the ConstitutionalMinimum, 69 STAN. L. REV. 491, 501
(2017).

298. Davis, 932 F.3 d at 837.
299. Had the U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari in either case, the arguments may have had
more traction. See, e.g., Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl, 570 U.S. 637, 641 (2013) (limiting application of the Indian Child Welfare Act to a child whom the majority opinion described as
"1.2% (3/256) Cherokee"). But see id. at 690 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (criticizing the majority's "analytically unnecessary references to the fact that Baby Girl is 3/256 Cherokee by ancestry" and its "intimation that the statute may violate the Equal Protection Clause as applied
here").
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election for state officers, and academics and activists have questioned whether
the activities of the OHA can fairly be characterized as an exercise of self-governance. 300 The Pacific Island cases directly implicated land rights, self-governance, and decolonization. The expansion of Rice to cover those cases without regard to the underlying issues was thus an important step toward invalidating a
host of laws that somehow recognize the land or self-determination rights of
Indigenous and colonized peoples.
D. Import: Civil-Rights Statutes
A subsequent housing case from Guam took the attacks on Indigenous Pacific Islander rights one step further. This suit challenged a law that protected
Chamorro homelands through a system of reduced rate leases available only to
Chamorro applicants. 30 1 The suit invoked statutory civil-rights law, not constitutional race law,3 0 2 to challenge Indigenous rights, adding more legal tools for
challenging Indigenous classifications using a race framework. The United
States also took the lead in challenging Guam's housing law, a shift from the
federal government's role in previous cases. 3 3
Arnold Davis, the same plaintiff from the Guam plebiscite lawsuit described
in the previous Section, applied for a lease from the Chamorro Land Trust, but
he was rejected because he did not qualify under the law's definition of "Native
Chamorro."3 4 After the district court ruled in favor of Davis in his separate challenge to the "native inhabitants" classification,305 the Justice Department sued
the Chamorro Land Trust Commission (CLTC) alleging that, in limiting leases
to those who qualified as Native Chamorros, the CLTC violated the Fair Housing
Act's ban on racial discrimination in housing.306
Prior to this ruling, the Chamorro Land Trust Act had created the CLTC to
manage land held in trust for the benefit of "Native Chamorros," which the 1975
Act defined to include "any person who the Commission determines to be of at

300. Kauanui, The Politics ofBlood, supra note 240, at 121.

301.

Complaint at 6-8, United States v. Guam, No. 17-00113 (D. Guam Sept. 29, 2017).

302. Complaint, supra note 301, at 1o-1.

303.

Press Release, U.S. Dep't Just., Justice Department Sues Guam's Government for Racial and
National Origin Discrimination in Violation of the Fair Housing Act (Sep. 28, 2017), https://
www.justice. gov/opa/pr/justice-department-sues-guam-s-government-racial-and-national
-origin-discrimination-violation [https://perma.cc/XFP9-JJ9Q].

304. Steve Limtiaco, Land Trust ConcernsBrought to Feds LongAgo, PAc.

DAILY NEWS (Oct. 1, 2017),
https://www. guampdn.com/story/news/2o17/1o/o1/land-trust-concerns-brought-fedslong-ago/72o422001 [https://perma.cc/U3CG-J6RL].

30s.

Davis v. Guam, 2017 WL 930825, at *15 (D. Guam Mar. 8, 2017) (No. 11-00035).
306. Complaint, supra note 301, at 1.
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least one-fourth part of the blood of any person who inhabited the island prior
to 1898."307 Such references to "blood quantum" have long been used by Indian
tribes 08 and the federal government to signify the strength of an individual's
connection to an Indigenous community. 309 The Guam legislature later
amended the definition to include "any person who became a U.S. citizen by virtue of the authority and enactment of the Organic Act of Guam or descendants
of such person."310

"

The amendment is notable for at least three reasons. First, it reflects the trend
in Federal Indian law away from the language of blood quantum in favor of the
language of citizenship." Second, the amendment expands the class of qualifying people by eliminating the blood quantum floor and emphasizing historical
connection without requiring a certain degree of Indigenous ancestry.3" And
third, the statute now distinguishes between people living on the islands before
U.S. acquisition and those who came after. Some of those people were Spanish
citizens and were permitted to choose their citizenship status (U.S. or Spanish),
while the political rights of "native inhabitants" remained subject to the future
will of Congress.313 Those Native inhabitants were granted U.S. citizenship in
the 195o Organic Act, so reliance on the 1950 citizenship date more accurately
describes the class of colonized people in Guam.
In order to make its case that the CLTC violated the Fair Housing Act, the
United States took a page from the Rice playbook. It argued that Chamorros in
Guam are not recognized by Congress as an Indian tribe. It emphasized the
Guam legislature's use of the term "Chamorro" which, the United States contended, "is generally understood as a racial and ethnic term."3

307. Guam Pub. L. 12-226 (1975).

308. See, e.g., GOVER, supra note 11, at 83; Paul Spruhan, The Origins, Current Status, and Future
Prospects of Blood Quantum as the Definition of Membership in the Navajo Nation, 8 TRIBAL L.J.
7-8 (2007); TallBear, supra note 154, at 88-89; Ryan W. Schmidt, American Indian Identity
and Blood Quantum in the 21st Century: A Critical Review, 2011 J. ANTHROPOLOGY 1, 4-6;
Melissa L. Meyer, American Indian Blood Quantum Requirements:Blood Is Thicker than Family,
1,

OVER THE EDGE: REMAPPING THE AMERICAN WEST 231, 241-44

(Valerie J.

Matsumoto

&

in

Blake Allmendinger eds., 1999).

309. See, e.g., Paul Spruhan, A Legal History of Blood Quantum in FederalIndianLaw to 1935,51 S.D.
L. REv. 1, 1-2 (2006).

310. Guam Pub. L. 15-118 (198o) (codified at 21 GUAM CODE ANN. § 75101 (2021)).
311. Matthew L. M. Fletcher, Race andAmerican Indian Tribal Nationhood, 11 Wyo. L. REv. 1, 29596 (2011) ; Rolnick, Tribal CriminalJurisdictionBeyond Citizenship andBlood, supra note 17, at
427-47 (describing and critiquing the trend toward exclusive reliance on tribal citizenship).

312. See generally GOVER, supra note

11,

at 76-94 (contrasting tribal citizenship rules that rely on

descent of any degree with rules that rely on blood quantum).

313. Treaty of Paris, supranote 276, at 1759.
314. Complaint, supra note 301, at 3.
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By invoking the Fair Housing Act, the United States attempted to expand
the Rice rule in three important ways. First, it lifted an argument developed in
the context of the Fifteenth Amendment's absolute approach to race and voting,
in which interests are not balanced, and deployed it in the context of property
and housing, where the Fifteenth Amendment does not apply. As described in
Section II.B, voting is a unique context and only challenges to voting classifications implicate the Fifteenth Amendment. The voting context thus permitted a
conclusion in Rice that might have been more difficult in another context, and it
was also the reason the courts in both Davis cases felt bound to apply the same
rule. Lower courts had previously upheld Indigenous property protections in
CNMI, so the choice to revive challenges to local property protections in Guam
was significant.
Second, it borrowed the classification-and-intent gloss applied by the Court
to Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendment cases and used it to interpret
civilorights statutes. This is important because the Fair Housing Act permits attention to the subordinating effects of a classification, not just its intent. As a
result, it sometimes offers greater protections for subordinated racial groups
than the Reconstruction Amendments do. Importing constitutional race jurisprudence into the statutory context thus threatens to narrow civil-rights law in
a way that courts have declined to do. 315
And third, the United States took the lead in arguing that Indigenous rights
in the territories were illegal. Whether and how the United States intervenes in
litigation between Indian tribes and other parties has been an important factor
in determining whether tribal interests win316 - and the U.S. position in the territorial cases has shifted over the course of the lawsuits described in this Part. In
Rice, the federal government argued that the law should be upheld.3 17 In the

315. See Harris & West-Faulcon, supra note 151, 116-17 (arguing that the Court has extended constitutional affirmative action precedent into other areas of law and that the Ricci opinion "in
effect, . . . imports the substance of strict scrutiny review into the doctrinal regime" of Title
VII).
316. For discussions of amicus briefs in Indian law cases that emphasize the unique role of the
federal government, see generally Matthew L.M. Fletcher, The Utility of Amicus Briefs in the
Supreme Court's Indian Cases, 2 AM. INDIAN L.J. 38 (2013); and Frank Pommersheim, Amicus
Briefs in IndianLaw: The Case of Plains Commerce Bank v. Long Family Land and Cattle Co.,
56 S.D. L. REV. 86 (2011). Fletcher has also described the United States' view as an important
factor in the Court's decision whether to grant certiorari in Indian cases, Matthew L.M.
Fletcher, Factboundand Splitless: The CertiorariProcess as a Barrierto Justicefor Indian Tribes, 51
ARIz. L. REV. 933, 970 (2011), and found that the United States fares better before the Court
when it takes a position against tribal interests than when it sides with tribal interests, see
Matthew L.M. Fletcher, The TenthJustice Lost in Indian Country, THE FEDERAL LAWYER, Mar.Apr. 2011, at 36.
317.

Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondent, Rice v. Cayetano, 1999
WL 569475 (No. 98-818).
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CNMI case, the Justice Department was silent. 18 In the Guam plebiscite case,

the United States intervened against Guam. 319 And in the Guam housing case,
the Justice Department initiated its own civil-rights lawsuit challenging the
Chamorro Land Trust Act. The Guam housing suit settled, but the decision to
invest federal litigation resources in challenging a territorial housing law transformed the Justice Department from a defender of Indigenous rights laws into
an active dismantler. This shifting federal role appears to be the result of a longterm strategy to harness Justice Department resources: the United States filed its
lawsuit after the plaintiff involved in the Guam plebiscite case applied for a lease.
That plaintiff was backed by multiple organizations hostile to minority rights,
and those organizations had pressured the United States to intervene in previous
cases.3 2

0

E. Full Circle: Indian Law
Though Indigenous Hawaiians and Pacific Islanders have been vulnerable at
least since Rice to arguments that their rights and recognition are race-based and
therefore unconstitutional, Indian tribes within the continental United States are
protected by Morton v. Mancari, a 1978 case holding that Indian classifications
serve the political purpose of furthering the federal government's treaty-based
obligations to tribes and are thus not considered racial, even if they rely in part
on ancestry.32 1 Mancari has not stopped challenges to Indian ancestry classifications, though, and litigants have used Rice as an independent rule that ancestry-

318. See supra note 268.
319. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Plaintiffs-Appellee and Urging Affirmance, Davis v. Guam, 2017 WL 5957470 (Nov. 28, 2017).
320. See supra note 268 (describing efforts to involve the Justice Department in the CNMI case).
The Trump Justice Department was also criticized for being inconsistent in its willingness to
strongly defend Indigenous interests in other areas. See Trump AdministrationAbandons the
Indian Health Care Improvement Act in Court Case, INDIANZ.COM (Mar. 26, 2019) (criticizing
the U.S. Department of Justice's decision not to defend the Affordable Care Act as leaving
"Indian country without an advocate" and noting that the district court judge who struck
down the ACA, which included reauthorization of the Indian Health Care Improvement Act,
also struck down the ICWA) ; Hard Work "in the Trash": Standing Rock Sioux Tribe Slams
Trump on DakotaAccess, INDIANZ.COM (Sep. 4, 2018) (citing tribal criticism of the Trump Administration's "hasty" decision to expedite construction of the Dakota Access pipeline despite
the previous Administration's identification of important treaty and cultural resource concerns).
321. 417 U.S. 535, 554 (1974).
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based classifications are unconstitutional, and therefore only non-ancestrybased "Indian" classifications should be analyzed under Mancari.322
In 2017, a federal judge in Texas relied on Rice to strike down the ICWA. 323
The ICWA is a landmark law that protects the relationship between Indian tribes
and their children by affirming tribal jurisdiction over child welfare matters and
ensuring that state courts notify tribes and follow specific procedures before
adopting Indian children out to non-Indian families. 3 2 4 It was enacted in re-

sponse to a century of policies that removed Indian children from their families,
first through federally sponsored boarding schools and later through state childwelfare systems, which routinely terminated the rights of Indian parents based
on cultural misunderstandings and vague allegations about poverty and neglect. 32s The case in Texas is one of several filed in federal courts in recent years
with the aim of overturning the entire law.3 26
At the heart of the court's holding that the statute violated the Fourteenth
Amendment was its determination that "by deferring to tribal membership eligibility standards based on ancestry, rather than actual tribal affiliation, the
ICWA's jurisdictional definition of 'Indian children' uses ancestry as a proxy for
race."3" This finding reflected a dramatic misunderstanding of the statute's definition of Indian child, which requires that a child be a citizen of a tribe or be
both the child of a tribal citizen and eligible for citizenship under the tribe's
rules. 328 In other words, the statute articulates a narrow version of tribal affiliation based almost exclusively on political citizenship, not on ancestry.
The possibility that an Indian child could be the child of a tribal citizen but
not a formal tribal citizen herself is real for two reasons. First, tribal citizenship

322. See supra note 34 (citing cases in which litigants relied on Rice to challenge "Indian" classifications).
323. Brackeen v. Zinke, 338 F. Supp. 3 d 514 (N.D. Tex. 2018), rev'd sub nom. Brackeen v. Bernhardt,
937 F-3 d 406 (5th Cir. 2019), aff'd in relevant partsub nom. en banc Brackeen v. Haaland, 994
F-3d 249 (5th Cir. 2021), cert. granted, 142 S. Ct. 1205 (2022).
324. Kathryn E. Fort, Beyond Minimum Standards: FederalRequirements and State Interpretationsof
the Indian Child Welfare Act, 45 COURT REV. 26, 27-29 (2009).
325. Matthew L.M. Fletcher, The Origins of the Indian Child Welfare Act: A Survey of the Legislative
History, MICH. STATE UNIv. (Apr. 10, 2009), https://www.law.msu.edu/indigenous/papers
/200 9 -0 4 .pdf [https://perma.cc/F6RL-K77A]; see generally MARGARET D. JACOBS, AGENERATION REMOVED: THE FOSTERING AND ADOPTION OF INDIGENOUS CHILDREN IN THE POSTWAR

WORLD (2014) (documenting history of child welfare removal); infra note 365 (citing histories of boarding schools).
326. See Addie Rolnick & Kim Pearson, RacialAnxietiesin Adoption: Reflections on Adoptive Couple,
Mhite Parenthood, and Constitutional Challenges to the ICWA, 2017 MIcH. STATE L. REV. 727,
751-53 (describing and citing lawsuits challenging the ICWA between 2014 and 2017).

327. Brackeen, 338 E Supp. at 533-34
328. Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978, 25 U.S.C.
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generally requires affirmative filing of paperwork, so a child who has been placed
outside the home could easily lack formal citizenship simply because no one has
yet filed the correct paperwork. 329 Second, the ICWA was intended to counteract
government policies that severed the relationship between children and their
tribes, and one effect of those policies was that some eligible children might not
be enrolled because the connection has already been severed; the law aims to
reconnect those children. 330 The district court, however, simply looked at the
reference to parentage, cited Rice, and held that the definition was unconstitutional.331
A panel of the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed.332 The case was reheard before the en banc court in January 2020, and the en banc court also upheld
the law. 333 Regarding the equal-protection challenge, the court held that the
"ICWA's Indian child designation classifies on the basis of a child's connection
to a political entity based on whatever criteria that political entity may prescribe."3" Congress was not expanding the law beyond tribal citizenship or affiliation, it reasoned, but was instead acknowledging the realities of tribal enrollment, which typically requires an affirmative act of registration that a child
would be incapable of undertaking alone.33 The Court of Appeals rejected the
district court's use of Rice to strike down the law, reasoning that the ICWA's "Indian child" classification is easily distinguishable from the classification at issue
in Rice.

The Court in Rice specifically noted that native Hawaiians did
not enjoy the same status as members of federally recognized
tribes, who are constituents of quasi-sovereign political communities. Instead, ancestry was the sole, directly controlling criteria for whether or not an individual could vote in the OHA
election. But unlike the ancestral requirement in Rice, the
ICWA's eligibility standard simply recognizes that some Indian
children have an imperfect or inchoate tribal membership. That

329. Brackeen v. Haaland, 994 F-3d 249, 340 ( 5 th Cir. 2021) (en banc).
330. Indian Child Welfare Act, Pub. L. 95-608,
U.S.C. § 1901-02).

52(3)-(4),

$3, 92 Stat. 3069 (1978), (codified at 25

331. Brackeen v. Zinke, 338 F. Supp. 3 d at 514.
332. Brackeen v. Bernhardt, 937 F-3 d 406 (5th Cir. 2019), aff'd in relevant part sub nom. en banc
Brackeen v. Haaland, 994 F-3d 249 (5th Cir. 2021), cert. granted, 142 S. Ct. 1205 (2022).
333. Brackeen v. Haaland, 994 F-3d at 249.
334. Id. at 338.
335. Id. at 340.
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is, the standard embraces Indian children who possess a potential but not-yet-formalized affiliation with a current political entity- a federally recognized tribe.336
To the Court Appeals, Rice was "wholly inapplicable except insofar as it reaffirmed the holdings of Mancari and its progeny that laws that classify on the
basis of Indian tribal membership are political classifications.""
The district court's conclusion that the ICWA's "Indian child" classification
was illegal did not survive appellate review, but its summary invocation of Rice
as outlawing ancestry-based "Indian" classifications reveals the way the Rice rule
has evolved. What began as a holding striking down a "Kanaka Maoli" classification because it did not involve citizenship in a federally recognized Indian tribe
had grown into a rule that could be used to invalidate a classification that specifically turns on citizenship in a federally recognized Indian tribe. The district
court repeated Rice's language about ancestry operating as a proxy for race, but
it engaged in no analysis of how ancestry was operating as a proxy for race in the
ICWA, revealing the way the Rice rule has simply flattened ancestry into race.
It also opened a door to challenge federal "Indian" classifications using Rice.
The Court of Appeals upheld the "Indian child" definition, but it was split on
the constitutionality of the "Indian" classifications used elsewhere in the statute
for foster care and adoption placement preferences, which do not turn on tribal
citizenship. The Supreme Court will now consider those provisions and may also
reconsider the "Indian child" classification. Until the district court's reasoning is
fully and squarely rejected by a reviewing court, Rice remains a threat to Indian
rights.
The people whose rights were at stake in the cases described above are Indigenous, colonized, racialized, and ancestrally defined- four of the five categories set forth in Part I. With the exception of the people involved in Brackeen,
however, they are not generally classified as "Indians." Beginning with Rice, the
courts have characterized these ancestry-based "Indigenous" classifications as
proxies for race. A rule that was refined in Pacific Islander voting cases has now
been invoked to challenge Indigenous property rights in the Pacific Islands and
Indian tribal rights expressly protected by federal law. Over the course of the
cases described in this Part, the courts have blurred or eradicated any distinction

336. Id. at 339 (citations omitted).
337. Id. at 340. The Fifth Circuit decision included a complicated collection of issues, with two
judges receiving en banc majority support for individual sections of their respective opinions.
While the "Indian child" classification was clearly upheld, id. at 267-68 (per curiam), the fate
of the adoption preference provision is less clear, see Kate Fort, Brackeen Decision Summary,
TURTLE TALK (Apr. 7, 2021), https://turtletalk.blog/2o21/o4/o7/brackeen-decision-summary
[https://perma.cc/V7WS-8AAV]. See supra note 9.
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between ancestry and race. Strategic litigants have then used that blurring to
urge courts to ignore all other legal frameworks that may apply, even in Indian
cases. Race jurisprudence has undermined Indigenous rights in Hawaii and the
Pacific Islands and has also become a significant threat to Indian tribal rights.

III. RECONSTRUCTION

AMENDMENTS

AS COLONIZING AGENTS

Whereas the foregoing Part offered details about the juridical moves used to
link ancestry with race and delink it from indigeneity and colonization, this Part
considers the implications of this strategy. For Indigenous peoples, the process
described above has threatened their existence and rights. For Indians, it has
tightened the "Indian" category so as to exclude more people and groups. For
non-Indigenous minorities, all of whom have only the race-law framework available, the cases described above have reinscribed an apolitical, individualized understanding of rights that could work against them in many contexts.
Rice crystallized the divide between Indians and racial groups by holding that
ancestry can be a proxy for race. Although Mancaripermits some recognition of
indigeneity based on ancestry, Rice also suggested that ancestry should be treated
as race when invoked outside the context of Indianness.338 In the cases described
in Sections II.C and II.D, litigants have asked lower federal courts to strike down
non-Indian ancestry-based classifications in contexts that much more closely
parallel the collective self-determination and property rights protected by Federal Indian law. While bound by the Supreme Court's holding in Mancari, and
sometimes rejecting the most far-reaching iterations of the arguments, such as
the argument that ancestry is always equivalent to race, or the argument that
Congress lacks power to recognize Indigenous Hawaiians,3 3 these lower courts
have declined to meaningfully limit or distinguish Rice, at least in the Pacific Island context. The rule that ancestry may be a proxy for race has been incrementally expanded into a rule that ancestry is nearly always a proxy for race when
used to designate non-Indian Indigenous or colonized peoples.

338. See Rolnick, The Promise of Mancari, supra note 17, at 997-98. ContraKymlicka, supra note 82,

at 187 (noting that "the dramatic enhancement of the rights of indigenous peoples over the
past 15 years has coincided with a period of stagnation, even retrenchment, in the international
status of minorities, and with growing international hostility to many minority rights claims"
and arguing that "[t] he success of the international indigenous movement to date has depended precisely on the assumption that progress for indigenous peoples need not, and will
not, open the door to greater recognition or protection of other minorities").
339.

See supra notes 20, 239, 292-298 (describing cases in which courts have avoided or rejected
these arguments).
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When courts employ a colorblind understanding of the Reconstruction
Amendments to undermine Indigenous rights, the most direct response is to
clarify the misunderstanding by distinguishing Indian law from race law: under
federal-Indian-law principles, Indigenous rights are political rights, and Indigenous status is a political status.340 This approach makes sense because until the
Court is willing to fully grapple with its cramped interpretation of racial equality,
distance from the doctrine will best protect Indigenous rights. 341 The doctrinal
space available to uphold classifications based on indigeneity or colonization is
shrinking, though. When it comes to voting classifications, that space has arguably disappeared. In place of an expansive understanding of colonization and
racialization, American law now has two boxes: Indianness and race. Neither of
these categories is defined in a way that reflects the historical reality of land transfer, enslavement, and disenfranchisement. Instead, the resulting doctrine allows
these injuries to continue, turning law into a tool of colonization.
A.

Erasureand Colonization

One of the core injuries wrought by Rice and its progeny is the suggestion
that, for purposes of U.S. law, being "Indigenous" has no legal significance. If
taken to its logical extension, the rule that ancestry-based classifications amount
to illegal race discrimination threatens to juridically erase Indigenous peoples
who do not fit into the narrow legal category of Indian.
U.S. law has one available framework for recognizing Indigenous self-determination and property rights: Federal Indian law. The protection offered by this
box is already thin in many ways. Indian tribes are not recognized by the Court
as having full "external" self-determination rights (e.g., treaty-making, full
property rights, full jurisdiction over outsiders).342 According to the Court, their

340. The district court opinion in Brackeen, for example, obviously misunderstands existing law
by substituting a brief citation to Rice for an entire body of law on political "Indian"classifications. See Brackeen v. Zinke, 338 F. Supp. 3 d 514, 531-32 (N.D. Tex. 2018).
341.

Sarah Irakoff, InextricablyPolitical: Race, Membership, and Tribal Sovereignty, 87 WASH. L. REv.
1041, 1132 (2012) ("If courts move in the direction of scrutinizing tribes' distinctive status in
today's color-blind climate, they are more likely to entrench historical discrimination against
indigenous peoples than to reverse it.").

342. Steele, supra note 71, at 309.
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sovereignty343 and land rights 4 4 are "subject to complete defeasance" by Congress.345 Federal Indian law is a settler-colonial creation in the sense that it recognizes Indigenous rights only to the extent that they do not unsettle American
nationhood or property rights.346
Despite its shortcomings, though, Federal Indian law recognizes Indigenous
peoples' continued existence via a model of contemporary nationhood. It protects important collective powers, such as the power to govern and adjudicate
according to non-Western cultural norms;34 7 the power to control, protect, discipline, and educate children;348 the power to tax;349 the power to punish;35 0 and
the power to exclude people from and regulate the use of land.35 1 The category
of "Indianness," which includes many people who are also racial minorities, allows Congress to pass laws to recognize these rights, or otherwise to benefit Indigenous peoples, despite constitutional limitations on the power of Congress to
legislate with regard to racial groups.

343. Courts have also claimed the power to divest tribes of aspects of sovereignty via the theory of
implicit divestiture. See Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191, 206-08 (1978)
(limiting tribal jurisdiction over non-Indians in criminal proceedings); Strate v. A-1 Contractors, 520 U.S. 438, 442 (1997) (limiting tribal jurisdiction over highway accidents involving
nonmembers); Plains Com. Bankv. Long Fam. Land & Cattle Co., 554 U.S. 316,328-29 (2008)
(limiting tribal sovereignty over land owned by nonmembers); see also Steele, supra note 71,
at 673 (discussing the untenability of the Court's "theory that tribes may have lost powers by
implication").

344.

See Johnson v. M'Intosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543, 603(1823); Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock, 187 U.S.
553, 565-66 (1903); Tee-Hit-Ton Indians v. United States, 348 U.S. 272, 279, 289 (1955);
United States v. Sioux Nation of Indians, 448 U.S. 371, 415 (1980); McGirt v. Oklahoma, 140
S. Ct. 2452, 2462 (2020).

34s.

United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 323 (1978).

346. See, e.g., Cayuga Indian Nation v. Pataki, 413 F. 3 d 266 (2d Cir. 2005) (holding that laches may

bar "disruptive" Indian land claims); see also Kauanui, PrecariousPositions, supra note 240, at
14 ("Hawaiians can look to cases from Indian Country and Native Alaska to shed light on the
problems and pitfalls of federal recognition.").
See Angela R. Riley, (Tribal) Sovereignty and Illiberalism, 95 CALIF. L. Rev. 799, 800 (2007).

348.

Addie C. Rolnick, Untanglingthe Web: JuvenileJustice in Indian Country, 19 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS.

&

347.

PUB. PoL'Y 49, 67 (2016).
349. See Merrion v.

Jicarilla Apache Tribe, 455 U.S. 130, 137 (1982).

3so. See Wheeler, 435 U.S. at 322; Talton v. Mayes, 163 U.S. 376, 380 (1896); see also Rolnick, Tribal

CriminalJurisdiction, supra note 17, at 338-39 (arguing that while Indian tribes retain some
ability to punish, their criminal jurisdiction is more limited than that of other sovereigns).

3s.

See Merrion, 455 U.S. at 139-40; cf Brendale v. Confederated Yakima Indian Nation, 492 U.S.
408, 444, 447 (1989) (Stevens, J., concurring) (holding that the Yakima Nation could regulate
land use by non-Indians in the closed portion of the reservation, but not in the area open to
settlement).
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In Rice, the Court confronted the question of legal protections for Indigenous peoples whose status was somehow outside this box. The Court could have
recognized parallel rights to self-determination, powers of self-governance, and
protections against land loss, effectively recognizing a legal category of "indigeneity" outside Indianness. 3 2 Even if the Court did not recognize "indigeneity"
as a legal category, it could have acknowledged that Hawaii was using ancestry
as a proxy for indigeneity, not race, and therefore not subjected the classification
to the scrutiny reserved for classifications based expressly on race or unexplainable on any grounds other than race. Instead, the Court treated ancestry as race,
leaving race as the only legal category available to Indigenous Hawaiians.
This categorical choice has far-reaching consequences. Racial groups are
treated differently than Indians under U.S. law. They have no self-determination
rights. The government can only very rarely pass laws to benefit them. And they
cannot be singled out as a group.353 By refusing to engage with the law's purpose
of protecting the political power of Indigenous Hawaiians over the administration of trusts to benefit them (in light of the Fifteenth Amendment analysis), the
Rice Court also suggested that protection of Indigenous rights was not a legally
meaningful purpose outside the context of Indian law. Without the protection
of Indianness, the Court determined that any attempt to identify Indigenous Hawaiians "as a distinct people, commanding their own recognition and respect"
was "a racial purpose." 354
For people whose experience does not require them to think about decolonization rights, indigeneity, or tribal affiliation, Justice Kennedy's maxim that ancestry is a proxy for race seems to prove itself because ancestry is likely to be
significant only when used as a proxy for race. But the Rice decision disregarded
a clearly outlined reason that ancestry was significant in the Hawaiian context:
ancestry was used as a proxy for historical continuity. Because indigeneity and
colonized status take their meaning from a historical moment of colonization,3ss
it is necessary to connect present-day peoples to their historical predecessors by
tracing back through time. For groups defined by kinship structures, as most

352. The rights and power attached to this category would not necessarily have been the same as

those attached to the Indian category. For example, if American law recognized the international legal category of indigeneity, it would not be required to recognize the territorialsovereignty of the groups in that category.
353. See supra note 156 and accompanying text (discussing how modern race jurisprudence rejects

group rights); infra note 373, 377-38o and accompanying text (discussing the rejection of
group rights and the vulnerability of laws protecting minority rights).
354. Rice v. Cayetano, 528 U.S. 495, 496 (2000).

3ss. See supra note 81 and accompanying text (indigeneity); supra note 51 and accompanying text
(colonized status).
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Indigenous peoples are, 356 tracing backward through ancestry makes sense.357
The rule of Rice makes it difficult to carve out a class of Indigenous or colonized
peoples because it eliminates the easiest tool for tracing a class of people who
suffered a past harm through time to a present class of people who can exercise
the remedy for that harm. If taken to their logical conclusion, the line of cases
described in Part II would make such tracing illegal.
On their face, these decisions strip Indigenous peoples in the territories, including Chamorros, Carolinians, and Samoans, of their group political rights in
the sense that important questions cannot be decided by Indigenous peoples as
a group at the ballot box. Of course, group political power may still be possible
via the election of representatives from Indigenous communities. It may also be
possible through numerical power in voting. But the Guam example shows how
the United States can easily overcome the will of colonized peoples by simply
locating and enfranchising new territorial residents.35
In the Guam plebiscite case, 5 9 the Court's disallowance of ancestry-based
classifications has already had a direct effect on a colonized peoples' ability to
pursue the remedy of decolonization. Peoples have a right to political self-determination, and as a non-self-governing territory, Guam residents are on the U.N.
list of peoples who have been unable to access this basic right.360 With the plebiscite, Guam sought to conduct a nonbinding poll of colonized residents to determine their desires with regard to pursuing decolonization remedies. By invalidating that election, the federal courts have done more than assure noncolonized
residents a voice in the process; they have made it nearly impossible for Guam
to distinguish between the votes of colonized and noncolonized residents, effectively depriving colonized peoples of any collective voice.
The CNMI and Guam lawsuits have also indirectly facilitated the potential
loss of Indigenous peoples' land rights. In CNMI, the Davis decision permitted
all residents of the islands to vote on whether to repeal Article XII of the NMI
Constitution, which protected Indigenous property rights. Indeed, the lease restriction was adopted for the express purpose of "'protect[ing] [the people]
against exploitation and ... promot[ing] their economic advancement and selfsufficiency' and ... preserv[ing] the islanders' culture and traditions, which are

356. Goldberg, supra note 191.
357.

Rolnick, Tribal Criminaljurisdiction, supra note 17, at 389-427 (describing how citizenship obligations are inherited via families, clans, and moieties).

358.

See supra note 280 (describing the problem of settler majorities outvoting colonized minorities); see also Aguon, supra note 81, at 54 n.4o (describing New Caledonia).

359.

Davis v. Guam, 2017 WL 930825 (D. Guam 2017), aff'd, 932 F.3 d 822 ( 9 th Cir. 2019), cert.
denied, 140 S. Ct. 2739 (2020).

360.

Aguon, supra note 81, at 52-53; Non-Self-Governing Territories, supra note

n5.
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uniquely tied to the land."361 Chamorros and Carolinians, who make up the legal
category of people protected by Article XII, are less than forty percent of the
CNMI population. Thus, assuming that all settler residents vote in favor of preserving their interests in acquiring property, it will be easy to remove the land
restriction. Removing the voting restriction will "allow anyone, even non-NMDs
who have gained residency after a short period of time, to vote on the fate of
NMD land ownership -potentially leaving NMDs without a homeland." 362
Similarly, the federal government's civil-rights challenge to Guam's lease program threatened to eliminate Guam's limited remedy for Chamorro land loss and
the only real bulwark against further loss.
Land transfer is the intended outcome in settler societies, and the physical
and metaphorical disappearance of the colonized is the primary tool of colonization.363 Early American law facilitated Indigenous peoples' anthropological disappearance by defining Indianness in a way that depended on blood quantum,
ensuring that Indians would no longer exist after a few generations of intermarriage. 364 Later, federal law facilitated cultural disappearance by educating Indian
children in schools designed to make them White.365 If Indian children could be
remade as White adults, Indians would no longer exist after their parents' generation died off. If colonized and Indigenous status could not be traced back
though time, the only people entitled to remedies for colonization would be the
generation that lived through a defining event (e.g., the people in Guam who

361. Wabol v. Villacrusis, 958 E2d 145o, 1452 ( 9 th Cir. 1990) (quoting 48 U.S.C. § 1801 (2018)).
362. Torres, supra note 254, at 185. In previously upholding the land restriction against an equalprotection challenge, the Ninth Circuit disavowed this use of law as colonizing agent: "The
Bill of Rights was not intended to interfere with the performance of our international obligations. Nor was it intended to operate as a genocide pact for diverse native cultures." Wabol,
958 E2d at 1462.

363. See Patrick Wolfe, Settler Colonialismand the Elimination of the Native, 8 J. GENOCIDE RSCH.
387, 387-90 (2006);

PHILIP JOSEPH DELORIA, PLAYING INDIAN 1-9 (1998); VINE DELORIA, JR.,
CUSTER DIED FORYOUR SINS: AN INDIAN MANIFESTO 9-14 (1969).

364. Maillard, supra note 142, at 357; Wolfe, supra note 363, at 401 (describing similar laws in Australia).
See generally ANDREW

365.

WOOLFORD, THIS BENEVOLENT EXPERIMENT: INDIGENOUS BOARDING

SCHOOLS, GENOCIDE, AND REDRESS IN CANADA AND THE UNITED STATES (2016)

(comparative

examination of U.S. and Canadian boarding schools that situates them as the primary means
by which governments carried out assimilation policies); MARGARET CONNELL SZASz, EDUCATION AND THE AMERICAN INDIAN: THE ROAD TO SELF-DETERMINATION SINCE 1928 (1999)

(discussing educational programs as a vehicle for assimilation of Indians);

K.

TSIANINA

LOMAWAIMA, THEY CALLED IT PRAIRIE LIGHT: THE STORY OF CHILOCCO INDIAN SCHOOL

(1994) (relating Indian experience of assimilation through boarding school program); CHRISTINE BOLT, AMERICAN INDIAN POLICY AND AMERICAN REFORM: CASE STUDIES OF THE CAM-

PAIGN TO ASSIMILATE THE AMERICAN INDIANS 95-97 (1987) (discussing government policies

and programs to assimilate Indians).
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were made citizens in 195o). Within one generation, there would be no one left
in the "Indigenous" or "colonized" legal categories. Outside the "Indian" category, Indigenous and colonized peoples would legally disappear, and the colonial
project would be complete.
B. Individuality, Immutability, and Racial Domination
Indigenous Pacific Islanders stand to lose the most from the rule that ancestry equals race, but the post-Rice territorial cases show that Indigenous Pacific
Islanders have been a pawn in a long game to exorcise all recognition of collective
identity and history from American constitutional jurisprudence on race. This
game has many more losers, most of whom would not be saved by a rule carving
out ancestry-based classifications tied to indigeneity. This is because, while firstin-time land-rights claims are unique to Indigenous peoples, collective identity
and harms stretching from history to the present day are not.366 For example,
Black people continue to be harmed by the law's refusal to consider collective
identity and account for the present-day impacts of historical harms. Just as Rice
narrowed legal recognition of indigeneity to exclude Indigenous peoples in the
territories, it also narrowed the legal concept of racial harm and remedy to more
fully exclude historical continuity and group identity.
The United States exacted a range of harms on various groups of people, all
in the name of expanding a physical and financial empire. Modern American law,
however, has successfully bifurcated its acknowledgement of these harms: Black
people lost control over their labor and capital and were excluded from the
American polity, while Indians lost land and were forcibly assimilated. Civilrights law thus prioritizes inclusion and citizenship and protects private property
and employment rights, while Federal Indian law protects collective land rights,
self-government, and a right to difference.
The Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments were unquestionably enacted to
protect Black people from subordination via exclusion. In recognition of the various ways subordination has operated and the various groups affected, they have
been interpreted to include other subordinated groups. But racial subordination
in this country has always worked in one direction (White over non-White), so
the Court's suggestion that it is impossible to know who the next subordinated
group will be is detached from historical reality. Meanwhile, Indigenous peoples
have experienced subordination in this country through forced inclusion, and

Kim & Abigail M. Holden, American ReparationsTheory
and Practiceat the Crossroads,44 CAL. W. L. REV. 1, 1-4 (2007); Robert Westley, Many Billions
Gone: Is It Time to Reconsider the Case for Black Reparations?, 40 B.C. L. REV. 429, 436-38
(1998) ; Kim Forde-Mazrui, Taking Conservatives Seriously: A MoralJustificationforAffirmative
Action and Reparations, 92 CALIF. L. REv. 683, 697-701 (2004).

366. Eric K. Yamamoto, Sandra Hye Yun
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the only way to prevent this subordination is to keep the non-Indigenous majority from completely silencing and erasing the Indigenous minority by preserving space for Indigenous territorial and governmental self-determination. 367
Efforts to resist both forms of subordination, however, have been stymied
by the legal compartmentalization of Indianness and race. The law effectively
divides identities and realities into mutually exclusive categories and protects
only a narrowly defined set of rights for each category. With regard to both the
boundaries of the categories and the scope of rights protected for each, Rice has
been an important tool, standing for the idea that group political identity among
racialized peoples is a threat to democracy. By bifurcating the legal protections
for subordinated groups, and narrowing the protection offered by each category,
courts have also created doctrinal tools that can be used against each other to
further narrow the protections available to everyone. The territorial cases
demonstrate that the political right understands that the continued exclusion of
minority voters is connected to the continued denial of collective self-determination to Chamorros: the same organizations pushing to allow everyone to vote
on self-determination in Guam are responsible for restrictive voting laws in general elections.368
Race law's failure to recognize group-based claims was not a foregone conclusion. When Owen M. Fiss wrote Groups and the Equal Protection Clause, there
was room to understand the Reconstruction Amendments as requiring groupbased remedies for collective harms. 369 At that time, four Supreme Court Justices
understood the Fourteenth Amendment to authorize college admissions programs that benefit underrepresented minority students because of their connection to a group that had suffered the historical harm of educational exclusion.3 70
The Court agreed that the Fifteenth Amendment authorized Congress to protect
367. See Brief Amicus Curiae of Anne Perez Hattori in Support of Defendants-Appellees and Affirmance, Davis v. Guam, 785 F. 3d 1311 ( 9 th Cir. 2017) (No. 13-15199), at *2 ("[I]f the flood of
recent migrants to Guam is allowed to vote in the plebiscite, this colonized polity will yet
again be denied even this symbolic expression of self-determination by dint of simple vote
dilution. Attempting to disguise such an injustice beneath the cloak of civil rights is as shameful as it is transparent.").

368. See supra note 270 (discussing J. Christian Adams and Hans von Spakovsky); see also Serrano,
supra note 170, at 501-02 (noting that anti-affirmative-action and conservative election attorneys represented a White U.S. citizen and Guam resident in his "attempt to vote in a politicalstatus plebiscite reserved for 'native inhabitants of Guam"').
369. Fiss, supra note 31, at 107; see also Owen Fiss, Another Equality, 2004 ISSUES LEGAL SCHOLARSHIP 1, 19-20 (linking individual and group interests); Jack M. Balkin & Reva B. Siegel, The
American Civil Rights Tradition:AnticlassjficationorAntisubordination?,58 U. M1A. L. REv. 9, 914 (2003) (arguing that antisubordination was not rejected but survived as a value that guides
courts in applying an anticlassification approach).
&

370. Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 324 (1978) (Brennan, White, Marshall
Blackmun, JJ., concurring).
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minority political power as well as access to the polls. 371 And in the context of
college admissions, it agreed to draw a direct line between the specific racial
harms enacted by states in the past to specific remedies today.37
The Court's anticlassification theory, cemented in the decades since Fiss advanced his theory, does not conceive of group harm. It locates the harm of racism
in the individual dignitary injury of classification, rather than the resulting material inequality that has resulted from classifications.37 3 Laws that invoke race
are subjected to strict scrutiny not because of the material damage they have visited upon actual groups of people, but because of the dignitary and value-based
injury they could pose to hypothetical individuals. This kind of injury hurts everyone equally, no matter how they are situated with regard to power.
Such an approach only makes sense if race is defined as a static biological fact
disconnected from history and hierarchy. The Rice Court's equation of race with
ancestry has helped shape an ongoing definition of race as an individual descriptor based on immutable physical or biological characteristics. Under such a
definition, it injures both individual dignity and national values to make any
election decision based on a biological descriptor. 374 It follows that collective
identity could not be based on such an irrelevant fact. 37
The assertion that ancestry is equivalent to race also reflects a common desire
among members of the public to operate in a perceived colorblind fashion by
rejecting all racial classifications in social settings. At the same time, many people
still cling to an understanding of race as scientific truth at the level of DNA or
ancestry. In court, it is possible to reconcile these positions by defining race in
terms of ancestry but asserting that it cannot have significance outside of scientific and medical data. This framing echoes beyond Indigenous rights and even
beyond constitutional jurisprudence on benign racial classifications. From it
flows some courts' colorblind insistence that official uses of certain immutable,
irrelevant characteristics (skin color, ancestry, hair texture) amount to discrimination when used in law, but classifying by mutable, performative, or cultural

371.

Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 47-48 (1986).

372. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 307-08.
373. Siegel, Equality Talk, supra note 29, at 1531; Barnes & Chemerinsky, supra note 29, at 1086-87.
374. Rice v. Cayetano, 528 U.S. 495, 517 (2000) (" [I]t demeans the dignity and worth of a person
to be judged by ancestry instead of by his or her own merit and essential qualities.").
375. See Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 648 (1993) (quoting Wright v. Rockefeller, 376 U.S. 52, 66
(1964) (Douglas, J., dissenting)). In the canon of cases that establish the rules of colorblind
constitutionalism, Rice's notoriety is dwarfed by its more famous Fourteenth Amendment
cousins Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976); Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan
Housing Development Corp., 429 U.S. 252 (1977); Bakke, 438 U.S. 265; Adarand Constructors,
Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200 (1995); and Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630 (1993). Its logic, however, is
just as central to the colorblind project.
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characteristics (hairstyle) does not. 376 Although all these factors were important
to disavowed legal definitions of race, only a subset is associated with race today.
The colorblind approach, which treats race as a biological, but politically insignificant, descriptor, places White people's dignitary interest in not being classified above minority groups' interest in exercising political power within a system that has long subordinated them. Indeed, the Court cited Rice in Parents
Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle School DistrictNo. 1 for the rule that ancestry-based classifications are generally forbidden because they "demean[] the
dignity and worth of a person,"37 7 and Justice Alito cited it in his dissent in Fisher
v. University of Texas for the same proposition.378 In the context of redistricting,
the colorblind approach ignores the issue being voted on, the backdrop of relative political power in that jurisdiction, and the history of similar power imbalances. 37" Consistent with the individual focus on facial classification over subordinating effects, constitutional race law has evolved to protect individual political
rights at the expense of group rights. 380
That the Reconstruction Amendments, which were designed to remedy the
exclusion of Black Americans, have become a tool to allow the silencing of Indigenous rights via majority participation defies logic. But it is completely consistent with the way the Amendments have been deployed as tools to silence
Black people and other minority groups in the context of voting. It is not simply
that the Amendments, after the Court's adoption of its intent doctrine, provide
anemic protection against vote dilution. In cases like Shaw and Miller, they have
also been used proactively to dilute or muffle minority political power by insisting on an individualized definition of race that is divorced from politics and history.381

376.

See D. Wendy Greene, Title VII: What's Hair(and Other Race-Based Characteristics)Got to Do
with It?, 79 U. CoLO. L. REV. 1355, 1370-76 (2008); Paulette M. Caldwell, A HairPiece: Perspectives on the Intersection of Race and Gender, 1991 DuKE L.J. 365, 376-81; Camille Gear Rich,
Performing Racial and Ethnic Identity: Discrimination by Proxy and the Future of Title VII, 79
N.Y.U. L. REv. 1134, 1202-12 (2004).

377. Parents Involved in Cmty. Schs. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 746 (2007) (quoting
Rice, 528 U.S. at 517).

378. Fisher v. Univ. of Tex., 136 S. Ct.
379.

2198,

2221 (2016) (Alito,

J., dissenting).

See Shaw, 509 U.S. at 657 (insisting that even racial classifications intended to remediate past
racism "may balkanize us into competing racial factions"); Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. goo,
927 (1995) (" [E]radicating invidious discrimination from the electoral process ... is neither
assured nor well served . .. by carving electorates into racial blocs.").

380. See, e.g., Shaw, 509 U.S. at 657; Miller, 515 U.S. at 927.
381. Miller, 515 U.S. at 911-12; Shaw, 509 U.S. at 647 ("A reapportionment plan that includes in one

district individuals who belong to the same race, but who are otherwise widely separated by
geographical and political boundaries, and who may have little in common with one another
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IV. DOCTRINAL INTERVENTIONS

If U.S. courts' interpretation of the Reconstruction Amendments and Federal
Indian law leaves Indigenous Pacific Islanders vulnerable to loss of rights and
recognition, what is the solution? Their vulnerability is a symptom of two problems. First, legal doctrines meant to address various forms of subordination are
detached from material reality. Second, interest groups have successfully used
the detached doctrinal strands to narrow protections in each area and further a
long-term project of subordination. Yet, each of the categories described in Part
I has come to be defined so restrictively that this subordinating project looks like
justice. Well-meaning judges can easily misunderstand an attack on Indigenous
peoplehood as an effort to protect the dignity of all citizens. Without an understanding of how the legal rules have evolved, the context for that evolution, and
other possible interpretations, a casual observer would almost certainly be confused about what justice means and how to pursue it.
An initial question, then, is whether the doctrine can be changed and how
radical a change is possible. This Part considers several options for reinterpreting
current doctrine to protect Indigenous Pacific Islanders, who have been pushed
outside the margins of protection in all areas of law. Centering them requires
revisiting the categories described in Part I and the rules that courts apply to each
one. This Part sets forth five strategies for doing so, addressed in order of how
radical a shift they require compared to the Court's current approaches. It considers the benefits and disadvantages of each approach, including which groups
will be helped or harmed and how, the feasibility of using each strategy in court,
and a consideration of each strategy's significance beyond individual cases.
First, litigants could opt not to challenge the Court's doctrinal frameworks
at all, but to accept them and work to highlight in individual cases why Indigenous rights merit protection. Second, litigants could rely on the domestic law of
the territories to carve out a new doctrinal approach for protecting Indigenous
peoples in the territories. Third, litigants could seek to achieve the same goal by
importing international-law protections into domestic law. By relying on areas
of law beyond Indian law and race law, the second and third approaches may
offer specific and tailored ways to protect non-Indian Indigenous rights without

but the color of their skin, bears an uncomfortable resemblance to political apartheid. It reinforces the perception that members of the same racial group -regardless of their age, education, economic status, or the community in which they live -think alike, share the same political interests, and will prefer the same candidates at the polls. We have rejected such
perceptions elsewhere as impermissible racial stereotypes.").

2731

THE YALE LAW JOURNAL

131:2652

2022

challenging the Court's approach to Federal Indian law or race law. Fourth, litigants could attempt to expand and reshape Federal Indian law by arguing that
some or all of its protections apply based on Indigenous status, a political identity, either instead of or in addition to Indian status. This approach would also
entail disentangling ancestry from race, at least when it is used as a proxy for
indigeneity. And fifth, rather than insisting that "Indigenous" classifications are
nonracial, litigants could challenge the Court's restrictive understanding of race
and remedies, trying in the process to reshape civil-rights law.
Each of these approaches has potential benefits and harms, further explored
below. In many instances, adopting a particular approach might benefit the primary litigant group in the short term, but harm that group or a broader group
in the long term. Ultimately, this Article recommends a combination of strategies
in which individual litigants remain free to adopt whatever approach seems most
likely to benefit them in the short term while trying to minimize the harm they
visit on other groups or on the long-term development of law. Because non-Indian Indigenous peoples are often overlooked, academics and policy makers
should take special care to consider how various doctrinal frameworks may impact them. The experience of Indigenous Pacific Islanders demonstrates why it
is essential to strategize collectively in this manner.
Advocates should work across doctrinal divisions to identify common harms
and interests among groups. In the same way that opponents of affirmative action and Black voting rights have calculated that weakened protections for Indigenous peoples will lead to weaker protections for others, those invested in
resisting subordination must recognize that protecting Indigenous Pacific Islander rights will change legal doctrine in a way that may benefit other groups
as well. This method for achieving justice is an important feature of critical race
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theory, 382 Black feminist theory,383 and deconstructionist philosophy. 384 Applied
here, the task of protecting Indigenous Pacific Islander rights invites a reimagination of categories and rules so that law might become more just. The longterm goal, then, is to reshape Federal Indian law, the law of the territories, and
race law in a way that minimizes the harm to all Indigenous peoples and to other
people of color.
A. Accept and Distinguish
In individual cases, the easiest approach - and, in the lower courts, often the
only one available -is to accept the legal framework given and distinguish. This
strategy can be powerful. Indeed, advocates have successfully used this strategy
to defend against equal-protection-based attacks on Indian tribal rights. Brackeen is the most recent example. ICWA's defenders successfully argued that the
district court's invocation of Rice was sloppy and failed to recognize that ICWA's
"Indian child" designation looks more like Mancari'scitizenship rule and less like
Rice's ancestry rule. 38 s As the court of appeals recognized, this provision is relatively easy to defend as a citizenship rule. 386 To the extent that it invokes ancestry, it only looks back a single generation, and it arguably does so only because

382. E.g., Mari J. Matsuda, Looking to the Bottom: CriticalLegal Studies and Reparations, 22 HARV.
C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 323, 325 (1987) ("When notions of right and wrong, justice and injustice,
are examined not from an abstract position but from the position of groups who have suffered
through history, moral relativism recedes and identifiable normative priorities emerge.");
Kimberle Crenshaw, Demarginalizingthe Intersection ofRace and Sex: A Black Feminist Critique
ofAntidiscriminationDoctrine,Feminist Theory andAntiracistPolitics, 1989 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 139,
167 (" [P]lacing those who currently are marginalized in the center is the most effective way
to resist efforts to compartmentalize experiences and undermine potential collective action.").
383. E.g., BELL HOOKS, FEMINIST THEORY FROM MARGIN TO CENTER 16 (2d ed. 2000) ("It is essen-

tial for continued feminist struggle that black women recognize the special vantage point our
marginality gives us and make use of this perspective to criticize the dominant racist, classist,
sexist hegemony as well as to envision and create a counter-hegemony."); see also Crenshaw,
supra note 382, at 153-54 (describing how Black feminists used their own experiences to reveal
the limitations of identity categories in political movements and applying those insights to

law).
384. See generally JACQUES DERRIDA, WRITING AND DIFFERENCE 278-93 (Alan Bass trans., 1978)

(1967) (critiquing the notion of a center); Michel Foucault, The Subject andPower, 8 CRITICAL
INQUIRY 777, 789 (1984) (emphasizing the importance of the "the other" in analyses of
power).
385. Federal Appellants' En Banc Brief at 24-32, Brackeen v. Haaland, 994 F. 3d 249 ( 5 th Cir. 2021)
(18-11479), 2019 WL 6699234
386. Brackeen, 994 F. 3d 249.
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tribal citizenship is typically not automatic. 387 Congress recognized that requiring children to be enrolled before the law applied to them would likely defeat the
law's purpose with regard to very young children living away from their tribal
communities.38'
Even if there is room to defend protections for non-Indian Indigenous peoples with this approach, distinguishing has been less effective in the Pacific Islander cases. In the CNMI case, the NMI government distinguished the "Northern Marianas descent" classification from the "Hawaiian" classification by
pointing out that it was created by the agreement that solidified CNMI's status
as a Commonwealth. 389 As a federally created classification related to a quasisovereign entity, the government argued, it is distinguishable from the statecreated category at issue in Rice, making the Mancariframework more appropriate. In the Guam plebiscite case, international recognition of decolonization
rights provides a basis for identifying a group of people based on the date of
colonization that was not present at all in Guinn and did not carry the same significance in Rice.390 Guam's unique status under international law also helped
distinguish the case from CNMI. As a non-self-governing territory, Guam's right
to political self-determination is recognized by international law. 39' The vote in
Guam directly implicated this right, which was not at issue in the CNMI case. 392
In each case, however, the court interpreted the rule of Rice to cover these potentially distinguishable scenarios.
This outcome may be partially attributable to the lack of broad-based support for the defendants in the territorial cases. When faced with a campaign to

387. See id. at 340.
388. Id.
389. See Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 16-17, Davis v. Commonwealth Election Comm'n, 844

F. 3d 1087 (2016) (No. 16-1437) (distinguishing the situation of Hawaiians from that of CNMI
residents); id. at 14-15 (explaining why Mancari should be extended to cover the case of
CNMI).
390. Opening Brief of Defendants-Appellants at 23, Davis v. Guam Election Comm'n, 9 3 2 F.3 d 822
(2019) (No. 17-15719), 2017 WL 4157072 (arguing that the historical date used to establish
ancestry in Davis has political significance because it refers to the "inalienable right to selfdetermination" enshrined in Guam's Organic Act).
391.

Id. at 22.

392. CNMI had arguably already exercised its right to self-determination when it negotiated with
the United States for commonwealth status. See Joseph E. Horey, The Right of Self-Government
in the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands, 4 AsIAN PAc. L. & PoL'Y J. 181, 187-90
(2003).
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expand the Rice rule to encompass the Court's broadest and most damaging suggestions, 393 successfully distinguishing new cases in court requires a coordinated
effort. For example, when the en banc Fifth Circuit considered Brackeen, 486
tribes, 59 tribal organizations, 26 states, the District of Columbia, 77 federal legislators, 31 leading child-welfare organizations, and 3 groups of legal academics
filed amicus briefs defending the law,394 and every brief that addressed the constitutional dimension argued that Mancari, not Rice, was the applicable precedent. 395 In contrast, the territorial cases went almost unnoticed. A total of four
amicus briefs were filed in either case, and certainly none by Indian law advocates.396 Neither Guam nor CNMI had the coalition of allies necessary to convince the court that the voting classifications should be saved.
Distinguishing the constitutional status of Indian tribes from that of other
groups is historically and doctrinally accurate. 397 It has allowed courts to incorporate a fuller understanding of the unique harms suffered by Indigenous peoples and recognize both tribes' continuing sovereignty and the United States's
commitment to upholding it as expressed in treaties, promises, and negotiations.
For those who fit easily into the "Indian" category, this is arguably the best strategy for preserving rights. However, Rice and subsequent tribal-jurisdiction cases
have narrowed the "Indian" category to the extent that anything short of con-

393. See supra notes 268-271, 285-291, 303-304, 320 and accompanying text (describing the briefs,

strategy, and individuals and organizations involved in the Guam and CNMI lawsuits); see
also Serrano, supra note 170, at 502 & n.4 (describing "anti-affirmative action and conservative
election attorneys" involved in the Guam plebiscite case).
394.

Brackeen v. Haaland (5th Circuit and Lower Courts), NATIVE AM. RTS. FUND (2021), https://
sct.narf.org/caseindexes/brackeenv_bernhardt_lower_courts.html
/37HG-7C6X].

[https://perma.cc

395. See, e.g., Brief of Amicus Curiae 486 Federally Recognized Tribes, Association on American

Indian Affairs, National Congress of American Indians, National Indian Child Welfare Association, and Other Indian Organizations in Support of Appellants and Reversal at 18-22,
Brackeen v. Haaland, 9 9 4 F-3 d 249 (5th Cir. 2021) (No. 18-11479), 2019 WL 7376824; En Banc
Brief of Members of Congress as Amici Curiae in Support of Defendants-Appellants and Reversal at 13, Brackeen, 994 F-3 d 249 (No. 18-11479), 2019 WL 7046960; Brief of Indian Law
Scholars as Amici Curiae in Support of Defendants-Appellants at 22, Brackeen, 994 F-3d 249
(No. 18-11479), 2019 WL 7046961.

396. See supra Sections ILC-ILD (describing the briefs filed in each case).
397. See Gregory Ablavsky, Beyond the Indian Commerce Clause, 124 YALE L.J.

1012, 1039-49 (2015)
(identifying various sources of federal power over Indian affairs that predate the Reconstruction Amendments); Carole Goldberg, supra note 1o8, at 955-73 (articulating three approaches
for upholding "Indian" classifications).
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sent-based citizenship in a federally acknowledged tribe may be outside its protections. 398 More to the point, it is unclear whether a strategy that focuses on
distinguishing Indian tribes and Federal Indian law could possibly encompass
Indigenous Pacific Islanders after the cases discussed in Part II. This strategy
does not help anyone (Indigenous or otherwise) left outside the "Indian" category. It could also harm them because positioning Indianness against race reinforces the Court's colorblind race jurisprudence, described in Section III.B, helping to excise any protection of collective identity and rights from race law.

B. Repurpose the Insular Cases
The Ninth Circuit has, in the past, upheld a law that treated Indigenous residents of the territories differently from non-Indigenous residents. In Wabol v.
Villacrusis,399 the Court considered a challenge to Article XII of the NMI Constitution. Article XII implements Section 805 of the Covenant to Establish a Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands in Political Union with the United
States of America, which requires CNMI to limit "long-term interests" in land
to persons of Northern Marianas descent. 400 Article XII provides that "acquisition of permanent and long-term interests in real property within the Commonwealth shall be restricted to persons of Northern Marianas descent."4 1 The Constitution initially defined long-term interests as any lease over forty years,
including renewal rights, but it was amended in 1985 to cover leases longer than
fifty-five years and to allow people not of Northern Marianas descent to acquire
long-term interests in condominiums above the first floor.4 0 2 The Wabol case
arose out of an effort to void a thirty-year renewable lease held by Philippine
Goods, Inc., a corporation that did not fit within the Constitution's definition of
corporations of Northern Marianas descent. 40 3 The challengers argued that the

398. See Rolnick, The Promise of Mancari, supra note 17, at 1015-25 (describing how tribal jurisdiction cases have further narrowed Indianness to reflect only a consent-based model of citizen-

ship).
399. 958 F.2d 1450 ( 9 th Cir. 1990), cert. denied sub nom. Philippine Goods, Inc. v. Wabol, 113

S.

Ct.

675 (1992).

400. Torres, supra note 254, at 162-63, 176; Act of Mar. 24, 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-241,
263, 275 (codified at 48 U.S.C. S 1801 (2018)).
401. N. MAR. I. CONST.

art. XII, §

402. N. MAR. I. CONST. art. XII,

§

S 805, 90 Stat.

1.

3 (amended 1985).

403. The Constitution defines persons of Northern Marianas descent as "a person who is a citizen
or national of the United States and who has at least some degree of Northern Marianas
Chamorro or Northern Marianas Carolinian blood or a combination thereof." N. MAR. I.
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provision violated the Fourteenth Amendment by conditioning property rights
on a racial classification. 40 4
The Court of Appeals rejected the challenge, holding that Congress had the
power to waive certain equal-protection constraints and it had done so in enacting the Covenant.405 Neither the court nor the litigants advanced the argument
that Hawaii would eventually make in Rice would eventually make: that such
classifications are governed by Mancari's legal framework. Instead, CNMI argued that in the territories, such a restriction on land ownership was not inconsistent with the Fourteenth Amendment because the Amendment protects only
fundamental rights whose enforcement would not be "impractical and anomalous" in light of local social and cultural conditions. 406
This argument draws on the Insular Cases, a series of cases in which the Supreme Court selectively incorporated U.S. constitutional provisions into the unincorporated territories. 40 7 According to this doctrine, only "fundamental" constitutional rights apply in the territories, 408 and the question of whether a
particular right is fundamental must be answered with an eye to local context

CONST. art. XII, S 4. A corporation meets this definition only if "it is incorporated in the Commonwealth, has its principal place of business in the Commonwealth, has directors one-hundred percent of whom are persons of Northern Marianas descent and has voting
shares ... one-hundred percent of which are actually owned by persons of Northern Marianas descent." N. MAR. I. CONST. art. XII, § 4. Only fifty percent of the stock in Philippine
Goods, Inc. was held by persons of NMI descent and only one of its three directors was a
person of NMI descent. Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 4, Wabol v. Villacrusis, No. 92-255
(U.S. Aug. 7, 1992).
404. Wabol, 958 F.2d at 1451; see also Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, supra note 403.
40s. Wabol, 958 F.2d at 1461-62.
406.

See id. at 1461-62.

407. Compare Balzac v. Porto Rico, 258 U.S. 298 (1922) (holding that the Sixth Amendment right
to a jury trial did not apply in Puerto Rico), with Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349 (1910)
(holding that Eighth Amendment protections against cruel and unusual punishment applied

in the Philippines).
408. Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244, 285-87 (1901) (holding that Congress's power with respect

to unincorporated territories is not limited by the Constitution); id. at 291 (White, J., concurring) (arguing that certain "fundamental" restrictions may nevertheless constrain Congress);
Hawaii v. Mankichi, 190 U.S. 197, 201 (1903); Dorr v. United States, 195 U.S. 138, 144, 148
(1904); Balzac, 258 U.S. at 312. "Fundamental" in the territories is not the same as "fundamental" in the states. Whereas rights apply to the states if they are "necessary to an AngloAmerican regime of ordered liberty," Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 149-50 n.14 (1968),
personal rights are "fundamental" in the territories only if they are "the basis of all free government," CNMI v. Atalig, 723 F.2d 682, 69o ( 9 th Cit. 1984) (quoting Dorr v. United States,
195 U.S. 138, 147 (1904)); see also Wabol, 958 F.2d at 146o (contrasting the two approaches).
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and practical effect. 409 The Ninth Circuit held that "the right of equal access to
long-term interests in Commonwealth real estate" was not fundamental and Article XII could not be challenged as a violation of equal protection.410
Territorial scholars are almost uniformly critical of the Insular Cases and the
selective-incorporation doctrine." One criticism centers on the cases' constitutionality: scholars argue that the Constitution does not permit Congress to administer permanent territories not destined for statehood. 1 2 Another criticism
is outcome focused: if the Constitution permits residents of unincorporated
American territories to have fewer personal rights than other Americans, the
Court is effectively embracing a form of second-class citizenship that was rejected with the passage of the Fourteenth Amendment. 413 For example, the
Court has held that defendants being tried in Puerto Rico's local courts do not
have the same right to a jury trial that the Sixth Amendment guarantees to state
and federal-court defendants.414 This criticism is usually framed as a racial problem: the doctrine was developed at the height of U.S. empire and reflects racially
coded ideas of conquest and domination.415 These scholars argue that using the

409. King v. Morton, 520 F.2d 1140, 1147-48 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (remanding to the district court for
consideration of whether the Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial is fundamental in American Samoa).
410. Wabol, 958 E2d at 1460, 1462.
411.

See generally RECONSIDERING THE INSULAR CASES: THE PAST AND FUTURE OF AMERICAN EMPIRE (Gerald L. Neuman & Tomiko Brown-Nagin eds., 2015) (criticizing the Insular Cases as
being based on outdated ideas about racial superiority and U.S. empire); Juan R. Torruella,
RulingAmerica's Colonies: The Insular Cases, 32 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 57 (2013) (analyzing the
constitutional validity of the colonial relationship between the United States and Puerto Rico
and concluding that the colonial regime has, from the start, contravened the Constitution);
see also H.R. 279, 117 th Cong. (introduced Mar. 6, 2021) (resolution introduced by Rep. Grijalva stating that the Insular Cases and the territorial incorporation doctrine "rest on racist
views and stereotypes" and "should be rejected as having no place in U.S. constitutional law").

412. Torruella, supra note 411, at 67.
413. See, e.g., Adriel L Cepeda Derieux & Neil C. Weare, After Aurelius: What Futurefor the Insular
Cases?, 130 YALE L.J.F. 284, 286 (2020) (" [L]ower courts continue to rely on the Insular Cases
to deprive residents of U.S. territories of rights and constitutional safeguards they almost
surely enjoy . .. [and the cases] . . . also continue to implicitly serve as a basis for Congress to
maintain discriminatory laws that treat residents of the territories as second-class citizens,
much as Plessy did for laws that discriminated against Blacks.").
414. Balzac v. Porto Rico, 258 U.S. 298, 310-11 (1922).
415. See ERMAN, supra

note

36,

at

161; KAL RAUSTIALA, DOES THE CONSTITUTION FOLLOW THE

FLAG? THE EVOLUTION OF TERRITORIALITY IN AMERICAN LAW (2009); Neil Weare, Why the

Insular Cases Must Become the Next Plessy, HARV. L. REV. BLOG (Mar. 28, 2018), https://blog
.harvardlawreview.org/why-the-insular-cases-must-become-the-next-plessy
[https://
perma.cc/5N47-N5VM].
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InsularCases as positive precedent thus means accepting and advancing the racial
and citizenship-based hierarchy encoded in them.4 16
Indeed, Justice Gorsuch recently called on the Court to overrule them, declaring, "The Insular Cases have no foundation in the Constitution and rest instead on racial stereotypes. They deserve no place in our law."4" As if responding
to Gorsuch's request for a suitable case, the plaintiffs in Fitisemanu v. United
States - a case challenging the designation of American Samoans as nationals instead of citizens - filed a petition for a writ of certiorari six days later, explicitly
asking the Court to overrule the Insular Cases.418 Those in favor of overruling the
Insular Cases argue that they are inconsistent with the Constitution's text and
original meaning, and that they are rooted in racist, imperialist justifications for
U.S. expansion.4'
If one focuses only on territorial status without regard to indigeneity, the
InsularCases are a net negative: they have resulted in weaker protections for residents. This view argues that residents of the territories are disadvantaged vis-avis other Americans because they lack full citizenship, either formally42 o or because their formal citizenship comes with a different set of constitutional rights.
These criticisms, while important, insufficiently consider the reality of Indigenous rights, which have long been seen as conflicting with U.S. courts' formulation of equality. Because of Indigenous vulnerability to reverse-discrimination
claims, weaker Fifth/Fourteenth Amendment protections actually translate into
stronger protections for land and self-determination. 421 Indeed, at least one
scholar has suggested that the court in the CNMI case would have reached an
outcome more protective of Indigenous rights if it had applied the Insular Cases'
"fundamental" and "impractical and anomalous" standard.4 22
The idea that the Insular Cases could be useful for Indigenous peoples is exemplified in Wabol. There, the selective-incorporation doctrine permitted the

416. See Derieux & Weare, supra note 413, at 289; Torruella, supra note 411, at 68-71.
417. United States v. Vaello Madero, No. 20-303, slip op. at 1 (2022) (Gorsuch,

J., concurring).

418. Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at 13-14, Fitisemanu v. United States, Nos. 20-4017, 20-4019
(U.S. Apr. 27, 2022).
419. Vaello Madero, slip. op. at 2-4, 5-7 (Gorsuch,
supra note 418, at 14-19, 25.

J., concurring);

Petition for a Writ of Certiorari,

420. See Rose Cuison Villazor, American Nationals and Interstitial Citizenship, 85 FORDHAM L. REV.

1673, 1675-76, 1711 (2017).
421. See Tapu, supra note 267, at 67 ("American Samoans and other Indigenous peoples of the
territories, however, must unfortunately rely upon the Insular Cases as a means to protect any
vestiges of self-determination.").

&

422. See Jose P. Mafnas Jr., Applying the InsularCases to the Case ofDavis v. Commonwealth Election
Commission: The Power of the Covenant and the Alternative Result, 22 U.C. DAV1s J. INT'L L.
POL'Y 105, 136-37 (2016).
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court to consider the material effects of colonization and the local realities affecting Indigenous residents of CNMI. Specifically, the court acknowledged the importance of land to Indigenous peoples, the potential devastation of land loss,
and the importance of Article XII in preventing it. 42 3
The Insular Cases, then, provided an opening for the Ninth Circuit to apply
an antisubordination vision of equality that has been suffocated in mainstream
equal-protection jurisprudence. As Rose Cuison Villazor has argued, the court
was able to protect cultural distinctiveness in Wabol.424 I argue, as Villazor does
in an earlier article, that Wabol protected political rights and identity, not just
cultural distinctiveness.4 2 To the extent that they acknowledge Indigenous
rights at all, calls to overrule the Insular Cases dismiss the political significance of
those rights, describing them instead as efforts to "safeguard[] traditional cultures."426 Framing Indigenous rights in the territories as a matter of "diverse cultural practices" can make the consequences of losing these rights easier to dismiss. 427 Underneath this cultural framing, however, Indigenous political rights
and identity are at stake.
The Wabol court's interpretation of equality makes space for the protection
of group rights and appreciates the devastation wrought by colonization. It
acknowledges that protection of Indigenous group rights was a political imperative for the United States in order to negotiate and ratify its agreements with
territories like CNMI. 428 Going further, Wabol's interpretation of the Insular
Cases underscores the importance of nonincorporation to Indigenous communi-

423. Wabol v. Villacrusis, 958 E2d 145o, 1452, 1458 ( 9 th Cir. 1990).
424. Villazor, supra note 3, at 139.
425. Villazor has advocated for a concept called "political indigeneity" that would transcend the
race-versus-political paradigm of equal-protection cases. Villazor, supra note 131, at 807.
426. Vaello Madero, slip. op. at 9, n.4 (Gorsuch, J., concurring) ("[R]ecent attempts to repurpose
the Insular Cases merely drape the worst of their logic in new garb.. .. Our government may
not deny constitutionally protected individual rights out of (purportedly) benign neglect any
more than it may out of animus.").
427. See Christina Duffy Ponsa-Kraus, The Insular Cases Run Amok: Against Constitutional Exceptionalism in the Territories, 131 YALE L.J. 2449, 2459 (2022) ("[E]ven if one believes, as the advocates of repurposing do, that it would be tragic not to find a way to accommodate cultural
practices in the U.S. territories, those ends cannot justify their doctrinal means, because the
cost of resorting to such means is the perpetuation of a system of permanent colonies. In my
view, even if certain diverse cultural practices in the territories cannot be reconciled with the
Constitution, this fact would not justify the repurposing of the InsularCases.").
428. Wabol, 958 E2d at 1458-59.
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ties. Some residents of the territories, particularly Indigenous residents, have rejected calls for full citizenship. 429 This challenges the orthodox view that equality
must mean full citizenship 430 and raises the possibility that incorporation can
sometimes mean annihilation.41 The Wabol court stated:
For the NMI people, the equalization of access would be a hollow victory
if it led to the loss of their land, their cultural and social identity, and the
benefits of United States sovereignty. It would truly be anomalous to
construe the Equal Protection Clause to force the United States to break
its pledge to preserve and protect NMI culture and property. The Bill of
Rights was not intended to interfere with the performance of our international obligations. Nor was it intended to operate as a genocide pact
for diverse native cultures. Its bold purpose was to protect minority
rights, not to enforce homogeneity. Where land is so scarce, so precious,
and so vulnerable to economic predation, it is understandable that the
islanders' vision does not precisely coincide with mainland attitudes toward property and our commitment to the ideal of equal opportunity in
its acquisition.43 2
This critique of incorporation as the best way to protect minority rights has
been adopted to some degree in Federal Indian law. Courts and scholars

429. For a careful history of U.S. citizenship as a tool of oppression for American Indians, see Robert B. Porter, The Demise of the Ongwehoweh and the Rise of the Native Americans: Redressing the
Genocidal Act of ForcingAmerican Citizenship upon Indigenous Peoples, 15 HARV. BLACKLETTER
L.J. 107 (1999).
430. See Rose Cuison Villazor, Rejecting Citizenship, 120 MICH. L. REV. 1033 (2022) (reviewing
MING CHEN, PURSUING CITIZENSHIP IN THE ENFORCEMENT ERA (2020)).
431. See JULIAN AGUON, THE PROPERTIES OF PERPETUAL LIGHT 65 (2021) (arguing that the Insular

Cases "contemplate the ability of unincorporated territories to 'breakout' of the Union"); Sina
Najafi & Christina Duffy Burnett [Ponsa-Kraus], Islands and the Law: An Interview with Christina Duffy Burnett, CABINET (Summer 2010), https://www.cabinetmagazine.org/issues/38
/najafiburnett.php [https://perma.cc/GK5-E36S] ("At its heart, the distinction between
incorporated and unincorporated territories was a distinction between permanence and fungibility. The insular cases in effect smuggled a theory of secession into American law.").
432. Wabol, 958 F.2d at 1462 (footnote omitted) (citation omitted) (citing Stanley K. Laughlin, Jr.,
The Application of the Constitution in United States Territories: American Samoa, a Case Study, 2
U. HAw. L. REv. 337, 386 (1980)). The American Samoan high court also upheld an ancestrybased land ownership restriction. Craddick v. TerritorialRegistrar, 1Am. Samoa 2d 10 (1980),
https://new.asbar.org/case-law/lasr2dlo/ [https://perma.cc/9HJ3-8Y5A]. The court held
that due-process / equal-protection guarantees were fundamental and applied in the territories, and it further held that Samoan land laws were race-based. However, given the importance of land and the potential harm of land loss, the court concluded that the government
had a compelling interest in "preserving the lands of American Samoa for Samoans and in
preserving the Fa'a Samoa, or Samoan culture." Id. at 12.
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acknowledge that U.S. citizenship was unilaterally bestowed on Indians in part
to support the federal government's goal of forced assimilation.433
The same can be argued about the territories. It is true that the Court was
more willing to tolerate indefinite unresolved political status in territories filled
with non-White people.434 But by likening the InsularCases to Dred Scott v. Sandford and Plessy v. Ferguson,43 s proponents of incorporation draw a parallel between the territories' particular mechanisms of subordination and Black subordination, positioning citizenship and full incorporation as the solution to both.
On the other hand, acknowledging that many territorial residents are not just
non-White but also Indigenous suggests that a better parallel might be to the
particular mechanisms of Indian subordination, including forced citizenship.
While cases like Tuaua v. United States436 and the movement for Puerto Rican statehood may seem to suggest that full incorporation (via citizenship or
statehood) would help address territorial inequality, the position of Indigenous
peoples in the territories demonstrates how full incorporation can be harmful to

433. See, e.g., Indian Country USA, Inc. v. Okla. Tax Comm'n, 829 E2d 967, 980 n.6 (loth Cir.
1987) (describing the historical link between citizenship assimilation, and the effort by settlers
to obtain title to Indian lands); Bethany R. Berger, BirthrightCitizenship on Trial: Elk v. Wilkins and United States v. Wong Kim Ark, 37 CARDozo L. REv. 1185, 1197-1201 (2016); Michael
D. Oeser, Tribal Citizen Participationin State and NationalPolitics: Welcome Wagon or Trojan
Horse?, 36 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 793, 803-04 (2010); Willard Hughes, Citizenshipand Suffrage: The Native American Strugglefor Civil Rights in the American West, 5 NEV. L.J. 126, 12930 (2004). See generally Kevin Bruyneel, ChallengingAmerican Boundaries: Indigenous People
and the "Gift" of U.S. Citizenship, 18 STUD. AM. POE. DEV. 30 (2004) (noting that Indigenous
people did not view their collective naturalization as unambiguously positive); Frederick
Hoxie, What Was Taney Thinking: American Indian Citizenship in the Era of Dred Scott, 82
CHI.-KENT L. REV. 329, 339-40 (2007) (describing earlier American support for Indian citizenship as linked to removal efforts).

See LAURA

434.

E. G6MEZ, MANIFEST DESTINIES: THE MAKING OF THE MEXICAN AMERICAN RACE

188-89 (2d ed. 2018) (2007) (recounting how opposition to New Mexican statehood was tied
to the argument that certain races were unfit for self-government and linking it to support for
strong colonial government in the Philippines); see also Downes, 182 U.S. at 282 ("It is obvious
that in the annexation of outlying and distant possessions grave questions will arise from differences of race, habits, laws, and customs of the people, and from differences of soil, climate,
and production, which may require action on the part of Congress that would be quite unnecessary in the annexation of contiguous territory inhabited only by people of the same race,
or by scattered bodies of native Indians.").
435. See, e.g., Ponsa-Kraus, supra note 427, at 2459 ("[A]rguing that we need to repurpose the Insular Cases to accommodate culture is like arguing that we need to repurpose Plessy v. Ferguson
to accommodate benign racial classifications.").
436. 788 F.3 d 300 (D.C. Cir. 2015); see also Brief of Citizenship Scholars as Amici Curiae in Support
of Appellants and Urging Reversal at 9-12, Tuaua v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 2461 (2016)
(mem.) (No. 13-5272) (juxtaposing the jus soli doctrine against race-based exceptions to it and
emphasizing that the rejection of these exceptions facilitated racial equality).
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them-and potentially to all residents of the territories. 437 The Fitisemanu petition dismisses the argument, important to the majority below, that many Samoans do not desire unilateral naturalization.4 38 Instead, the petition emphasizes
inclusion and assimilation, arguing that, "American Samoa's ties to the rest of
the country have strengthened significantly as it has become part of the Nation's
political, economic, and cultural identity."439 It also erases Samoan group political identity. In the absence of American citizenship, the petitioners argue, American Samoans "are citizens of nowhere: American Samoa is not a country, nor

part of any other besides the United States."44o
These arguments attack any attempt to repurpose the Insular Cases as misguided and even legally wrong.441 Of course, litigants regularly repurpose the
Court's precedent, and the meaning of constitutional protections shifts. Indeed, this Article describes a long-term project in which cases interpreting the
Constitution to protect the rights of Black Americans have been repurposed to
protect the rights of White Americans and to undermine Indigenous political
and cultural rights.
Repurposing the Insular Cases has parallels to the way advocates use Federal
Indian law. The doctrinal basis of modern Indian law is the Marshall Trilogy,
three cases in which the U.S. Supreme Court defined the unique status of Indian

.

437. See, e.g., Brief for Intervenors or, in the Alternative, Amici Curiae the American Samoa Government and Congressman Eni F.H. Faleomavaega at 18-30, Tuaua, 136 S. Ct. 246 1 (No. 135272) (opposing unilateral imposition of citizenship and explaining how citizenship could
negatively affect self-determination rights); see also Fitisemanu v. United States, 1 E 4 th, 862
865 (loth Cir. 2021) (noting that American Samoa's "democratically elected representatives .
. remind us that their people have not formed a consensus in favor of American citizenship
and urge us not to impose citizenship on an unwilling people from a courthouse thousands of
miles away"); ERmAN, supra note 36, at 132-34 (explaining how, for some, citizenship in
Puerto Rico signaled permanent inclusion with inferior status and contrasting that with the
Philippines' path to independence); Kauanui, PrecariousPositions, supra note 240, at 15-16
(summarizing arguments that incorporation of Kanaka Maoli via federal acknowledgement
as an Indian tribe would undercut claims to sovereignty and self-determination based in international law); Vezina, supra note 52, at 175 (describing resistance to citizenship in American
Samoa).
438. Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, supra note 418, at 12 (citing Judge Bacharach's assertion that
it "lacks factual support" and that, regardless, the Constitution's application "cannot change
with 'every change in the popular will"').
439.

Id. at 8.

440. Id. at 30.

441. Id. at 31-32 ([I]f the panel majority's decision is allowed to stand, it would set a dangerous
precedent that this Court's decisions are malleable, that they may be 'repurposed' by lower
courts as they see fit, and that lower courts are free to expand the InsularCases to deny American citizens their constitutional rights.").
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tribes under U.S. law.4 4 2 Like the Insular Cases, the Marshall Trilogy can be read
as almost irretrievably racist.443 But Indian tribes and legal advocates have repurposed the doctrine over time to protect Indigenous group rights.444 Less directly, critical race theorists have even employed aspects of Plessy to challenge
modern legal conceptions of race.445
This is not to suggest that the question of whether the Insular Cases are more
harmful than they are helpful is an easy one. Rather, it is worth considering the
issue from multiple angles. Because scholars of territorial law tend to focus on
one category (colonized status) at the expense of others (racialized or Indigenous), criticism of the Insular Cases insufficiently engages with the impact of embracing or rejecting the cases on racialized Indigenous peoples who live there.
Indigenous Pacific Islanders stand to gain the most from repurposing the
Insular Cases. When Congress or the territorial governments act to protect land
and self-determination rights, the selective incorporation doctrine offers a way
to argue that Congress may constitutionally treat the territories differently, just
as it may treat Indian tribes differently under the Indian Commerce Clause and
Mancari.

442.

Johnson v. M'Intosh, 21 U.S. (8. Wheat.) 543 (1823); Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5
Pet.) 1 (1831); Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832).

443.

See, e.g., Adam Crepelle, Lies, Damn Lies, and Federal Indian Law: The Ethics of Citing Racist
Precedent in Contemporary Federal Indian Law, 44 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 529, 541-46
(2021); Robert J. Miller, American Indians, the Doctrine of Discovery, and Manifest Destiny, 11
Wyo. L. REV. 329, 330-31 (2011); Matthew L.M. Fletcher, The Iron Cold of the MarshallTrilogy,
82 N.D. L. REV. 627, 674-76 (2006); Robert A. Williams, Jr., Columbus's Legacy: Law as an
Instrument of Racial DiscriminationAgainst Indigenous Peoples' Rights of Self-Determination, 8
ARIZ. J. INT'L & CoMPAR. L., Fall 1991, at 51, 72-74.

444. E.g., Reid Peyton Chambers, JudicialEnforcement of the FederalResponsibility To Indians, 27
STAN. L. REV. 1213, 1216 -23 (acknowledging that the federal-trust doctrine is rooted in part in
the Marshall Court's characterization of Indians as dependent and in a permanent "state of
pupilage" and offering an alternative vision of the trust responsibility as a federal obligation
to support tribal autonomy); Steele, supra note 71 (employing the concept of federal plenary
power to defend tribal sovereignty and jurisdiction while acknowledging that the cases establishing it were concerned with undermining tribal nationhood); Joseph William Singer, Indian Title: Unravelingthe Racial Context of PropertyRights, or How to Stop Engagingin Conquest,
10 ALBANY Gov'T L. REV. 1, 4 (2017) (arguing that "despite its racist language and its limitations on tribal property rights, the Johnson opinion can be read as protective of both tribal
property rights and sovereignty").
44s. See Cheryl L Harris, Whiteness as Property, 1o6 HARv. L. REV. 1707,1747,1789 (1993) (describ-

ing Plessy as recognizing and protecting a property interest in Whiteness and arguing that
affirmative action programs should be understood as challenging this property interest).
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But this protection comes with the risk that Congress or the territorial government could act to harm Indigenous territorial residents with minimal constitutional checks.446 While Mancari is also a double-edged sword, it does offer
some protection by demanding that "Indian" classifications be "tied rationally to
the fulfillment of Congress' unique obligation toward the Indians."447 The territorial incorporation doctrine is even more forgiving in the sense that once a court
determines that a right is not fundamental, it is not required to balance state
infringement on that right against the asserted reason for doing so. Nonincorporation happened to protect Indigenous rights in Wabol because the right invoked (equal protection) was being used by non-Indigenous residents to further
subordination.448 There is nothing in the selective incorporation doctrine, however, to ensure this result in other contexts. For example, if territorial courts regularly tried and convicted Indigenous residents at high rates in non-jury trials,
any effort to mitigate the damage through jury trials would be a dead end, at
least as a constitutional argument, because the courts have determined that the
right does not even apply. Further, because any holding that a right is not fundamental would apply equally to all residents of the territories, non-Indigenous
residents could be harmed as well.44 Wabol helped the government protect Indigenous interests, but the same approach could leave the government's power
to legislate against Indigenous interests unchecked. For example, Wabol's holding that one aspect of equal protection is not fundamental has been invoked to
limit constitutional protections in other areas. 450

446. See Stephen Carino, True Self-Determination Lies in Sovereignty, SAIPAN TRIB. (May 23, 2018),
https ://www.saipantribune.com/index.php/true-self-determination-lies-in-sovereignty
[https://perma.cc/7F66-PL53] ("The Insular Cases grant the territories as much flexibility as
a leash grants a dog, it can be tightened and pulled back at the whims of its owner, in this
case, Congress.").
447. Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 555 (1974); see also Goldberg, supra note 109, at 263 (pointing
out that the Mancari Court articulated something more exacting than typical rational-basis
scrutiny). But cf Del. Tribal Bus. Comm. v. Weeks, 430 U.S. 73, 8 5 (1977) (applying Mancari
and upholding Congress's decision to exclude some groups from the benefits of a settlement);
United States v. Antelope, 43o U.S. 641, 646-47 (1977) (applying Mancari and upholding the
extension of federal criminal jurisdiction into Indian country in a manner that results in more
severe punishments for Indian people than for similarly situated non-Indians punished under
state law).
448. See Haney-L6pez, supra note 212, at 1784 (explaining how modern equal-protection doctrine
furthers racial subordination).
449. See Duffy Ponsa-Kraus, supranote 427, at 2482-512 (explaining how the InsularCases have hurt
the interests of territorial residents).

Sablan, 95 F. Supp. 2d 1133, 1139-40 (D. N.M.I. 1999) (relying on Wabol
to hold that "one person, one vote" is not fundamental).

4so. Accord Rayphand v.
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The Insular Cases are undeniably racist and extra-textual. But so is this
Court's race jurisprudence. Unless that, too, is re-envisioned, Indigenous peoples in the territories stand to lose an important source of protection against the
existential threat posed by the Court's race cases. The Court - and the advocates
and scholars urging it to rule on the question- must take into account the unique
political status of Indigenous peoples in the territories and grapple with the material effect on those people of any decision to overrule them.
C. Import InternationalLaw
For Indigenous peoples in the territories, international-law principles may
offer another way to protect political, land, and cultural rights. International law
specifically protects cultural distinctiveness, self-determination, and group identity for Indigenous peoples within nation-states. 451 It also recognizes that colonized peoples have a right to political self-determination that encompasses independence, 4s2 an option not aclmowledged for Indigenous peoples within nationstates. 453 Indigenous residents of non-state territories have rights under both regimes. 454 If U.S. courts were to recognize and import international principles,
those principles would supply an alternative doctrinal basis for upholding Indigenous land and self-determination rights in the territories.
Acts of Congress should be construed whenever possible not to violate international law.455 The laws at issue in the CNMI case and in both Guam cases were
creatures of territorial legislatures, but the definitions they employed (NMI descent, Native inhabitant, Native Chamorro) were each traceable to acts of Congress. In the CNMI case, the United States signed a covenant that referred to
"people of Northern Marianas descent."456 In Guam, both the "Native inhabitants" and "Native Chamorro" classifications referred to a class of people granted

451. G.A. Res. 61/295, at 3-4 (Sept. 13, 2007).
452.

G.A. Res. 1514 (XV), at 66-67 (Dec. 14, 1960); International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights arts. 1, 27, Dec. 15, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171.

453.

See Aguon, supra note 182; Daes, supra note 75, at 15-17, 23. But see Lam, Remembering, supra
note 87 (arguing that Indigenous peoples within state borders do have a right to political selfdetermination).

454. Indigenous peoples within states have a less clear claim to the status of colonized peoples, but

the claim has certainly been advanced in the context of Kanaka Maoli. See Aguon, supra note
121, at 385-93.
4ss. See Murray v. Schooner Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64, 81 (1804).
456. See Covenant to Establish a Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands in Political Un-

ion with the United States of America § 8o5(a), 90 Stat. 275 (1976) (approved by 48 U.S.C.
1801); Torres, supra note 254, at 182; Covenant § 805(a).
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citizenship by Congress pursuant to the Guam Organic Act. 4 57 Chamorros and
Carolinians are Indigenous peoples, and Guam and CNMI were both at one
point non-self-governing territories eligible for decolonization rights. 458 Although CNMI is no longer on the U.N. list, the Covenant implements the agreement upon which its current relationship with the United States is based. 459 Applying the Charming Betsy canon, 460 the laws at issue in those cases could be
construed as classifications based on international concepts of indigeneity or colonization, not as racial classifications, in order to avoid an interpretation that pits
international obligations against U.S. constitutional commands.
Even if courts were to treat the classifications in these cases as racial ones, the
United States arguably has a compelling interest in upholding its obligations
under international law toward Indigenous and colonized peoples. To survive
strict-scrutiny analysis the classifications must still be narrowly tailored, but as
described in Parts I and III, ancestry may be a necessary proxy for identifying
present-day Indigenous and colonized peoples in the absence of formal rules of
group membership. As the Guam cases demonstrate, the U.S. government has
struggled to find a way to define the class of colonized peoples without using
terms that invoke either race or ancestry, and any category that includes all present-day residents of U.S. territories would allow postcolonization immigration
to dilute or overpower the interests of those groups who experienced colonization.461
Drawing on international law would benefit Indigenous peoples in the territories by centering indigeneity and colonized status, two categories that have
limited or no significance in U.S. law. Instead of having to liken their situations

457. See Torres, supra note 254, at 187. Congress used the term "Native inhabitants" in its commit-

tee report. H.R. Rep. No. 81-1677 (1950), reprintedin 1950 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2840, 1950 WL 1716.
458.

459.

460.

Hawaii was too, but the designation was revoked before any bilateral negotiation took place,
a historical fact that remains a site of contestation today. Ramon Lopez-Reyes, The Re-Inscription of Hawaii on the United Nations'List of Non-Self-Governing Territories, 28 PEAcE RSCH. 71,
71 (1996).
Non-Self-Governing Territories,supra note n5. Exclusion from this list does not mean they are
not entitled to any protections. Rather, they are viewed as having exercised their self-determination rights via the Covenant, and the Covenant therefore governs the terms of their relationship and political rights.
The CharmingBetsy canon is a rule that ambiguous statutes should be construed so as not to
conflict with international law. Note, The Charming Betsy Canon, Separation of Powers, and
Customary InternationalLaw, 121 HARv. L. REv. 1215, 1217 (2008).

461. See Torres, supra note 254, at 187; see also supra note 280.
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to those of American Indian tribes, 4 62 Indigenous Hawaiians and Pacific Islanders could more accurately describe their unique political status by invoking
international-law frameworks. 463 Importantly, international-law definitions of
"indigeneity" acknowledge that descent or ancestry is part of what ties presentday Indigenous peoples to those who were colonized in the past. 464 A stronger
focus on international-law concepts like decolonization, peoplehood, self-determination, consultation, and free, prior, and informed consent would also benefit
recognized Indian tribes and their citizens. 465
This approach is imperfect for several reasons. First, U.S. courts often look
to international norms and obligations, but they have stopped short of treating
them as binding rules. 466 Second, both Davis v. Commonwealth Election Commission and Davis v. Guam were decided, like Rice, on Fifteenth Amendment
grounds. While international law may be a compelling interest for equal-protection purposes, the Fifteenth Amendment's prohibition is more direct. Any classification construed as race -based could still violate that Amendment if used in
the context of voting. Third, this approach fails to recognize the common interests of and obligations toward Indian tribes and other Indigenous peoples under
the jurisdiction of the present-day United States. Instead, it treats Indigenous
peoples in the territories as outside the scope of standard American Indian law
doctrine and protected only by international-law norms. As a result, defenses of
the Indian Child Welfare Act would continue to be doctrinally disconnected
from defenses of Indigenous rights in the Pacific Islands even though, as this
Article demonstrates, the litigation attacking each one employs the same strategy
and precedent.

462. There are over Soo federally acknowledged Indian tribes, and each has a different history of
political relations with the United States. Nevertheless, the histories of federally acknowledged tribes in the contiguous United States have certain commonalities that are not shared
by Alaska Native peoples, by Kanaka Maoli, or by Indigenous Pacific Islanders. The framework of Federal Indian law is thus an awkward fit. See Kauanui, PrecariousPositions,supra note
24o, at 14-19.
463. Some scholars have argued in other contexts that the United States should expand its recognition of Indigenous group rights to be more in keeping with international law. See Kristen
A. Carpenter, Sonia K. Katyal & Angela R. Riley, Clarifying CulturalProperty, 17 INT'L J. CULTURAL PROP. 581, 582-84 (2010).
464.

Erica-Irene A. Daes, Standard-SettingActivities: Evolution of Standards Concerningthe Rights of
IndigenousPeople 19-21 (Econ. & Soc. Council, Working Paper, 1996).

465. See Robert A. Williams, Jr., Encounterson the Frontiersof InternationalHuman Rights Law: Redefining the Terms of IndigenousPeoples'Survival in the World, 1990 DuKE L.J. 66o, 699-704; S.
James Anaya & Sergio Puig, Mitigating State Sovereignty: The Duty to Consult with Indigenous
Peoples, 67 UNIv. OF TORONTO L.J. 435, 462-64 (2017).
466. See Rebecca Tsosie, Reconceptualizing Tribal Rights: Can Self-Determination be Actualized
Within the U.S. Constitutional Structure?, 15 LEwis &CLARKL. REv. 923, 948 (2012).
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D. Replace Indianness with Indigeneity
A simple - but practically unlikely- solution would be for the Court to overrule Rice (or reject its reasoning) and expand the Mancari rule to encompass all
classifications that further protections for Indigenous property, self-determination, and self-government. The dissenting Justices in Rice adopted a version of
this approach by reasoning that a classification identifying "Indigenous Hawaiians" was a political classification analogous to "Indian" classifications and therefore covered by the Mancari rule. 467 While the majority's decision to treat the
classification as outside the scope of Indian law may have seemed limited enough
that it would not forbid recognition of indigeneity, hindsight shows that it has
been used to do just that. Because Rice is the only Supreme Court decision addressing the legality of ancestry-based Indigenous classifications, the Court
could simply overrule it or clearly reject its reasoning, allowing lower courts to
engage in more nuanced consideration of whether a given classification involving indigeneity is political. This approach would incorporate Villazor's theory of
political indigeneity into legal doctrine. 468
Of course, the legal category of Indian could also be expanded to include
Indigenous peoples in the territories. Ablavsky has demonstrated that "Indian"
had multiple meanings in constitutional history.469 Taking this history seriously
means that courts should expand, rather than contract, the legal definition of
"Indian." Several Indigenous peoples today that are uncontroversially considered
to be Indians were not always so clearly included. This was especially true as the
U.S. government decided how to interact with Indigenous peoples in territories
that became states after the mid-18oos. In New Mexico, the Court engaged in a
sustained debate about whether Pueblo peoples were legally Indian even though
their cultural and religious practices were different than those of other Indian
groups and their citizenship and property rights under U.S. treaties set them

467. Rice v. Cayetano, 528 U.S. 495, 527-47 (2ooo) (Stevens,
burg, J., dissenting).

J., dissenting); id. at 547-48

(Gins-

468. Villazor, supra note 131, at 833 (applying and examining political indigeneity in the context of
Indigenous property rights).
469. Ablavsky, supranote 57, at 1049-60.

2749

THE YALE LAW JOURNAL

131:2652

2022

apart from other Indian groups.470 Similar questions about Indian status surfaced in the territory of Alaska 471 and resurfaced when Alaska became a state 472
and after passage of the Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act. 473 The legal status
of Alaska's Indigenous communities was not fully resolved until the 199os, when
Congress passed the Federally Recognized Tribes List Act and clarified the status
of the Central Council of the Tlingit and Haida Indians of Alaska.4 4 That these
peoples were eventually included speaks as much to the flexibility of "Indian" as
a legal category as it does to the Court's concern with expanding federal power
and the problem of unresolved aboriginal title in the new territories. 475 Certainly, historical evidence exists that would support redefining Indigenous Pacific Islanders as Indians. 476
A U.S. legal category of "indigeneity" that embraces more than citizens of
federally acknowledged tribes would more closely reflect international-law definitions of "indigeneity." It would also undermine the ancestry-race equivalence
that has characterized subsequent uses of the Rice rule. Susan Serrano has argued
that, for Indigenous peoples, a reparative justice approach requires that ancestry
be delinked from race in constitutional law because delinking would allow courts
to measure and address the harms of colonization. 477 Descent (or ancestry) is
one of the primary means that both American and international bodies have used

470. Compare United States v. Joseph, 94 U.S. 614 (1876) (Pueblos are not Indians) with U.S. v.
Sandoval, 231 U.S. 28 (1913) (Pueblos are Indians); United States v. Candelaria, 271 U.S. 432
(1926).

471. See Sidney Haring, The IncorporationofAlaska Natives UnderAmerican Law: United States and
Tlingit Sovereignty, 1867-1900, 31 ARIZ. L. REv. 279, 283-91 (1989).
472. Robert T. Anderson, Alaska Native Rights, Statehood, and UnfinishedBusiness, 43 TULSA L. REv.
17, 28-31 (2013).
473. Id. at 35-40-

474. Federally Recognized Indian Tribe List Act of 1994, Pub. L. 103-454, 1o8 Stat. 4791. Indeed,
the Court recently interpreted the Indian category expansively to account for the unique legal
status of Alaska Native communities post-ANCSA. See Yellen v. Confederated Tribes of the
Chehalis Rsrv., 141 S. Ct. 2434 (2021) (holding that ANCSA corporations are Indians tribes
for purposes of the Indian Self-Determination and Education Assistance Act and the CARES
Act).
47s. For in-depth discussions of the role of federal authority in the New Mexico cases, see Laura

Gomez,

MANIFEST DESTINIES: THE MAKING OF THE MEXICAN AMERICAN RACE

GERALD TORRES, WHO IS AN INDIAN? : THE
LAW STORIES (Goldberg, et al., eds.) (2014).

(2d

ed. 2018);

STORY OF UNITED STATES V. SANDOVAL, INDIAN

476. See, e.g., Brian Rouleau, MaritimeDestiny as ManifestDestiny: American CommercialExpansionism and the Idea of the Indian, 30 J. EARLY REPUBLIC, 377, 382-88 (2010) (examining maritime
journals classifying indigenous peoples in the Pacific as "Indians").
477.
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to connect present-day peoples to peoples who lived in colonized nations before
settlement. 478
When it is used to identify groups as Indigenous, ancestry serves as a proxy
for historical continuity.47" When used to identify individuals properly associated with those groups, ancestry serves as a proxy for both history and kinship. 480 In both cases, ancestry serves to delineate a group that is legally significant because of its political and historical relationship to the United States. Once
this use of ancestry is highlighted, it is harder for advocates to make the argument that ancestry is always race. As the Ninth Circuit recognized in Davis v.
Guam, ancestry is sometimes a proxy for race, but it isn't always. 481 Courts can
and should engage in a careful inquiry each time about how it is being used.4" 2
Delinking ancestry and race could also have benefits beyond Indigenous
rights. For example, reparations are an attempt at compensating a present-day
group in order to repair a specific historical harm. While many contemporary
conversations about reparations envision them as flowing to a racially identified
group, this approach could potentially present constitutional problems if presented to a court that has adopted a colorblind, anticlassification view.483 The
U.S. government and some states have already provided reparations for racial
harms, but they have typically done so on the basis of ancestry. That is, the class
of people entitled to reparations payments includes those who either directly experienced a particular harm or are descended from ancestors who experienced

478. See supra note 83 and accompanying text; supra note 99-101 and accompanying text.
479. The biological understanding of ancestry does not capture its political function as a proxy for
kinship, group affiliation, and political identity. See In re Estate of Tudela, No. 05-0027-GA,
2009 WL 2461676 (N. Mar. L Commw. Super. Ct. Aug. 7, 2009) (exempting a surviving
spouse who lacked biological NMI ancestry from the land-alienation restriction); see also
Torres, supra note 254, at 177 (making this point).
480. See generally Goldberg, supra note 191 (arguing that descent can be a proxy for kinship); TallBear, supra note 154 (arguing that blood quantum is often used metaphorically as a proxy for
number of relatives or strength of connection).
481. Davis v. Guam, 932 E 3 d 822, 834-35 ( 9 th Cir. 2019).
482. The Davis court nevertheless concluded that ancestry was being used as a proxy for race in

that particular case. See Davis v. Guam, 932 F. 3 d at 825.
483. Whether the group could be identified in the first place would depend on whether remedying
historical harm would count as compelling interest and whether the use of racial criteria was
narrowly tailored. With Rice and Bakke as precedent, both could easily be answered in the
negative.
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the harm. 484 Consider reparations for slavery. While there are compelling arguments for expanding the class of beneficiaries to include all Black Americans today, it would be doctrinally simpler to provide reparations to descendants of enslaved Americans, provided that the Court is willing to differentiate between
ancestry as a proxy for historical connection to a political harm and ancestry as a
proxy for race.485

The language of Mancari notwithstanding, legal recognition of indigeneity
need not entail delineating between racial and non-racial classifications. Rather,
it could acknowledge that racial equality is not inconsistent with the recognition
of Indigenous rights. For example, the Canadian Supreme Court upheld, against
a constitutional challenge, a program in which aboriginal fishers were issued
commercial fishing licenses for a period during which nonaboriginal commercial
fishers were excluded from the fishery. 486 In contrast to the U.S. Supreme
Court's approach in Mancari and Rice, the Canadian court accepted two premises: "[T]he right given by the pilot sales program is limited to Aboriginals and
has a detrimental effect on non-aboriginal commercial fishers who operate in the
same region as the beneficiaries of the program. It is also clear that the disadvantage is related to racial differences." 487 The Canadian court also acknowledged the conflict between formal equality of access to fishing rights and the
pilot program's treatment of aboriginal fishers.488 Nevertheless, it held that the

&

484. See, e.g., Act of Aug. to, 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-383, § 105(a)(7) (providing for payments to
descendants of Japanese American citizens and permanent residents who experienced internment); 1994 Fla. Laws 3296, 3297-98 (authorizing payments to victims of the Rosewood
massacre and creating a scholarship fund for their direct descendants); The U.S. PublicHealth
Service Syphilis Study at Tuskegee: FrequentlyAsked Questions, U.S. CTRS. DISEASE CONTROL
PREVENTION (Apr. 22, 2021), https://www.cdc.gov/tuskegee/faq.htm [https://perma.cc
/9K66-MB7L] (describing settlement authorizing payments to victims of Tuskegee study and
their descendants).

485.

See Soumya Karlamangla, CaliforniaTask Force Votes to Offer ReparationsOnly to Descendantsof
Enslaved People, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 30, 2022), https://www.nytimes.com/2022/03/3o/us/california-reparations.html [https://perma.cc/TX6V-GTT2] (describing arguments against descendant-only reparations, including the fact that the harms set in motion by slavery echoed
far beyond that specific institution); Lil Kalish, California Task Force: Reparationsfor Direct
Descendantsof Enslaved People Only, CALMATTERS.ORG (Mar. 30, 2022), https://calmatters.org
/california-divide/2o22/o3/california-reparations-task-force-eligibility/
[https://perma.cc
/6T3T-EQNH] (summarizing arguments for and against descendant-only reparations and
reporting that Erwin Chemerinsky testified about the possibility of a race-neutral classification based on lineage).

486. R. v. Kapp, 2 S.C.R. 483,496 (2008).

487. Id. at 547
488. Id. at 489. ("There is also a real conflict here, since the right to equality afforded to every

individual under s. 15 is not capable of application consistently with the rights of aboriginal
fishers holding licenses under the pilot sales program.").
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program was constitutional, noting that the protection of group rights and efforts to ameliorate the conditions of a disadvantaged group were not inconsistent
with the idea of equality, even if there appeared to be a facial conflict. 489
E. Acknowledge that Race Is Political
In each of the scenarios described in the previous Sections, fixing one aspect
of Rice's damage requires leaving another untouched and unquestioned. For example, territorial residents who emphasize international rights to decolonize
necessarily imply that Hawaiians, because they are within a state and not on the
U.N. list, do not have the same rights. This argument thus tacitly condones the
illegal U.S. annexation of Hawaii. The fourth scenario -replacing Indianness
with indigeneity- does not require distinguishing among Indigenous peoples
according to who the U.S. government formally acknowledges or who has a better claim to decolonization. However, it would leave untouched Rice's jurisprudential understanding of race. It would thus shield Indigenous peoples from the
bludgeon of the colorblindness, but it would do nothing to contest the flat understanding of race as ahistorical and personal - meaning that Rice could still be
used to stifle the political power and collective voice of non-Indigenous minorities.

Recognition and protection of Indigenous Pacific Islanders' rights poses a
problem under current U.S. constitutional jurisprudence on race for two basic
reasons. First, in the absence of an acknowledged tribal government with a clear
citizenship rule, governments have defined Indigenous Pacific Islanders with reference to descent. Because courts equate ancestry with race, this type of classification runs headlong into the presumption against facial racial classifications.
Second, even if a classification could be drawn that excised ancestry, the Court
has also suggested that any effort to recognize Indigenous peoples as continuing
political entities outside of Federal Indian law could be unconstitutional because

489. The court began its analysis with the Canadian Charter of Rights, which contains two provisions that address the meaning of equality. Section 15(1) prohibits governments from making
"distinctions based on enumerated or analogous grounds that have the effect of perpetuating
disadvantage or prejudice or imposing disadvantage on the basis of stereotyping." Kapp, 2
S.C.R. at 511 (citing Canadian Charterof Rights and Freedoms, s 15, Part 1 of the Constitution
Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act, 1982, c 11 (U.K.)). Section 15(2) protects the
ability of governments to create programs that proactively prevent discrimination. Id. Section 25 of the Charter specifically protects aboriginal rights where application of the Charter
would otherwise impair them. Id. at 520-21 (citing Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms,
s 25, Part 1 of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act, 1982, c 11

(U.K.)).
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such political recognition amounts to a racial purpose.t While this objection is
less clear, it seems that courts may see Indigenous Pacific Islander populations as
racial groups because they have been historically racialized. 1 Any attempt to
imbue them with political significance, then, is suspect because race is not supposed to have political significance under U.S. law.
Race is not the only lens for understanding the experience of Indigenous
peoples in the territories; it may even be the clumsiest framework available.
However, race as it is understood in U.S. constitutional jurisprudence is the most
intractable barrier to protecting Indigenous rights. The litigation campaign described in this Article is a strong indicator that the political right plans to use race
jurisprudence to prevent recognition of Indigenous rights and, in turn, to use
the newly strengthened vision of colorblindness to further chip away at the
rights of non-Indigenous minorities. If this is true, efforts to distinguish or
adopt a different legal framework will always be of limited efficacy. Until U.S.
courts can embrace a thicker conception of racial equality, race jurisprudence will
always render Indigenous rights precarious.
Another strategy for protecting Indigenous rights, then, would be to directly
address the thin, colorblind understanding of race that permeates Fourteenth
and Fifteenth Amendment case law. In this scenario, Federal Indian law could
serve as a model for reenvisioning race law. 9 2 The "Indian" category is a legal
and historical fiction. But it signals the shared experience of colonization, and
the "Indian" legal category reflects, albeit imperfectly, other important presentday ties such as political citizenship, kinship, and culture. A reenvisioned legal
approach to race could acknowledge that race, while a constructed and illegiti-

490. Rice v. Cayetano, 528 U.S. 495, 518 (2000) ("It is a matter of some dispute, for instance,

whether Congress may treat the native Hawaiians as it does the Indian tribes."); id. at 515
("The very object of the statutory definition in question and of its earlier congressional counterpart in the Hawaiian Homes Commission Act is to treat the early Hawaiians as a distinct
people, commanding their own recognition and respect. The State, in enacting the legislation
before us, has used ancestry as a racial definition and for a racial purpose.").
491. See, e.g., Davis v. Guam, No. 11-00035, 2017 WL 930825, at *1 (D. Guam Mar. 8, 2017) (interpreting federal census data to explain that Chamorros were the predominant race living in
Guam in the year 1950); see also Davis v. Commonwealth Election Comm'n, No. 1-14-CV00002, 2014 WL 2111065 (D.N.M.I. May 20, 2014) (decision and order granting in part and
denying in part plaintiff's motion and defendant's cross motion for summary judgment) (taking judicial notice of 195o census data for the CNMI, including population breakdown by
race).
492. See Maggie Blackhawk, Federal IndianLaw as ParadigmWithin PublicLaw, 132 HARV. L. REV.
1787, 1793-1800 (2019).
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mate category, has nevertheless bound groups of people together in shared experience, 493 and its boundaries often track geographic, cultural, and relational
ties that further connect people.
If race were understood in this manner, the argument that Indigenous classifications look like racial classifications would not threaten them. First, the invocation of descent would not transform the classifications into racial ones because race would not be defined solely in terms of ancestry. More importantly,
even if they were understood that way, recognized Indigenous political rights
would not appear to be potential constitutional violations because the law would
recognize that racial classifications could have ongoing political significance. 494
Such a shift would stop a significant source of legal challenges to Indian tribal
rights. It would also permit recognition of Indigenous rights outside the context
of Federal Indian law, whether or not those rights accrue to members of racial
groups.
In practice, this strategy is dangerous. It ties Indian rights, which have
largely survived constitutional attack, to race-conscious remedies, which largely
have not. For this reason, it makes little sense for Indian tribes to pursue it; even
Indigenous residents of the territories, while shut out of Federal Indian law, can
employ the arguments set forth above while steering clear of the conversation
about race. This Article's premise, though, is that the opportunity for Indigenous
Pacific Islanders to make nonracial arguments is rapidly disappearing. Whether
or not Chamorros and Carolinians understand themselves primarily in racial
terms, opponents of Indigenous political and land rights understand them that
way, and, more importantly, they are willing to use that understanding to obtain
land and oppose Indigenous political self-determination.
This result has occurred in large part because advocates have accepted the
doctrinal divisions between Indians, racial groups, and territorial residents, thus
failing to see the link between racialization and colonization and advance arguments that seek to contest the divisions. If race were redefined as a fluid classification that is part of an ongoing process of domination and subordination, the

493. See Seth Davis, The Thirteenth Amendment and Self-Determination, 104 CORNELL L. REV.
ONLINE 88, 90-91 (2019).
494.

Were the Court to adopt this thicker conception of race, it might reconsider its rule that benign classifications are to be strictly scrutinized just like invidious ones. See Addie C. Rolnick,
Rice v. Cayetano Reconsidered, in CRITICAL RACE JUDGMENTS: REWRITTEN U.S. COURT OPINIONS ON RACE AND LAW (Bennett Capers, Devon W. Carbado, R.A. Lenhardt & Angela
Onwuachi-Willig 2022); Devon W. Carbado, Footnote 43: RecoveringJustice Powell'sAnti-PreferenceFramingofAffirmativeAction, 53 U.C. DAVIS L. REv. 1117,1122-27 (2019) (explaining how

recognizing the nonneutrality of merit-based admissions and conceptualizing of affirmative
action as a structural countermeasure would call into question the appropriateness of strict
scrutiny for these programs).
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links between the subordination of various groups could be more clearly elucidated. Such a strategy would better reflect the collective action that has characterized past and present social movements. 4 5
One way to resist the limit of categories without sacrificing the rights that
are protected by current doctrine would be to argue in the alternative. Litigants
seeking to defend against allegations that Indigenous rights are race-based could
primarily rely on existing doctrine. For example, Indian tribes and the federal
government could defend the ICWA on the theory that its "Indian child"
classification turns on citizenship eligibility and it only applies to federally
acknowledged tribes. Similarly, territorial governments and Indigenous Pacific
Islander communities could emphasize their unique territorial status and use
that doctrinal opening to highlight international obligations to colonized and
Indigenous peoples and the United States' acceptance of those obligations in instruments like the Covenant.
In such cases, litigants should explain the political and historical significance
of the classification and importance of the right in question without regard existing doctrinal categories. For example, litigants defending the ICWA could emphasize the historical harm of child loss, its continued effects today, its connection to colonization, and the importance of the ICWA as a reparative measure.
Litigants defending property law regimes in the territories could emphasize the
importance of land to Indigenous peoples, the role of land transfer in colonization, and the material consequences of land loss to Indigenous communities.
These litigants could then briefly set forth an alternative argument about
why the classification should be upheld, even if the Court were to determine it
was race-based. In so doing, these litigants would be acknowledging that the
collective historical harms of child loss and land loss were also racial harms and
could use the lens of indigeneity to more clearly elucidate why a remedy is required. This strategy is important because it leaves room for an understanding
that non-Indigenous entities may have experienced similar historical harms and
may have similar group claims to a remedy. It would create a theoretical opening
to defend group-based remedies for historical harms against non-Indigenous racial minorities in future cases, rather than entrenching the Court's individualized, ahistorical view of race. The goal of this strategy is to use any available tool

495. For example, Kyle Mays highlights the interrelated histories of Black and Indigenous resistance. KYLE T. MAYS, ANAFRO-INDIGENOUS HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES (2021). Robert

Chang and Neil Gotanda emphasize the importance of coalition movements that focus on
White supremacy and point out that this approach requires that minority groups reject the
invitation to be included or protected at the expense of another group. Robert S. Chang and
Neil Gotanda, The Race Questionin Latcrit Theory andAsian AmericanJurisprudence,7 NEV. L.J.
1012,
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to protect the right in question while minimizing potential damage to the rights
of other peoples or groups in future cases.
CONCLUSION

American law mediates the rights of Indigenous peoples, racial minorities,
and colonized peoples through Indian law, race law, and territorial law, respectively. Each of the three areas of law relies on a distinct set of legal categories and
doctrines. They are rarely analyzed together because they appear to be concerned
with fundamentally different rights, issues, and historical processes. This Article
makes the case that they are not so different. Rather, each doctrinal area is an
attempt to mediate through law the relationship between dominant and subordinated groups. At times, the doctrine carves out protections for subordinated
peoples. More often, law functions to further the colonizing project. Within each
area, advocates and scholars have worked to identify the subordinating effects of
specific laws and, with uneven success, to restructure or reenvision those laws to
further antisubordination.
This Article demonstrates that the different doctrinal strands also interact
with each other to narrow the protections offered by each one and undermine
the possibility of collective action. Rice v. Cayetano was a pivotal moment in this
regard: the Court imported race jurisprudence into the area of Indigenous rights,
but it did so by equating the claims of excluded Black people with the claims of
White settlers, rather than with the claims of Indigenous communities. With
this sleight of hand, the majority engaged in a juridical act of colonization, reducing massive historical harms and present day material subordination to "dismay" that is shared equally by everyone, 496 and it used race jurisprudence as the
tool to do so.
The Rice Court borrowed across doctrinal areas in order to narrow the liberatory potential of both areas. This process has culminated in recent cases limiting
Indigenous Pacific Islanders' right to land and self-determination. This Article
highlights the destructive effect of legal categories by focusing on what happens
to people who are left out of all the categories. The fact that the Reconstruction
Amendments now pose a significant threat to domestic protections of Indigenous peoples' land and self-governance rights is a cruel absurdity. But absurdity
results when legal categories are restricted and unmoored from their historical
purposes and material realities.

496. Rice v. Cayetano, 528 U.S. 495, 524 (2000) ("When the culture and way of life of a people are
all but engulfed by a history beyond their control, their sense of loss may extend down
through generations; and their dismay may be shared by many members of the larger commu-

nity."(emphasis added)).
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More importantly, it demonstrates that this process of interdoctrinal borrowing has been used intentionally by advocates on the right for the purpose of attacking Indigenous rights and non-Indigenous racial minority rights. Left unprotected by the doctrine and unexamined in legal scholarship, Indigenous
Pacific Islanders have been a casualty of this project and of the left's failure to
engage in the same kind of interdoctrinal analysis and advocacy. These most recent cases are lesson in the costs of such an approach. While the realities of litigation require different groups to advance arguments to distinguish themselves
from other groups, this defensive posture should not stand in the way of efforts
to reimagine law.
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